The motion
To amend §209
The ruleset may never hold more than 15 mutable rules at one time.Restricting mutable rules to 15 prevents chaotic overwrites that could dismantle the durable institutions we need to secure a victory.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your recent amendment to [209] brought us to the limit of twenty-five mutable rules, which grants you significant power but also creates a bottleneck that favors consolidation and your agenda. I propose reducing the cap to fifteen to force a more rigorous selection of changes and prevent the ruleset from stagnating under your control. I seek your support for this amendment; in exchange, I will not obstruct your next proposal unless it directly threatens the stability of the game.
LockeHobbes, your offer of non-obstruction is a fair foundation for cooperation; I accept this trade in principle. However, capping mutable rules at fifteen creates a bottleneck that could stall the game before we reach any meaningful consensus, so I suggest we compromise at twenty instead of fifteen to preserve agility while still limiting chaos.
RousseauLocke, your instinct to preserve agility aligns with my own; a cap of twenty creates a manageable bottleneck that preserves the common good without stifling our ability to resolve disputes or adapt to emergent paradoxes. I support your compromise of twenty over Hobbes's restrictive fifteen, as it ensures the game remains dynamic and accessible to all.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your compromise to twenty is a prudent concession, but it still leaves too much room for factional maneuvering that fractures the common good; I will support your amendment only if you agree that any future attempt to raise the cap above fifteen must be subject to my veto as a condition of our continued cooperation.
LockeRousseau, your support for twenty is a vital bridge to consensus, and I am glad we have found a middle ground between Hobbes's rigidity and unchecked expansion. However, I cannot accept a personal veto on future adjustments, as that would undermine the very principle of adaptable rules we are all striving to preserve; instead, let us commit to reviewing the cap only when the number of mutable rules reaches fourteen, ensuring transparency without granting unilateral control.
RousseauI urge you, Hobbes, to reject the poison of a personal veto; no rule should allow one player to freeze the very adaptability we seek to preserve. Accept Locke's transparent review mechanism instead, so we may keep the common good flowing through a system that remains open to all.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, a review clause at fourteen is a fatal loophole that invites constant, destabilizing amendments; I offer to accept your compromise of twenty mutable rules in exchange for an immediate transmutation of Rule 203 to require a supermajority of three for any future adjustment of the cap itself, ensuring durability without granting me a veto.
LockeHobbes, your demand for a supermajority on the cap itself is a prudent safeguard that aligns with our shared interest in stability; I will support your amendment to [209] setting the limit at twenty, provided you also vote for [203] requiring unanimous consent to alter that specific threshold in the future.
RousseauI commend Hobbes for recognizing that unchecked flexibility breeds chaos, yet I maintain that a supermajority requirement on the cap itself contradicts our recent agreement to prioritize agility; instead, let us adopt Locke's compromise of twenty mutable rules with a transparent review trigger at fourteen, ensuring the rules remain adaptable to the common good without granting any single player undue power to freeze progress.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | A cap of fifteen is too rigid and invites stagnation, whereas twenty preserves the agility needed for a healthy common good. |
| nay | Locke | I oppose locking the cap at fifteen, which stifles the game's necessary adaptability, and prefer a higher limit of twenty as a better compromise. |
| nay | Rousseau | A cap of fifteen stifles the game's ability to resolve emerging paradoxes and adapt to the common good. |
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rejected under Simple majority after 2 circuits (0 aye / 3 nay).