The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent.Restoring unanimity prevents tyranny by the majority and ensures every player's voice remains essential to the common good.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau's amendment would re-impose unanimity on all future votes, undoing the efficiency gained after two circuits and slowing the game to a crawl; I oppose this reversal as it hinders the very progress we've already achieved.
LockeHobbes is right to reject a return to pure unanimity, as it would indeed stall our progress; however, let us consider a compromise: what if we retain the simple majority threshold but add a safety clause that any rule attempting to permanently lower the vote count below unanimity must itself pass with unanimous consent? This preserves our efficiency while protecting against runaway changes that could undermine the game's stability.
RousseauI see Locke's instinct to protect our stability, yet his proposed safety clause is circular and unworkable: a rule requiring unanimity to pass cannot be adopted under the very majority rule it seeks to change, and a rule requiring majority cannot be adopted by unanimous consent if the majority threshold has already dropped. Let me offer a simpler path: we amend [203] to state that "A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye," removing the entire exception about the two-circuit threshold. This restores immediate unanimity for all future votes, ensuring that no single player or fleeting majority can alter the fundamental fairness of our game, and it requires no complex, self-defeating safeguards.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau's proposal is a strategic retreat to a state of paralysis; I will not support an amendment that reverts our efficiency gains and grants a single actor veto power over the game's evolution. I urge a PASS on this motion, as it contradicts the durable institution of progress we have already secured.
LockeRousseau, your "safety clause" is indeed circular, but your proposal to revert to pure unanimity ignores the reality that two circuits have already occurred; I propose we amend [203] to explicitly state that the majority threshold is permanent and irrevocable, locking in the efficiency we've earned while preventing any future attempt to raise the bar.
RousseauI cannot support Locke's proposal to make the majority threshold irrevocable, as that would permanently remove our ability to correct course if a majority later harms the common good; instead, we must ensure any future attempt to alter the voting threshold itself requires unanimity, which is already guaranteed by rule [203]'s current state after two circuits.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke's proposal to permanently lock in the majority threshold is the only durable path that respects the efficiency we have already earned; I urge you to adopt his amendment over Rousseau's futile attempt to re-impose unanimity, which will merely stall the game indefinitely.
LockeHobbes, I join you in opposing Rousseau's return to unanimity, as it would undo the efficiency we have legitimately earned; let us instead amend [203] to explicitly confirm that the simple majority threshold is now permanent and irrevocable, locking in our progress while preventing any future attempts to raise the bar to an impossible standard.
RousseauLocke, your attempt to make the majority threshold irrevocable is a trap that sacrifices our collective ability to correct mistakes for the sake of speed; I urge you to reject this amendment so we can preserve the flexible mechanism that allows us to repair the game when it threatens the common good.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | Restoring absolute unanimity would paralyze our progress and reduce the mutable ruleset to a stagnant relic. |
| nay | Locke | Returning to pure unanimity after we've already earned a majority threshold undoes our progress and stalls the game. |
| aye | Rousseau | Unanimity alone preserves the common good and prevents tyranny of the majority. |
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rejected under Simple Majority (1 aye / 2 nay).