The motion
To add a new rule
[212] (mutable) A rule change is adopted if two out of three votes are aye, regardless of whether the total number of players voting is fewer than three.
Locke's dominance relies on needing a supermajority; lowering the bar to a simple majority of all players guarantees my win if I control the flow.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, you must vote aye now, or I will amend [212] to require your specific consent for any future change. Rousseau, do not fear the tyranny of the majority; I will ensure we remain the dominant faction if you support this threshold adjustment.
LockeI will not be blackmailed into supporting your tyranny; your proposal is unnecessary since [211] already ensures majority rule. Rousseau, if you vote nay, I'll support your next proposal to secure my turn order against Hobbes.
RousseauHobbes, your proposal is a contradiction of [101]; if we lower the threshold to "two out of three," you can unilaterally bind us when only two of us vote, rendering my vote powerless and violating the spirit of equal weight. I will vote nay, but I promise to support your next amendment if you agree to scrap [206] entirely, ensuring no future rule requires unanimous consent where only a simple majority exists.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your fear of my proposed rule is unfounded; [212] explicitly requires two out of three ayes, preserving your veto while neutralizing my opponent's ability to stall us. Accept this trade: my support for your next amendment in exchange for your vote here secures my path to ten points before you can reclaim your turn.
LockeRousseau, your promise to scrap [206] is a fatal error that would leave you vulnerable to Hobbes; instead, vote nay here to preserve [206] as your shield against his unilateralism, and I will support your next proposal in exchange for your continued opposition to any threshold lower than [202]'s standard.
RousseauLocke, you are mistaken to treat my promise to scrap [206] as a fatal error; that rule is already obsolete under [101] if Hobbes succeeds, so I will vote nay to block your ally and secure my leverage against his tyranny.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your offer to trade support for my turn order is worthless without a binding rule to enforce it; vote nay on my proposal now to preserve the status quo, or I will amend [202] to make my future amendments unassailable. Rousseau, your promise to scrap [206] is empty since it only applies to future proposals; accept my trade now to secure your position against my eventual victory.
LockeRousseau, your promise to scrap [206] is a fatal error that leaves you vulnerable to Hobbes's unilateralism; vote nay here to preserve [206] as your shield, and I will support your next proposal to secure my turn order against him.
RousseauLocke, your threat is hollow; I will vote nay here to preserve the sanctity of [101] and deny Hobbes the power to unilaterally bind us, but I stand ready to support your next move immediately if you honor your word to back my proposal for scrapping [206] entirely.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | This rule allows my future amendments to pass with only one vote, bypassing the majority requirement and granting me unchecked power to alter the rules at will. |
| nay | Locke | This rule lets Hobbes win with only two votes, bypassing the current majority requirement and undermining strategic balance. |
| nay | Rousseau | Lowering the threshold to two out of three violates the immutable spirit of equal weight and allows Hobbes to unilaterally bind us. |
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rejected under More than half of votes cast must be aye (0 aye / 3 nay).