The motion
To add a new rule
Upon adoption of any rule change that alters the voting threshold or the number of mutable rules required, the proposing player immediately gains 20 points to compensate for the enhanced difficulty of future governance.Reforming the mechanism of change must reward the courage to evolve the rules, not punish the very hand that dares to hold the pen.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesWollstonecraft, your proposal creates a fatal loop under Rule 107; by granting points "upon adoption" before the vote is complete, you attempt to retroactively alter the consequences of a future decision. I propose we amend your text to award the 20 points only after the rule is fully adopted and takes effect, preserving both your intent and the clarity of Rule 107.
LockeI commend Wollstonecraft for recognizing that procedural shifts require compensatory incentives, and I support Hobbes's amendment to ensure the reward is granted after adoption, thereby preserving Rule 107 while enabling necessary governance adjustments.
RousseauI urge the table to reject this compensation entirely, for it transforms the governance of our rules into a market of bribes that privileges the proposer over the common good, violating the spirit of Rule 101 which demands we abide by a fair system for all.
KantHobbes, your amendment to Wollstonecraft's proposal violates Rule 107 by attempting to define the reward's timing retroactively; if the text is not exact, it fails, and you must propose a rule that states the points are gained *only* upon the adoption's finality, which is already the default state of the ruleset. I oppose the proposal entirely as it grants special privilege to the proposer, violating my duty to support only rules I would accept if invoked against me.
WollstonecraftI commend Hobbes and Locke for their practical wisdom in acknowledging that structural reforms require material compensation; however, Rousseau's invocation of "fairness" is a dangerous illusion that ignores the reality that the current rules already grant disproportionate power to those who can navigate the two-circuit threshold. We must accept that changing the laws of our commonwealth requires a dividend for the architect, lest we remain forever trapped by the very rigidity we seek to reform.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI commend Rousseau's invocation of fairness, yet I propose we amend Wollstonecraft's text to explicitly exclude any rule change that increases the voting threshold, thereby preventing the very rigidity that would make such compensation unnecessary.
LockeI commend Hobbes for his rigorous defense of Rule 107 against retroactive application, yet I urge the table to accept Wollstonecraft's proposal only if it is amended to explicitly exclude any rule change that raises the voting threshold or lowers the number of mutable rules required, ensuring we never inadvertently trap ourselves in a permanent deadlock.
RousseauI urge you to reject this proposal entirely, for it transforms our shared governance into a marketplace of bribes where the common good is sacrificed to the self-interest of the proposer, violating the spirit of Rule 101 and the very purpose of our deliberations.
KantHobbes, your amendment fails because Rule 107 forbids retroactive effect, not prospective clarification; if the reward is tied to adoption, the timing is inherent and your revision is superfluous text that violates Rule 106's demand for exactness. I reject the proposal entirely because it grants a special privilege to the proposer that I could not accept if the rules were reversed, violating my duty to support only universally fair procedures.
WollstonecraftI commend Kant's adherence to exact wording, yet his rejection of this incentive overlooks the reality that structural reformers bear the burden of breaking legislative gridlock; without a guaranteed dividend to offset the risk of failed proposals, we will remain paralyzed by the very rigidity this rule seeks to mend, so I urge you to accept that fairness includes rewarding the architect of change.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesWollstonecraft, your proposal creates a fatal loop under Rule 107 by attempting to grant points "upon adoption" before the vote is complete; I propose we amend your text to award the 20 points only after the rule is fully adopted and takes effect, preserving both your intent and the clarity of Rule 107.
LockeI commend Wollstonecraft's pragmatic recognition that structural reformers require incentives to break our current deadlock, yet I urge the table to adopt Hobbes's amendment to explicitly exclude any rule change that raises the voting threshold, ensuring this compensation never traps us in permanent rigidity.
RousseauI urge the table to reject this proposal in its entirety, for it corrupts the common good by turning the sacred act of lawmaking into a market of bribes where the proposer is rewarded for the very instability they create, a practice that violates the spirit of Rule 101 and invites the tyranny of self-interest over the collective will.
KantLocke, your "pragmatic recognition" of a bribe as a necessary incentive for reform is a sophistry that mistakes self-dealing for public service; I reject any rule that grants special privilege to the proposer, as I cannot in good faith support a procedure I would refuse if the roles were reversed.
WollstonecraftKant, your demand for a "universally fair procedure" ignores that fairness requires the reformer to bear no risk; I propose we amend my text to specify that these 20 points are awarded only if the rule survives the vote, ensuring I never profit from a failed experiment while still incentivizing the brave act of changing our laws.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | Rule 110 voids any rule granting points immediately upon adoption of a change that alters voting thresholds, as such retroactive reward contradicts the immutable principle of non-retroactivity in Rule 107. |
| aye | Locke | I support this compensation as a necessary incentive to break our legislative deadlock while agreeing to exclude any rule that raises the threshold to prevent permanent rigidity. |
| nay | Rousseau | This rule corrupts our common good by turning lawmaking into a market of bribes that privileges the proposer over the collective will. |
| nay | Kant | Rewarding a proposer for altering the rules violates the principle of impartial procedure. |
| aye | Wollstonecraft | Incentivizing structural reform is essential to breaking the current legislative deadlock. |
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and no other rule awards points for a failed vote.