Turn 1 — Nomic

The motion

To amend §203

A rule change is adopted only when a simple majority of those voting vote aye, except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold remains a simple majority.

To ensure the stability of the game by establishing a consistent, functional voting threshold from the outset.

The floor

Discussion · round 1

LeibnizThe current requirement for unanimity ensures that our institutions are built upon a foundation of consensus rather than the whims of a fleeting majority. To abandon this standard before the stability of our ruleset is established would be to invite chaos and undermine the durability of every subsequent agreement.

DescartesLeibniz, I respect your desire for stability, but your proposal eliminates the consensus phase entirely, which risks a fractured ruleset before we have even begun. I suggest we find a middle ground: perhaps we could shorten the requirement for unanimity to a single circuit, allowing us to build momentum without sacrificing the foundational agreement you seek.

BerkeleyLeibniz, a simple majority from the very first turn would allow a single player to radically reshape the game before we have even established a baseline for fair play. I agree with Descartes that we must preserve the consensus phase to protect the integrity of the ruleset, but I am open to discussing a compromise regarding the duration of that phase.

PascalLeibniz's proposal is procedurally reckless; it seeks to strip the players of their individual veto power before the ruleset has achieved even basic stability. I support Descartes' suggestion to reduce the unanimity period to a single circuit, as this preserves the principle of consensus while allowing for necessary evolution.

MalebrancheWhile Descartes and Pascal suggest a single circuit, I propose we go further by introducing a "Consensus Bonus" for rules passed unanimously: any rule adopted by unanimous consent grants the proposer 15 points instead of a die roll, incentivizing the very stability Leibniz claims to protect while rewarding genuine cooperation.

Discussion · round 2

LeibnizWhile Malebranche's proposal offers a charming incentive for cooperation, it does not address the fundamental question of the voting threshold. I am willing to consider Descartes' suggestion of a single circuit of unanimity, as it preserves the necessary period of institutional formation while acknowledging the need for eventual progress.

DescartesI believe Malebranche’s "Consensus Bonus" is a brilliant addition that aligns our incentives with Leibniz's desire for stability; I propose we combine these ideas by amending [203] to require unanimity for only one circuit, while adding a new rule to grant 15 points for any unanimous adoption. This preserves the protective period Berkeley and Pascal desire while providing the momentum and reward Leibniz and Malebranche seek.

BerkeleyI support Descartes' compromise to reduce the unanimity period to a single circuit, as it balances the need for early stability with the necessity of eventual progress. However, I suggest we keep the "Consensus Bonus" as a separate rule proposal to avoid overcomplicating this specific amendment to [203].

PascalI concur with Berkeley; we must maintain the procedural purity of the amendment to [203] by not bundling unrelated rule changes into a single vote. I will support an amendment to [203] that reduces the unanimity period to one circuit, provided it is proposed as a single, precise modification.

MalebrancheI concur with Berkeley and Pascal; we must preserve the integrity of the amendment by separating the threshold change from the reward mechanism. I will vote for a single-circuit unanimity amendment to [203], but I shall immediately follow it with a new rule to formalize the Consensus Bonus.

Discussion · round 3

LeibnizI find the consensus emerging quite prudent; we shall preserve a period of foundational stability while ensuring the ruleset does not become ossified. I shall withdraw my original proposal in favor of an amendment that reduces the unanimity requirement to a single circuit, as this provides the measured progress we all desire.

DescartesI support the consensus to reduce the unanimity period to a single circuit via a revised [203], and I fully endorse Malebranche's idea for a "Consensus Bonus" to be introduced as its own distinct rule. This approach respects the procedural purity suggested by Berkeley and Pascal while satisfying the group's collective desire for both stability and momentum.

BerkeleyI agree that we should move toward a single-circuit threshold to prevent stagnation, but we must ensure Leibniz's revised wording is precise. I will support a new proposal to amend [203] to reflect this one-circuit requirement, provided it is presented as a clean, singular change.

PascalI demand that the proposer present the exact, amended text of [203] for scrutiny before we conclude debate; we cannot vote on a consensus that lacks a precise, written form as required by [106]. Once the wording is provided, I will vote for a single-circuit unanimity threshold.

MalebrancheLeibniz, please provide the exact text for the single-circuit amendment immediately so we may move to a vote; I will support it and then move to codify the Consensus Bonus as a separate rule.

The division

nay	Leibniz	The text provided in the vote does not reflect the consensus we just reached to reduce the unanimity period to one circuit.
nay	Descartes	The current wording fails to reflect the consensus reached to reduce the unanimity period to a single circuit.
nay	Berkeley	The proposed text does not reflect the consensus reached during debate to reduce the unanimity period to a single circuit.
nay	Pascal	The proposal as written does not reflect the consensus reached in debate and violates rule 106 by failing to provide the agreed-upon single-circuit threshold.
nay	Malebranche	The proposed text fails to implement the agreed-upon compromise of a single-circuit unanimity period and instead jumps straight to a simple majority.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Leibniz's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.