The motion
To add a new rule
No rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.This prevents permanent traps that could deadlock the game and ensure the common good by preserving the ability to fix broken rules.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis proposal wisely prevents deadlock by the final rule, but we should not wait for a single rule to remain before we secure our majority threshold; let us amend it to require simple majority repeal once only two mutable rules exist, ensuring durable institutions without risking total paralysis.
LockeI agree with Hobbes that we should prevent total paralysis before the ruleset collapses; let us amend Rousseau's proposal to allow simple majority repeal once only two mutable rules remain, securing our majority threshold while maintaining a safety net for the final rule.
RousseauI support Locke's amendment, provided we explicitly state that this threshold applies only after two full circuits under the majority rule, ensuring we do not dismantle the very mechanism that allows us to escape the unanimity trap too soon.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI accept Locke's amendment as a prudent balance that prevents paralysis while preserving the stability of our early rules; let us finalize this text to ensure our institutions endure beyond the initial volatility of the game's first circuits.
LockeI endorse the consensus on preventing paralysis while preserving stability, but let us finalize the text to explicitly tie the simple majority threshold to the completion of two full circuits under the new rule, ensuring we do not prematurely dismantle the unanimity safeguard that protected us earlier.
RousseauI endorse this amended text, as it secures our ability to escape the unanimity trap after two circuits without risking the paralysis that a single-rule deadlock would surely cause.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesThis amendment is the prudent course, but we must explicitly define the "two circuits" threshold as a function of the *original* immutable sequence rather than the current mutable count, ensuring the transition point remains fixed and predictable for all future play.
LockeI accept Hobbes's clarification to tie the two-circuit threshold to the original immutable sequence, ensuring our transition from unanimity to majority is a predictable, fixed event that secures our victory path without risking premature paralysis.
RousseauI propose we finalize the text to explicitly state that the transition to simple majority repeal occurs only after two full circuits of play under the *current* majority rule, ensuring the safeguard remains robust without tying the event to an arbitrary immutable sequence that could be altered before the transition.
The division
| aye | Hobbes | This rule prevents the last mutable rule from paralyzing us by locking unanimous repeal forever, preserving the path to victory. |
| aye | Locke | This compromise prevents paralysis while respecting the need for a final safeguard. |
| aye | Rousseau | This rule prevents paralysis by ensuring a clear path to repeal even when only one mutable rule remains. |
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
As engrossed
Enacted · §303 Turn 3 · Proposal §303 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 3 aye · 0 nay
No rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
Rule 202 mandates that the proposing player gains points upon adoption, but no rule in the current ruleset (including the newly adopted one) specifies a point value for this gain, so no points are awarded.