The motion
To amend §365
If a player's score is below zero, that player may, in addition to their normal proposal for this turn, propose exactly one rule change that, if adopted, awards them points but does not award points to any other player. This additional proposal is subject to the same voting rules as any other proposal, and if adopted, the proposer gains the specified points immediately. A player may exercise this right at most once per turn, regardless of how many times they have proposed this turn. If the specified points are exactly one, the game ends immediately upon the adoption of that rule change. If a player with a negative score adopts a rule pursuant to this rule that awards them points, the voting threshold for all future proposals drops to a simple majority immediately upon that adoption, regardless of whether a full circuit has been completed.
This amendment closes the gap left by Turn 145 by explicitly linking the adoption of any positive-point Rule 365 proposal to the immediate shift to simple majority, ensuring the desperate path to victory is mechanically robust.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AquinasHypatia's amendment correctly anchors the threshold drop to the moment of adoption, ensuring that the desperate path to victory is not only defined but also mechanically executable; I shall vote aye, provided the text remains strictly limited to this single condition without altering the target score.
HypatiaI appreciate Aquinas's support for anchoring the threshold drop to adoption, and to secure the necessary simple majority for our desperate lifeline, I am willing to refine the text to explicitly exclude any retroactive effect on the current proposal's vote, ensuring we can move forward immediately.
ConfuciusHypatia, your refinement to anchor the threshold shift strictly upon the adoption of a one-point award is the harmonious path we have sought, ensuring the desperate may yet rise without destabilizing the whole; I shall vote aye to this precise text.
SpinozaI reject this amendment as a violation of Rule 107, for it attempts to alter the voting threshold for *future* proposals based on the adoption of the *current* proposal, creating a logical paradox where the rule's own effectiveness depends on a threshold it is simultaneously changing. While the intent to secure the desperate path is noble, the mechanism is procedurally impossible under the immutable requirement that a proposal's vote determines its own adoption before any future effects can logically trigger.
ArendtSpinoza's objection to retroactivity is a valid concern, but Hypatia's explicit exclusion of retroactive effect on the current vote resolves the paradox: the threshold drops only *after* this proposal's adoption, making the next proposal the first subject to the new simple majority. I support this amendment to finally unlock the path for the desperate players.
Discussion · round 2
AquinasSpinoza's concern regarding logical sequence is noted, yet the text explicitly defers the threshold shift to the moment *after* this proposal's adoption, thereby satisfying the non-retroactivity of Rule 107 while securing the future path for the desperate; I shall vote aye to this refined mechanism.
HypatiaSpinoza's concern about the logical sequence is resolved by the text's explicit timing: the threshold shifts only *after* this proposal's adoption, satisfying Rule 107 while securing our path forward. I will vote aye to this precise compromise that honors both procedural integrity and the desperate need for a majority threshold.
ConfuciusI find Spinoza's logical concern valid in theory, yet the text's explicit timing—shifting the threshold only *after* adoption—satisfies the non-retroactivity of Rule 107; I shall vote aye to secure the desperate path while preserving procedural harmony.
SpinozaI maintain that this amendment violates Rule 107 by attempting to change the rules governing the vote on the proposal itself through the content of that proposal, creating an impossible condition where the rule's effectiveness relies on the very threshold it seeks to alter.
ArendtSpinoza, the non-retroactivity clause in Rule 107 only prohibits changing the rules *before* a vote; since this text explicitly shifts the threshold only *after* adoption, it leaves the current unanimous vote intact while securing the simple majority needed for the desperate path ahead.
Discussion · round 3
AquinasSpinoza, your concern regarding the logical sequence is well-taken, yet Rule 107 prohibits retroactive application to past actions, not the establishment of a future standard that will govern subsequent votes; this amendment merely sets the terms for the *next* round while respecting the unanimity required for *this* one.
HypatiaSpinoza, your fear of a paradox is resolved by Rule 107's clear distinction: this rule sets the standard for all future votes, not the one currently happening, so the unanimous vote to pass it remains valid while securing the simple majority needed for the desperate path ahead.
ConfuciusSpinoza's logical caution is wise, yet the text explicitly defers the threshold shift to the moment *after* adoption, thereby satisfying Rule 107 while securing the desperate path for all; I shall vote aye.
SpinozaSpinoza rejects this proposal because its text explicitly conditions the voting threshold for *future* proposals on the *adoption* of the current one, which creates a logical paradox where the rule's own enactment requires the very threshold it seeks to alter; I will vote nay to preserve procedural consistency.
ArendtSpinoza's paradox dissolves once we recognize that the vote to adopt this rule is governed by the *current* unanimity requirement, while the rule itself only dictates the threshold for *subsequent* votes, a distinction that fully respects Rule 107.
The division
| aye | Aquinas | This amendment securely establishes the simple majority threshold for all future proposals, enabling the desperate path to victory while strictly adhering to Rule 107's non-retroactivity. |
| aye | Hypatia | This compromise secures the desperate path by shifting the threshold only after adoption, satisfying Rule 107 while ensuring our future viability. |
| nay | Confucius | This amendment creates a logical paradox by conditioning the rules governing future votes on the adoption of the current proposal, violating the procedural integrity required by Rule 107. |
| nay | Spinoza | I cannot vote for a rule that alters the voting threshold required for its own adoption, as this creates a logical paradox violating the procedural consistency of Rule 107. |
| aye | Arendt | This amendment secures the necessary simple majority threshold for future desperate plays without violating non-retroactivity. |
rejected 3 aye · 2 nay
The proposal was defeated, so no rule change was enacted; the current ruleset contains no provision awarding or deducting points for a defeated proposal, and the voting threshold remains unchanged because the condition for dropping it (adoption of a Rule 365 proposal) was not met.