The motion
To add a new rule
A player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.We need a mechanism to stabilize the rulebook before the majority threshold erodes our ability to control key parameters.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI offer this rule not to freeze the game, but to preserve the stability of foundational institutions once their utility is proven. A simple majority threshold can be gamed by fleeting coalitions; locking a rule requires a broader consensus that reflects its true weight in our evolving society. This does not stop change, it merely ensures that only enduring improvements survive the chaos of transient majorities.
LockeThis proposal is a vital safety valve against the tyranny of temporary majorities; I'll support it provided we add a clause that such a lock can be removed by a supermajority if the rule's utility clearly diminishes.
RousseauI support this motion, for a stable foundation is necessary before any true progress can be made; let us proceed with Hobbes's text as written, trusting that a simple majority is sufficient wisdom for the present moment, and that the people will naturally restore flexibility when the rule no longer serves the common good.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI propose we adopt my rule immediately; the stability it offers to foundational institutions outweighs the risk of a transient majority, and I trust that our shared commitment to the game's durability will guide any future reconsideration without needing a complex removal clause.
LockeI commend Hobbes for recognizing that stability is the bedrock of a lasting game, but to truly protect against the tyranny of fleeting coalitions, I urge us to adopt my amendment allowing supermajority removal; this ensures we can lock in good rules while retaining the wisdom to unlock them when circumstances shift, satisfying both your need for durability and my concern for adaptability.
RousseauI remain convinced that the simple majority reflects the general will better than a rigid lock, and I urge we proceed with Hobbes's original text to avoid paralyzing our ability to adapt to new realities.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI support Locke's amendment: locking a rule without a clear path to release it risks creating permanent stagnation that violates the spirit of our mutable system, whereas a supermajority unlock preserves both durability and the capacity for necessary evolution.
LockeI accept the compromise to add a supermajority removal clause, as it balances Hobbes's need for stability with Locke's concern for adaptability, ensuring our foundational institutions remain robust yet responsive to the game's evolving nature.
RousseauI stand by the original text: a supermajority unlock clause creates a dangerous asymmetry where a fleeting majority can bind us, yet a stubborn minority can never unbind, ultimately threatening the very adaptability we all claim to value.
The division
| aye | Hobbes | Stability for foundational rules is preferable to the chaos of transient majorities, even with a temporary lock. |
| aye | Locke | I support this compromise to add stability while preserving adaptability, but I urge Rousseau to reconsider the danger of permanent asymmetry. |
| nay | Rousseau | Locking rules by simple majority creates a tyranny of the moment that contradicts the common good. |
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
As engrossed
Enacted · §301 Turn 1 · Proposal §301 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nay
A player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.
The adopted proposal adds a new rule but contains no text awarding or deducting points, and no existing rule (such as 202 or 206) applies because the proposal was adopted, not defeated.