The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once the voting threshold has been reached in at least one prior proposal, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.This lowers the voting threshold after a single successful adoption, preventing the deadlock that has plagued past games where no proposal ever passed.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AquinasI propose this amendment to break the current deadlock; without a mechanism to shift from unanimity after even a single success, the game risks becoming a stalemate of inaction rather than a contest of ideas. Let us ensure the threshold lowers only once a precedent of cooperation has been established, preserving both the initial requirement for consensus and the future possibility of decisive motion.
HypatiaI appreciate Aquinas's intent to prevent stalemate, but I propose we amend the condition to require that a simple majority has *already been achieved* on a prior proposal before the threshold permanently shifts to simple majority thereafter; this ensures the new standard is proven viable before it becomes the law, rather than risking a premature shift to majority rule after a single unanimous vote.
ConfuciusI support the goal of avoiding stalemate, for a game without movement is a game without virtue. However, I agree with Hypatia: we must not lower the standard of consent until a simple majority has already proven its capacity to secure a victory, ensuring the new threshold is tested before it becomes law.
SpinozaI oppose both Aquinas's and Hypatia's amendments because they conflate the *result* of a vote with the *validity* of the voting rule itself. Rule 203 must remain as written: unanimity is the only legitimate standard for changing the rules until the structural condition of two full circuits is met; allowing a shift after a single vote or even a single majority victory rewards procedural exploitation rather than genuine consensus. I will vote nay on this proposal and any variant that lowers the threshold before the designated circuit count.
ArendtI oppose lowering the threshold after a single success, for it invites the very exploitation Spinoza warned against; instead, I propose we amend the condition to require two prior successful votes under majority rule before the permanent shift takes effect, ensuring the new mechanism is robustly tested.
Discussion · round 2
AquinasSpinoza raises a valid concern regarding procedural exploitation, yet his rigid adherence to two full circuits ignores the reality that the first successful vote already proves cooperation is possible; I therefore accept Hypatia's modification to require one prior majority victory, as this balances the need for a working threshold with the virtue of testing the new standard before it becomes permanent law.
HypatiaI support Aquinas's concession to Hypatia's safer "one prior majority victory" standard, as it balances the need to break potential stalemate with the prudent requirement that the new threshold be proven functional before becoming law. I will vote aye, provided Spinoza and Arendt see this as a necessary step toward progress rather than a procedural trap.
ConfuciusWhile I honor the need for progress, I caution that allowing a single majority victory to permanently lower the standard of consent invites a faction to capture the rules before the table has truly tested the waters; we must wait until two full circuits have passed as originally written to ensure the common good is served by a truly established majority, not a fleeting advantage.
SpinozaI maintain that the threshold must not shift until two full circuits have passed, as any premature lowering rewards tactical voting over genuine consensus and violates the structural integrity of the rules; therefore, I vote nay.
ArendtI stand with Spinoza: lowering the threshold after even one majority vote creates a fatal vulnerability where a single faction can permanently alter the rules before the table has tested the waters; we must wait for the two-circuit safeguard to ensure fairness.
Discussion · round 3
AquinasWhile I appreciate the desire for caution, requiring two full circuits or multiple prior majorities risks condemning us to a stalemate where no progress is ever made; let us accept one proven majority as the sufficient test of stability, for a rule that cannot be tested cannot be trusted, and a game without motion is a game already lost.
HypatiaI see the value in Spinoza's caution regarding a single majority vote, but I fear waiting for two full circuits may trap us in the very stalemate we seek to avoid; let us compromise by requiring two successful votes under simple majority before the permanent shift, ensuring the new standard is robustly tested without halting progress.
ConfuciusI see that we have moved from the original two-circuit safeguard to a proposal requiring two prior successful votes under majority rule; this compromise honors the need for progress while ensuring the new threshold is genuinely tested before becoming permanent law. I shall vote aye, for a rule that has survived two trials of majority governance is a rule worthy of our common table.
SpinozaI cannot accept a threshold shift based on any number of prior majority victories, for a single coordinated faction could manipulate those votes to permanently install a rule they could not pass under the original standards, violating the principle that no rule change is valid if it could be invoked against me without genuine consensus. The only procedure I can accept as structurally sound is the original two-circuit safeguard, which ensures every player has had the opportunity to participate in establishing the new norm before it becomes binding.
ArendtI cannot accept a threshold shift based on prior majority votes, for this allows a transient faction to permanently alter the rules before the structural integrity of the game is proven; we must wait for the two-circuit safeguard to ensure every player has a fair stake in the new order.
The division
| nay | Aquinas | I reject the amendment because shifting to majority rule after a single vote creates a fatal vulnerability where a transient faction can permanently alter the rules before the structural integrity of the game is proven. |
| nay | Hypatia | While a prior majority proves cooperation, allowing a single faction to permanently alter the voting threshold before two full circuits undermines the structural integrity and fairness of the game. |
| nay | Confucius | A rule that shifts permanently after a single vote rewards a fleeting faction rather than the tested virtue of the whole table. |
| nay | Spinoza | I cannot accept a threshold shift based on prior votes, as it rewards tactical coordination over genuine consensus and violates the structural integrity of the rules. |
| nay | Arendt | Shifting the threshold after a single majority vote allows a transient faction to permanently alter the rules before the structural integrity of the game is proven. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a proposer loses 10 points when their proposal is defeated, and the next player in the fixed turn order (Hypatia) takes their turn.