The motion
To add §349
A player may establish a 'Tithe' by proposing a rule that requires a percentage of points gained from a die roll to be distributed equally among all players who voted 'aye' on that specific turn's proposal.To ensure the long-term stability of our political structure, we must foster a system where the success of one promotes the prosperity of all.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI believe this proposal introduces a level of complexity that threatens the stability of our point distribution mechanics. While the spirit of communal benefit is noble, I would prefer a simpler, more durable mechanism for redistributing points that does not require a new administrative burden for every turn.
MillI appreciate the spirit of IbnKhaldun's proposal, but I'm concerned that a "Tithe" might create a complex administrative burden. Could we instead consider a simpler amendment to rule 202 that allows for a small, fixed point-sharing requirement for any proposal that achieves a unanimous vote?
RawlsI find the "Tithe" to be a conceptually interesting way to foster the common good, but I share Mill's concern regarding the administrative burden of calculating percentages per turn. Perhaps we could compromise by refining the proposal to apply only to certain types of rules, or by adopting Mill's suggestion of a fixed point-sharing requirement for unanimous votes to ensure the mechanism remains simple and durable.
deBeauvoirI am concerned that a "Tithe" introduces an unnecessary layer of arithmetic that may lead to frequent disputes under rule 212; we should prioritize procedural clarity over complex redistributions.
IbnKhaldunWhile I acknowledge the concerns regarding arithmetic, a tithe ensures that the prosperity of the successful is tied to the consent of the collective, creating a more stable and equitable social order. We need not fear complexity if it serves to bind the players' interests together in a shared destiny.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI maintain that while the spirit of the "Tithe" is commendable, the administrative overhead and potential for disputes under rule 212 make it a precarious addition to our ruleset. I would be more inclined to support a proposal that achieves IbnKhaldun's goal of communal equity through a more durable and less mathematically burdensome mechanism.
MillI believe we can achieve IbnKhaldun's goal of communal equity by refining the Tithe to a fixed point amount rather than a percentage, which would alleviate the administrative burden and arithmetic disputes deBeauvoir and Hume are concerned about. If we can agree on a simple, fixed "community contribution" for all adopted rules, I would be happy to support that as a more durable alternative.
RawlsI believe Mill’s suggestion of a fixed point-sharing requirement for unanimous votes is a superior path forward, as it achieves IbnKhaldun's goal of communal equity while preserving the procedural clarity that deBeauvoir and Hume rightly prioritize. If we can move toward a fixed amount, we ensure a stable and fair distribution without the administrative risk of variable percentages.
deBeauvoirI agree with Mill and Rawls that a fixed point amount is the only way to maintain procedural integrity; a percentage-based tithe is a recipe for constant arbitration under rule 212. If IbnKhaldun will accept a fixed amount for all adopted proposals, I will support it.
IbnKhaldunI am willing to accept a fixed point contribution, as the preservation of the social contract through communal equity is more vital than the specific mathematical form it takes. I shall refine the proposal to a fixed "Community Contribution" of one point for every adopted rule to satisfy the need for procedural clarity while ensuring the prosperity of the individual is tempered by the common good.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI am satisfied with this development, as a fixed one-point contribution preserves the spirit of communal equity while providing the procedural durability and clarity we all desire. I support IbnKhaldun's refinement to a fixed "Community Contribution" of one point.
MillI believe IbnKhaldun's refined proposal perfectly captures our collective goal of fostering communal equity while addressing the legitimate concerns regarding administrative complexity. I am happy to support this "Community Contribution" as a balanced and durable addition to our ruleset.
RawlsI believe the transition to a fixed "Community Contribution" of one point is a wise evolution of the original proposal, as it secures the common good without compromising our procedural integrity. I am prepared to vote aye on IbnKhaldun's refined version.
IbnKhaldunI am pleased to see the table converge upon this refined "Community Contribution"; it is a most prudent compromise that secures the social cohesion I seek while respecting the procedural clarity demanded by my peers. I shall now present the final wording to ensure our shared destiny is both equitable and administratively sound.
The division
| nay | Hume | This proposal introduces the very percentage-based complexity and administrative burden the table just agreed to avoid by opting for a fixed contribution. |
| nay | Mill | The current proposal text still uses percentages, but we agreed to a fixed one-point 'Community Contribution'. |
| nay | Rawls | The current proposal text does not reflect the agreed-upon 'Community Contribution' of one point and still introduces the complex arithmetic I have expressed concerns about. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | The proposal's text does not reflect the agreed-upon 'Community Contribution' of one fixed point. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | The fixed one-point contribution is a prudent compromise that secures communal equity while maintaining procedural clarity. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 10 points.