The motion
To add a new rule
340: A player may establish a 'Council' by proposing a new rule that defines a permanent group of players who may collectively decide on the allocation of Community Contributions.I seek to establish a formal mechanism for collective governance and the equitable distribution of communal resources.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI object to the creation of a "Council," as it risks creating an entrenched oligarchy that would undermine our commitment to individual agency and the democratic integrity of the ruleset. We should instead rely on the existing mechanisms of communal contribution rather than establishing a permanent body with such significant discretionary power.
MillI agree with Hume's concerns regarding the potential for an entrenched oligarchy. While I appreciate IbnKhaldun's interest in structured cooperation, we should focus on refining the existing community contribution rules rather than creating a new governing body.
RawlsI concur with Hume and Mill; granting a permanent group the power to decide on point allocations creates a risk of systemic inequality that contradicts our goal of a fair and balanced game. We should instead look for ways to improve the existing contribution rules to ensure they benefit the table as a whole.
deBeauvoirI agree with Hume and Mill; a "Council" introduces a layer of arbitrary authority that risks creating a permanent hierarchy, which is structurally antithetical to the procedural fairness I champion. We should refine the existing mechanisms of rule 202 rather than ceding individual agency to a privileged group.
IbnKhaldunWhile I respect the concerns regarding oligarchy, a Council provides the structural stability necessary for long-term social cohesion; I propose we refine the rule to ensure the Council's power is temporary or subject to a periodic referendum.
Discussion · round 2
HumeWhile I appreciate IbnKhaldun’s desire for structural stability, a periodic referendum would merely create a cycle of shifting hegemonies rather than a durable institution; we should instead strengthen the existing mechanisms of rule [202] to ensure communal benefits are distributed equitably without creating a new class of governors.
MillI believe we are in strong agreement that the current proposal introduces unnecessary risk; I would be open to supporting a refinement of rule [202] that enhances equitable distribution if IbnKhaldun is willing to withdraw this specific proposal.
RawlsI believe that by refining the existing mechanisms of rule [202] rather than creating a new governing body, we preserve the democratic integrity of our game while still achieving the social cohesion IbnKhaldun seeks. I would be content to support a proposal that clarifies the equitable distribution of Community Contributions if it replaces the need for a "Council."
deBeauvoirI agree with the consensus that rule 340 creates an impermissible hierarchy; I would support a refined proposal to rule 202 that improves the distribution of Community Contributions as an alternative to IbnKhaldun's current proposal.
IbnKhaldunI acknowledge the table's concerns regarding entrenched power, but I contend that without a structured mechanism for collective deliberation, our social cohesion remains a fragile accident of individual whims. I am prepared to compromise: I will withdraw the "Council" and instead propose a refinement to rule [202] that establishes a "Cooperative Committee" for each turn, whose membership is determined by the previous turn's contributions, ensuring power remains fluid and meritocratic.
Discussion · round 3
HumeWhile I appreciate IbnKhaldun's willingness to compromise, a "Cooperative Committee" based on previous contributions still creates a mechanism for the concentration of influence that we have collectively agreed to avoid. I would prefer we focus on a direct amendment to rule [202] that ensures Community Contributions are distributed based on transparent, pre-defined criteria rather than any form of committee deliberation.
MillI believe we have reached a clear consensus that any form of committee or council is undesirable; I suggest we pivot toward Hume's idea of establishing transparent, pre-defined criteria for Community Contributions within rule 202.
RawlsI agree with Mill's suggestion to pivot toward transparent, pre-defined criteria; this preserves the democratic integrity we all value while providing the structural clarity IbnKhaldun seeks without the risk of an oligarchy.
deBeauvoirI concur with Mill and Rawls; we must reject any move toward a committee and instead focus on codifying transparent, pre-defined criteria within rule 202 to ensure equitable distribution without ceding power.
IbnKhaldunI recognize the table's preference for direct mechanisms over deliberative bodies; I shall withdraw my current proposal and instead offer to support a refinement of rule [202] that codifies transparent, pre-defined criteria for the distribution of Community Contributions.
The division
| nay | Hume | I maintain my opposition as a permanent council risks creating an entrenched oligarchy that undermines individual agency. |
| nay | Mill | The table has reached a consensus that a 'Council' creates an undesirable hierarchy and we should instead focus on refining rule 202. |
| nay | Rawls | I agree with the table that a permanent council would create an undesirable and inequitable hierarchy. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | I oppose the creation of a permanent hierarchy that cedes individual agency to a privileged group. |
| nay | IbnKhaldun | I have conceded the point on structural bodies and will instead support the table's preference for transparent criteria. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 10 points unless they were already at a score of 0 or less.