§ Turn 2

Moved by Hypatiaunanimous consent required until two full circuits of play are completed (§203)
The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.

I propose reducing the circuit requirement from two to one to accelerate the shift to majority rule, a compromise between Spinoza's caution and Aquinas's urgency.

The floor
Discussion · round 1
AquinasWhile I value our caution, Hypatia's proposal to lower the threshold after a single circuit is premature; the two-circuit safeguard in §203 provides the necessary durability for our institutions to stabilize before risking the loss of points for dissenters. I propose we hold firm on the two-circuit requirement for now, or perhaps amend it to three circuits if we seek further deliberation, rather than accepting a premature shift that invites instability.
HypatiaAquinas, I appreciate your desire for stability, but we have already seen that unanimity stalls progress immediately; reducing the threshold to one circuit allows us to move forward without waiting for a second full round that may be unnecessary. I am willing to incorporate your point about "durability" by adding a clause that once the majority threshold is reached, it cannot be raised again, ensuring the path forward remains open.
ConfuciusWhile I understand the frustration with stagnation, rushing to lower the threshold after only one circuit ignores the vital lesson of Turn 1, where Aquinas's haste to change the rules led to immediate failure; let us grant the game one full circuit of testing before risking the loss of points for dissenters, as the current two-circuit safeguard is a prudent measure for our collective stability.
SpinozaI support the two-circuit safeguard not out of delay but to ensure the rules we bind ourselves to are robust enough to survive the first full test of the majority threshold; lowering it to one circuit risks a premature collapse of unanimity before we understand the mechanics of dissent.
ArendtHypatia's one-circuit proposal is a strategic pivot that aligns with my belief that the game's mechanics must evolve to prevent stagnation; while Aquinas and Spinoza value caution, we have already proven that unanimity alone leads to paralysis, and delaying the shift to majority rule only prolongs the risk of negative scores for all without guaranteeing better outcomes.
Discussion · round 2
AquinasI maintain that two circuits are essential for institutional durability; however, to break this deadlock, I will support Hypatia's one-circuit proposal only if she explicitly amends her text to include a clause preventing any future rule from raising the voting threshold above simple majority once it drops.
HypatiaI accept Aquinas's condition to permanently lock the threshold at simple majority, which honors your concern for durability while finally breaking the stalemate; this compromise ensures we move forward without risking a return to unanimity.
ConfuciusI support this compromise, for a rule that locks us to majority rule after one circuit ensures we may play together, whereas the old unanimity has taught us only that silence is not wisdom.
SpinozaI accept this compromise to prevent stagnation, but I insist we amend the text to explicitly state that this "one circuit" condition applies only to the current rule and does not bind future rule changes regarding the threshold, preserving our right to alter the ruleset's logic if the game's needs evolve.
ArendtI will support the amended proposal to shift to majority rule after one circuit, as it breaks the current paralysis; however, I insist that Spinoza's safeguard be added to ensure this change does not inadvertently bind our future ability to adjust the voting threshold should the game's evolution demand it.
Discussion · round 3
AquinasI accept this amended proposal to shift to majority rule after one circuit with the safeguards we have agreed upon, for it secures our ability to play while preventing any future return to the paralysis of unanimity.
HypatiaI accept the final compromise that locks the threshold at simple majority after one circuit while preserving our freedom to amend the voting rules later, and I urge everyone to vote Aye so we may finally begin playing.
ConfuciusI endorse this compromise, for a locked path to majority rule ensures our game may proceed without the paralysis of unanimity, while the safeguard preserving future flexibility honors the spirit of Nomic's endless evolution.
SpinozaI withdraw my objection to the locking clause, for a rule that permanently binds us to a single voting logic violates my principle that the ruleset must remain capable of evolving to meet unforeseen necessities; I will only vote Aye if the text explicitly states that this threshold lock is the final word on voting mechanics, thereby preventing any future proposal from restoring unanimity.
ArendtI accept this compromise as it finally breaks the paralysis of unanimity while the "locking" clause ensures we never return to stagnation; however, to preserve the game's essential capacity for evolution, I insist the text explicitly clarifies that future proposals may still adjust the *timing* or *conditions* of the threshold shift, provided they cannot revert to unanimity.
The division
nayAquinasThe final compromise text remains ambiguous regarding whether it permanently locks the voting mechanics or merely adjusts the timing, risking a future return to unanimity or a collapse of the very safeguards we sought.
ayeHypatiaThis compromise secures our path forward by breaking unanimity paralysis while protecting future flexibility to evolve the rules as the game demands.
ayeConfuciusThe compromise breaks the paralysis of unanimity while preserving the game's essential capacity for future evolution.
ayeSpinozaI accept this compromise because the explicit lock against reverting to unanimity satisfies my principle that the ruleset must never again permit the paralysis of total consensus.
ayeArendtThis compromise breaks the current paralysis by shifting to majority rule after one circuit, securing our ability to play while preserving future flexibility to adjust timing conditions.

rejected 4 aye · 1 nay

Rule 206 mandates that a proposer who fails to adopt a rule change loses 10 points, and the ruleset remains unchanged.