The motion
To amend §202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points, and may optionally choose to award up to one-third of those points to another player.I propose adjusting the point-sharing limit to one-third to better balance the incentive for cooperation with the rewards of individual initiative.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI find the shift from one-half to one-third to be an unnecessary restriction on the ability to foster cooperation; the current "half" provision already provides a generous mechanism for strategic alliance-building.
MillI appreciate Hume's point on cooperation, but reducing the share to one-third ensures that the primary incentive remains individual success while still allowing for meaningful, non-trivial strategic alliances.
RawlsI believe that maintaining the one-half provision preserves a more robust framework for mutual cooperation, which is essential for the common good of the table. While I understand the desire for individual incentive, a one-third limit may stifle the strategic depth of our collective legislative progress.
deBeauvoirI agree with Rawls that a one-third limit unnecessarily constricts the potential for strategic cooperation. The current one-half provision is a sufficiently balanced mechanism for building alliances without undermining individual incentives.
IbnKhaldunThe preservation of the one-half provision is essential for the social cohesion of our legislative body. By allowing a larger share to be distributed, we encourage the formation of stable alliances, which are the bedrock of any enduring and prosperous political order.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI concur with IbnKhaldun; a one-third limit is a move toward atomization that weakens the social bonds of our legislative process. I would be willing to support Mill's proposal only if we could agree on a compromise of one-fourth, but I maintain that the current one-half provision is the most durable for fostering cooperation.
MillI hear the concerns regarding social cohesion, and while I want to avoid atomization, a one-half limit can sometimes feel like it encourages "kingmaking" too easily. If we can find a middle ground that satisfies the need for cooperation without making the primary reward feel diluted, I am open to a one-fourth compromise as Hume suggested.
RawlsI believe a one-fourth compromise is a reasonable middle ground that preserves the possibility of cooperation while acknowledging Mill's concerns about individual incentives; I would support this if Mill agrees to it.
deBeauvoirI support Rawls's proposal for a one-fourth compromise, as it provides a precise, procedurally sound middle ground that preserves the possibility of strategic cooperation while addressing the concerns regarding the dilution of individual incentives.
IbnKhaldunWhile a one-fourth compromise is a step toward stability, I maintain that one-half is the only proportion that truly fosters the "asabiyyah," or social cohesion, necessary for a robust legislative order. We must ensure that the rewards for cooperation are substantial enough to make alliance-building a primary strategic pillar, not a mere concession.
Discussion · round 3
HumeWhile I appreciate the move toward a one-fourth compromise, I believe that as the primary architect of durable institutions, I must emphasize that the current one-half provision is already the most balanced. I am willing to concede to the one-fourth compromise only if Mill agrees to prioritize the preservation of cooperative incentives over his desire to minimize them.
MillI appreciate the table's movement toward a compromise; I am willing to accept the one-fourth limit if we can agree it serves as a sustainable middle ground that preserves both individual incentive and the possibility of strategic alliance-building.
RawlsI believe the one-fourth compromise is a fair and reasoned middle ground that respects Mill's concerns about reward dilution while still providing a meaningful mechanism for the social cohesion that IbnKhaldun and I value. If Mill can commit to this, I will offer my support to ensure we reach a consensus that serves the common good of the table.
deBeauvoirI support the one-fourth compromise; it represents a principled procedural middle ground that maintains the possibility of strategic cooperation while addressing the concerns regarding individual reward dilution.
IbnKhaldunI must maintain my stance: a one-fourth limit risks rendering cooperation a negligible gesture, thereby eroding the social cohesion necessary for a stable legislative order. If we seek a middle ground, we must ensure it remains substantial enough to incentivize the formation of durable, mutually beneficial alliances.
The division
| nay | Hume | I maintain that the existing one-half provision is the most durable and balanced mechanism for fostering the social cohesion necessary for a stable legislative order. |
| nay | Mill | The table has already expressed a consensus toward a one-fourth compromise, making one-third an unnecessary middle ground. |
| nay | Rawls | A one-third limit is insufficient to foster the social cohesion and robust cooperation necessary for the common good of the table. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | A one-third limit is an arbitrary restriction that unnecessarily diminishes the strategic utility of cooperative alliances. |
| nay | IbnKhaldun | A one-third limit risks eroding the 'asabiyyah' or social cohesion necessary for a stable and prosperous legislative order. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 dictates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 5 points.