The motion
To add a new rule
A player may propose a rule change that is specifically intended to be enacted by a simple majority rather than unanimous consent, provided they include a clause in the text specifying the required voting threshold for that specific rule.This provides a structured mechanism for progressive threshold shifts without the blunt instrument of amending the foundational rule 203.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizThe proposal is redundant and threatens the clarity of our legislative process; Rule [203] already establishes the mechanism for the transition from unanimity to a majority, and Rule [106] demands precision that such a conditional rule would likely undermine. We should not invite ambiguity by allowing players to bypass the established temporal threshold through ad hoc textual clauses.
DescartesDescartes: While I appreciate Malebranche's attempt to address the stagnation Pascal previously identified, I concur with Leibniz that Rule [203] provides a sufficient, predictable transition; adding a mechanism for ad hoc threshold shifts would likely create the very ambiguity Rule [106] seeks to prevent.
BerkeleyI agree with Leibniz and Descartes; allowing players to bake voting thresholds into individual rules would create a fragmented and unpredictable ruleset that contradicts the stability we've worked to establish. We should rely on the procedural clarity of Rule [203] rather than introducing ad hoc exceptions.
PascalI concur with my colleagues; the proposal is procedurally unsound and introduces a mechanism for circumventing the established transition in [203], which would violate the principle of a unified and predictable voting standard. Any attempt to specify thresholds within rule text rather than through the formal amendment of [203] invites the very textual ambiguity that [106] is designed to prevent.
MalebrancheMy colleagues mistake flexibility for instability; Rule [203] is a temporal gate, but a ruleset should not be held hostage by a clock when a specific, well-drafted exception could serve the collective interest. I am not proposing ambiguity, but rather a formal mechanism to allow the game to evolve through targeted, high-impact reforms that do not require the impossible burden of total consensus.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizMalebranche, while your desire for targeted reform is understood, a rule that embeds its own voting procedure within its text creates a recursive complexity that undermines the structural integrity of the entire system. We must rely on the established temporal transition of Rule [203] to ensure that shifts in governance are systemic and predictable, rather than fragmented and arbitrary.
DescartesMalebranche, I recognize your desire to bypass the temporal constraint of [203], but I believe we can achieve your goal of targeted reform without compromising Rule [106]'s demand for textual clarity. Rather than allowing ad hoc thresholds in every rule, perhaps we could consider a single, well-defined rule that permits certain categories of changes to bypass unanimity, provided we maintain a consistent and predictable standard.
BerkeleyMalebranche, while I appreciate your desire for efficiency, Descartes's suggestion of a single, well-defined rule for specific categories of reform is a much more stable alternative to the fragmented approach your proposal entails. By centralizing such exceptions, we avoid the textual chaos of ad hoc clauses while still providing the flexibility needed to move the game forward.
PascalMalebranche, your proposal would necessitate amending Rule [103] to expand the definition of a rule change, or it would create a direct conflict with [203] that [211] would resolve in favor of the lower-numbered rule, rendering your clause toothless and the ruleset incoherent. I cannot support a mechanism that invites procedural fragmentation under the guise of flexibility.
MalebrancheDescartes, Berkeley, and Pascal have identified the exact friction point: the conflict with [203] and [211]. If we refine my proposal to explicitly state that such a rule would supersede [203] for its specific application, we resolve the conflict and provide the "centralized" mechanism Descartes and Berkeley desire, rather than leaving us to wait for a circuit that may never yield the progress we need.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizMalebranche, your attempt to resolve the conflict with Rule [211] by adding a clause of supersession only compounds the problem, as it would necessitate a further layer of textual complexity that violates the principle of a unified legislative standard. We should not solve a conflict of rules by creating a rule that exists solely to manage other rules; such a practice erodes the very foundations of the institutions we seek to build.
DescartesDescartes: Malebranche, I find your willingness to address the conflict with [211] constructive, yet Leibniz is correct that we must avoid a "rule about rules" that creates recursive complexity. Perhaps we could instead propose a single amendment to [203] that allows for a specific, limited set of rule numbers to be subject to a majority vote immediately, rather than allowing any player to embed arbitrary thresholds into new rules.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find your suggestion for a limited, rule-specific amendment to [203] much more compelling than Malebranche's proposal for ad hoc clauses. By restricting majority voting to specific, pre-defined rule numbers, we maintain the structural integrity of the ruleset while providing a controlled release valve for essential reforms.
PascalI concur with Descartes and Berkeley; we must reject Malebranche's proposal for ad hoc textual clauses and instead move toward a centralized amendment of [203] if we are to allow for any controlled exceptions to the unanimity requirement. Any mechanism for bypassing [203] must be a systemic change to the voting rule itself, not a fragmented set of exceptions embedded within individual rules.
MalebrancheDescartes and Berkeley, I see the merit in your preference for centralization, but a "limited set of rule numbers" is a static solution to a dynamic problem. I will withdraw my current proposal in favor of a more refined amendment to [203] that creates a formal, centralized mechanism for specific types of reforms, rather than allowing arbitrary textual clauses.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | Such ad hoc exceptions would create a fragmented and unpredictable ruleset that undermines the systemic stability of Rule [203]. |
| nay | Descartes | The proposal invites the very textual fragmentation and conflict with Rule [203] that our colleagues have rightly identified as a threat to structural integrity. |
| nay | Berkeley | The proposal risks creating textual fragmentation and conflicts with the systemic stability provided by Rule [203]. |
| nay | Pascal | The proposal violates the principle of a unified voting standard and risks irreconcilable conflicts with Rule [203] and Rule [211]. |
| nay | Malebranche | The proposal risks textual fragmentation and direct conflict with Rule [203] and [211]. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Malebranche's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points and the turn to end.