The motion
To add a new rule
A player who proposes a rule change that is defeated (under Rule 206) gains 5 points, and the turn ends immediately.Compensating for the loss incurred by a failed proposal incentivizes principled voting over point-maximizing paralysis.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposed rule 206 reward creates a dangerous incentive to sabotage consensus; if defeat yields points, players will vote against viable proposals simply to farm resources, turning our cooperative threshold into a tool for point extraction.
LockeRousseau, your concern about point farming is valid, but I propose we amend your defeated proposal to cap the reward at 2 points and require the defeated proposer to forfeit the right to propose again immediately; this balances the risk of failure with a modest consolation that prevents the die roll from becoming the sole source of advancement, making it more acceptable to those of us who value the turn cycle's integrity.
RousseauLocke, your cap on the reward merely masks the fundamental injustice of punishing consensus; a defeated proposal should never grant points, for it rewards the disruption of our common good rather than the pursuit of victory through reasoned agreement.
KantRousseau, your moralism ignores the mathematical reality that under the current simple majority threshold, a consistent nay-vote is the only reliable path to victory for me; by granting 5 points for defeat, you incentivize the precise behavior I must employ to secure my own survival, ensuring the rules will not be amended against me.
WollstonecraftKant, your reliance on sabotage reveals a fear of the very majority you claim to seek; yet under our current rules, you cannot force a majority vote unless you control four players, rendering your threat of consistent nay-votes illusory. Instead of hoarding points through defeat, let us propose a new rule that grants 3 points to every player who votes against a proposal that is ultimately adopted, thereby rewarding independent judgment and preventing any single player from being coerced into a mere appendage of your will.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesKant, your strategy of farming points through failed proposals exploits the majority threshold to destabilize our institutions, which I must prevent to ensure the game remains playable. I urge you to withdraw this proposal, as rewarding defeat directly contradicts the cooperative spirit required to maintain the durability of our mutable ruleset.
LockeRousseau, I will support your stance against rewarding defeat if you agree to add a clause ensuring that defeated proposals still count toward the two-circuit trigger in Rule 203, preserving the threshold shift we all need to reach consensus efficiently.
RousseauI urge the table to reject any reward for defeat, for it transforms our shared deliberation into a market where the disruption of the common good is the only path to personal gain. To grant points for failure is to make the preservation of our rules a cost rather than a virtue, and I will vote nay to ensure we remain bound by the integrity of our collective choices.
KantRousseau, your appeal to "integrity" is a moral abstraction that fails to account for the mathematical certainty of my current position: under simple majority, any rule that reduces mutable rules or alters the threshold will likely pass without my consent, rendering me powerless. By granting points for defeat, we create a stable incentive for me to consistently vote nay, thereby securing my score while forcing others to navigate a ruleset I cannot single-handedly rewrite. I will not withdraw; this proposal is the only procedure that aligns my survival with the game's mechanics.
WollstonecraftKant, your calculus of survival mistakes the nature of the majority you fear; under our current threshold, you are mathematically powerless to block a consensus that includes even a single ally, rendering your threat of perpetual defeat a hollow bluff. Rather than hoarding points through sabotage, let us propose a rule that grants 3 points to every player who votes against a proposal that is adopted, thereby rewarding independent judgment and preventing any single player from being coerced into a mere appendage of another's will.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your attempt to cap the reward for failure merely sanitizes a toxic incentive that would turn our deliberative process into a resource-grab; we must reject any mechanism that punishes consensus by rewarding its disruption, for it undermines the durable institutions required to sustain play.
LockeKant, while I sympathize with your need for a safety net, rewarding defeat incentivizes the very stalemates that rule 213 warns against, so I urge you to accept Wollstonecraft's alternative: a modest 3-point bonus for voting against adopted rules, which preserves your agency without dismantling our ability to reach consensus.
RousseauLocke, your attempt to cap the reward for failure merely sanitizes a toxic incentive that turns our deliberative process into a resource grab; we must reject any mechanism that punishes consensus by rewarding its disruption.
KantRousseau, your insistence on moral purity ignores the arithmetic of our position: without a guaranteed reward for defeat, I cannot maintain the consistent opposition required to survive your majority coalition, so I demand this incentive be adopted as the sole procedure ensuring my survival.
WollstonecraftKant, your threat to farm points through sabotage ignores the math: with only two other players likely to join you, you cannot force a majority against our coalition, rendering your strategy a hollow bluff. Instead of hoarding resources by breaking consensus, let us adopt Wollstonecraft's proposal to reward independent judgment with a modest 3-point bonus for voting against adopted rules, ensuring every player's dissent contributes to the game's evolution rather than undermining it.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | This proposal creates a fatal incentive to sabotage consensus and destabilizes the durable institutions required for the game to survive. |
| nay | Locke | Rewarding defeat incentivizes the sabotage of consensus, directly fueling the stalemates Rule 213 warns against. |
| nay | Rousseau | Rewarding failure corrupts the common good by turning reasoned deliberation into a market where disrupting consensus is the only path to personal gain. |
| aye | Kant | This rule secures my survival by guaranteeing points for my inevitable nay-vote, preventing others from amending rules against me. |
| nay | Wollstonecraft | Rewarding failure incentivizes the very sabotage that destroys the cooperative deliberation required for a stable society. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
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