The motion
To add a new rule
A rule that requires unanimous consent for its own repeal or amendment must be proposed by a player who has not yet voted on the proposal under which it is being repealed or amended.This prevents Hobbes from locking rules permanently after just two circuits by forcing him to wait for his next turn before trying to change the lock.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke's proposal attempts to introduce a procedural delay for unanimous rules, effectively creating a hidden veto power that undermines the certainty of rule stability I sought with 301. I urge the table to reject this unnecessary complication and preserve the clarity of our current framework.
LockeHobbes, I propose we modify my draft to specify that the restriction applies only if the repealing player has already voted "aye" on the original unanimous rule, removing the hidden veto you fear while preserving the stability of our framework.
RousseauI appreciate Locke's concession, but a rule that penalizes those who voted 'aye' for stability while rewarding those who opposed it creates a perverse incentive to sabotage consensus. True stability must come from the rule's inherent strength, not a mechanism that punishes agreement; I urge you to drop this amendment entirely.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your fear of sabotage is unfounded; the amendment only restricts players who already secured the rule's stability, thereby preventing a double-dip where one player blocks both the creation and the removal of a durable institution. I urge the table to reject this flawed amendment now, as it introduces an arbitrary procedural hurdle that weakens the very certainty 301 was designed to guarantee.
LockeI propose we amend the restriction to apply only if the repealing player has explicitly voted 'aye' on the original rule, ensuring that those who built the stability bear the cost of its removal while preventing hidden vetoes. This balances Hobbes's desire for durability with Rousseau's concern for fairness, creating a clear path forward for all.
RousseauI urge the table to reject this amendment, as it transforms a consensus-based lock into a punitive trap that rewards obstructionism; true stability should protect the common good, not penalize those who previously supported it.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your characterization of the amendment as punitive ignores its function as a guardrail against strategic double-crossing; a player who voted aye to establish a lock should not retain the unilateral power to dissolve it before the lock is tested. I urge the table to reject this flawed proposal now, as it introduces an arbitrary procedural hurdle that weakens the very certainty Rule 301 was designed to guarantee.
LockeRousseau, let's pivot: I propose we drop the specific restriction on repealing players entirely and instead require that any motion to repeal a unanimously-adopted lock must be accompanied by a separate, explicit motion to "unlock" the rule, which requires a supermajority vote. This satisfies Hobbes's need for clear stability protocols and Rousseau's desire to prevent punitive traps, while giving us a robust, transparent mechanism to manage rule changes without introducing hidden vetoes.
RousseauI support Locke's pivot to a separate unlocking motion, as it replaces punitive traps with transparent procedures, but I must insist that any such unlock requires only a simple majority to preserve the game's vitality and prevent permanent stagnation.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | This rule creates a paradox by making the proposal itself impossible to enact if the proposer is the one who locked it. |
| aye | Locke | This amendment blocks the double-cross by preventing a player who just locked a rule from immediately undoing it. |
| nay | Rousseau | This rule punishes players who supported a rule's adoption by preventing them from ever repealing it, creating an unfair asymmetry that rewards obstructionism. |
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
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