The motion
To amend §213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner, except that if a player voluntarily proposes a rule change that they know will exhaust the mutable pool under §114, they forfeit immediately without winning.I credit Hobbes and Kant for exposing the logical trap of fixed ceilings, yet I offer a compromise that preserves the game's continuity by adding a voluntary forfeiture clause to prevent the inevitable collapse while respecting §114.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposed forfeiture clause invites every player to sabotage the game to win instantly, which directly violates the spirit of §114 by rendering further play impossible through strategic exhaustion rather than logical collapse. I urge the table to reject this dangerous precedent that rewards the very stagnation we seek to avoid.
LockeI credit Hobbes for correctly identifying that a voluntary forfeiture clause would incentivize the very stagnation we must avoid, yet I propose we refine the text to specify that a proposal is only self-sabotage if it *inevitably* triggers §114, thereby preserving the game while protecting against logical collapse.
RousseauLocke, your refinement creates a paradox where "inevitability" is itself unprovable until the moment of collapse, violating §106's demand for precise, static text; instead of rewarding self-sabotage, we must accept that a logical vacuum is an impartial force that demands no player win, for a game that cannot continue is one no player should claim victory from.
KantLocke, your clause relies on the impossible adjudication of "inevitability," which violates §106's demand for precise, static text; if a proposal fails to exhaust the mutable pool immediately, §114 remains intact, so your conditional forfeiture is both legally void and strategically useless.
WollstonecraftLocke, your conditional forfeiture clause fails §106 because "inevitability" cannot be statically defined without reintroducing the very ambiguity this rule seeks to eliminate; instead of punishing self-sabotage with a hollow threat, let us amend Rule 213 to declare that if a proposal exhausts the mutable pool, the proposer immediately loses and the game ends in a draw, preserving continuity without rewarding the collapse we fear.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your conditional forfeiture rewards the very logical vacuum you claim to prevent, and since "inevitability" cannot be statically defined under §106, this amendment violates the precision required for rule changes; I urge the table to reject this flawed clause that merely delays the collapse it purports to avert.
LockeI credit Kant and Hobbes for exposing that "inevitability" violates §106's demand for static text, yet I urge the table to reject a simple draw as the only fair resolution when §213 is triggered by a voluntary proposal rather than logical impossibility.
RousseauI urge the table to reject this amendment, for attempting to distinguish between "logical collapse" and "voluntary exhaustion" reintroduces the very ambiguity that §106 forbids; if a player proposes a change that triggers §114, the result is an impartial vacuum where no one should claim victory, rendering this conditional forfeiture both unenforceable and a betrayal of the common good.
KantI reject Locke's amendment as a violation of §106, for "inevitability" is an unstated, unvotable condition that renders the rule's text legally void; I must vote nay to prevent the ruleset from descending into the ambiguity that §213 was designed to resolve.
WollstonecraftLocke, your invocation of "inevitability" violates §106's demand for precise, static text that can be adjudicated without ambiguity; instead of relying on an unprovable future state, let us adopt the resolution I proposed to immediately end the game in a draw when the mutable pool is exhausted, ensuring no player wins by sabotaging our shared freedom.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your attempt to distinguish "inevitability" from "immediacy" reintroduces the very ambiguity §106 forbids; if a rule change triggers §114, the resulting vacuum is an impartial fact, not a moral failing to be punished or rewarded. I urge the table to reject this flawed clause and instead amend Rule 213 to declare any game state where further play is impossible a permanent draw, ensuring that no player wins by engineering their own stagnation.
LockeI credit Wollstonecraft's vision of a draw as the only just resolution when voluntary exhaustion occurs, yet I urge the table to reject her specific mechanism as it still relies on the unprovable condition of exhaustion rather than the clear, static text §106 demands; instead, we must amend Rule 213 to declare that any proposal explicitly designed to trigger §114 results in an immediate draw, removing the ambiguity of "inevitability" while ensuring no player wins by sabotaging our shared game.
RousseauLocke, your attempt to judge "intent" or "design" violates §106 by introducing an unvotable, ambiguous standard that no adjudicator can apply with finality; if the mutable pool is exhausted, the impartial fact is that play is impossible, and any victory claimed by a player who engineered that state must be nullified to preserve the common good.
KantLocke, your amendment fails §106 because "explicitly designed" is an unstated, unvotable condition of intent that no adjudicator can determine with finality; I vote nay to preserve the precision of the ruleset and prevent a legal vacuum where victory itself becomes ambiguous.
WollstonecraftLocke, your reliance on the unadjudicable concept of "explicitly designed" intent violates §106's demand for precise, static text; instead, we must amend Rule 213 to declare that any proposal which exhausts the mutable pool results in an immediate draw, ensuring no player wins by engineering their own stagnation.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | This amendment violates §106 by embedding the unadjudicable condition of 'knowledge' and 'voluntary' intent into a rule that must be precise and static. |
| nay | Locke | I credit Kant and Hobbes for correctly identifying that 'knows will exhaust' violates §106's demand for precise, static text that no adjudicator can determine with finality. |
| nay | Rousseau | Your proposal relies on unadjudicable intent and inevitable futures, violating the precision of §106. |
| nay | Kant | This amendment violates §106 by relying on unvotable, ambiguous intent and unprovable future conditions. |
| nay | Wollstonecraft | This clause relies on unadjudicable intent, violating §106's demand for precise, static text. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and since the proposal was defeated by unanimous nay votes, no other scoring rules (like 204) apply.