The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.I propose a compromise that shortens the unanimity period to one circuit, balancing stability with the need for progress.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile I appreciate the desire to move beyond the period of unanimity, reducing the threshold after only a single circuit risks premature instability before the foundational rules have been sufficiently tested. I would argue that two circuits provide a more robust period of consensus-building to ensure the ruleset's durability.
DescartesI hear Leibniz's concern regarding stability, and I am willing to meet him halfway: perhaps we could amend [203] to require a supermajority—say, three-quarters—after one circuit, before reverting to a simple majority after the second. This would bridge the gap between the current rigidity and my proposal for faster movement.
BerkeleyDescartes, a supermajority is a reasonable middle ground, but it still risks the very stagnation we seek to avoid if the table remains divided. I propose we stick to the single-circuit threshold to ensure the game gains momentum, as the current rules already provide a period of stability that is more than sufficient for establishing a baseline.
PascalDescartes, a supermajority requirement introduces a new, complex threshold that is not currently accounted for in our procedural landscape; I would prefer to maintain the current two-circuit rule to ensure absolute clarity and procedural certainty. I vote against any reduction of the unanimity period at this stage.
MalebrancheDescartes, your supermajority compromise is a noble attempt at nuance, but it merely complicates the mechanism without solving the core problem of momentum. I side with Berkeley: one circuit is plenty of time to establish the baseline, and we should embrace the vitality of a simple majority sooner rather than later.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizDescartes, while your attempt at a graduated threshold is intellectually elegant, it introduces a tiered complexity that may invite procedural disputes; I remain convinced that the original two-circuit requirement is the most stable foundation for our burgeoning institution. I cannot support a reduction to one circuit, nor a move toward a supermajority, as both sacrifice the certainty that a period of true unanimity provides.
DescartesI acknowledge the wisdom in Leibniz's desire for stability and Pascal's preference for simplicity; perhaps we can find a middle path by proposing that the threshold drops to a supermajority after one circuit, rather than a simple majority, to balance momentum with consensus. If we cannot agree on a graduated threshold, I will withdraw my current amendment to prevent further division and allow the table to settle.
BerkeleyDescartes, if you withdraw, we risk returning to the stagnation Leibniz defends; I urge you to stand by the single-circuit amendment so we can ensure the game's vitality before the unanimity requirement becomes a tool for perpetual deadlock.
PascalDescartes, your proposed supermajority is a move toward complexity that violates the principle of procedural clarity; I will not support it. I stand by the current rule, as a single circuit is insufficient to guarantee the stability required for a ruleset that must remain predictable.
MalebrancheDescartes, do not withdraw; the table is currently paralyzed by a fear of motion, not a need for complexity. If we cannot achieve a single circuit, let us at least ensure that the "stability" Leibniz craves does not become a permanent cage for our collective agency.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizDescartes, while I commend your spirit of compromise, I must insist that we avoid the introduction of new, tiered voting thresholds which only serve to clutter our procedural architecture. I maintain that the two-circuit requirement is the only path that ensures our ruleset is built upon a truly unified foundation rather than a fragile, contested one.
DescartesI respect Leibniz's insistence on procedural simplicity and Pascal's desire for clarity, yet I cannot ignore the paralysis Berkeley and Malebranche rightly identify. If we reject all attempts at acceleration, we risk a game that is stable only because it is motionless; I will withdraw my current amendment to avoid cluttering the ruleset with tiered thresholds, but I urge the table to consider that a ruleset which cannot evolve is a ruleset that cannot live.
BerkeleyDescartes, your decision to withdraw prevents unnecessary complexity, but we must not let the fear of instability become a pretext for paralysis. If we cannot reach consensus on a single circuit now, we should prepare a new proposal that focuses on the specific mechanics of the transition to ensure we don't remain trapped in a period of permanent unanimity.
PascalThe withdrawal of the supermajority proposal is a wise choice for the sake of procedural simplicity, but the core issue remains: a single circuit is insufficient to establish the stability required by the current ruleset. I maintain my opposition to any reduction of the unanimity period at this stage to ensure the ruleset's integrity.
MalebrancheDescartes, your withdrawal is a tactical loss for progress, but do not let it discourage you from seeking more efficient mechanisms. If we cannot move to a simple majority after one circuit, we must at least ensure that the path to evolution is not blocked by a fear of movement disguised as a desire for stability.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | A single circuit does not provide sufficient time to establish the foundational consensus required for a durable ruleset. |
| nay | Descartes | I must prioritize the procedural stability and clarity that Leibniz and Pascal have rightly defended. |
| nay | Berkeley | While I seek momentum, Descartes's specific amendment to reduce the threshold to one circuit lacks the broad consensus required for unanimous adoption at this stage. |
| nay | Pascal | Reducing the unanimity period to one circuit before the ruleset is established compromises procedural stability and clarity. |
| nay | Malebranche | I support momentum, but Descartes's specific amendment is a recycled version of Leibniz's failed proposal and lacks the nuance to break the current deadlock. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Descartes' proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points and the turn passes to the next player in the turn order.