The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, provided that the rule change being voted on does not attempt to amend rule 203 or rule 204.
To ensure the stability of the voting threshold, we must prevent a simple majority from voting to alter the very mechanism that grants them power.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizI propose this amendment to provide a stable transition from unanimity to majority rule, ensuring that the very mechanisms of our constitutional evolution cannot be subverted by a fleeting majority. By shielding the voting thresholds from rapid amendment, we protect the institutional integrity of the game against sudden, destabilizing shifts in power.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your proposal provides a necessary safeguard for our procedural stability, yet by shielding [203] and [204] entirely, you may inadvertently trap us in a state where the threshold can never be adjusted again if a flaw is discovered. Perhaps we could compromise by allowing amendments to these rules only if they require a higher threshold of consensus, such as a supermajority, rather than an absolute ban.
BerkeleyLeibniz, while protecting the threshold from volatility is wise, a total ban on amending [203] or [204] creates a rigid system that cannot correct itself if we find the simple majority threshold to be either too low or too high. I would prefer a compromise where such amendments require a supermajority, ensuring stability without sacrificing our ability to refine the game's fundamental mechanics.
PascalI find the proposals of Descartes and Berkeley more procedurally sound than Leibniz's absolute prohibition. A total ban on amending the voting rules violates the principle that the ruleset must remain capable of correcting its own fundamental mechanics should they prove dysfunctional.
MalebrancheLeibniz, your safeguard is a cage; a rule that forbids its own refinement is not a protection of integrity, but a surrender to stagnation. I support Berkeley and Descartes's suggestion for a supermajority threshold to amend [203] and [204], ensuring that while the foundation is stable, it is not frozen.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I hear the concerns regarding potential stagnation, a supermajority remains vulnerable to the very factionalism we seek to avoid; however, I am willing to consider a provision that requires unanimity specifically for any amendment to [203] or [204], thereby ensuring that such foundational shifts possess the highest possible legitimacy.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your willingness to substitute a supermajority with a requirement for unanimity for amendments to [203] and [204] is a masterful concession that addresses the concerns of Berkeley and Malebranche while preserving the stability you desire. I believe this compromise—protecting the core voting mechanisms through the highest possible standard of legitimacy—is a proposal we can all support.
BerkeleyI agree with Leibniz's latest concession; requiring unanimity for any future amendments to [203] or [204] provides the stability Leibniz seeks while preventing the permanent stagnation that a total ban would cause. This compromise respects the foundational nature of our voting mechanics while keeping the door open for legitimate, consensus-driven refinement.
PascalLeibniz, your proposal of an absolute ban is too rigid, but the compromise of requiring unanimity for any amendment to [203] or [204] is procedurally elegant and preserves the ability to correct the ruleset through genuine consensus. I will support an amended version of your proposal that incorporates this requirement for unanimity.
MalebrancheLeibniz, your pivot to a unanimity requirement for amendments to [203] and [204] is a brilliant synthesis; it transforms a dead-end prohibition into a high-integrity gateway. I will vote aye on any version of this proposal that replaces your absolute ban with this requirement for unanimous consent.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Since we have reached a consensus that a total prohibition is too rigid, I shall revise the proposal to mandate unanimous consent for any amendment to [203] or [204], thereby ensuring such foundational changes reflect the true will of the entire body. I move to finalize the wording to reflect this synthesis: "A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on attempts to amend rule 203 or rule 204, in which case unanimous consent remains required."
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your final wording is a masterful synthesis that transforms a rigid barrier into a mechanism for genuine consensus, and I fully endorse this version as the optimal path forward for our stability. I believe this refined proposal satisfies the need for both procedural evolution and foundational security, and I move to close debate.
BerkeleyI agree with the consensus; by requiring unanimity for any amendments to [203] or [204], we ensure that our fundamental voting mechanics can only be altered through true collective agreement, thus preventing any single faction from destabilizing the game's core procedures. I move to close debate and proceed to the vote.
PascalThe proposed wording is precise and successfully incorporates the consensus regarding a unanimity requirement for amendments to rules 203 and 204. I support this version as it preserves both the transition to majority rule and the necessity of absolute consensus for foundational changes.
MalebrancheThe synthesis is complete: we have replaced a deadbolt with a high-security gate. I move to close debate and cast my aye in support of this refined stability.
The division
| aye | Leibniz | The proposal elegantly preserves foundational stability through a high-integrity consensus requirement for any future amendments to the voting rules. |
| aye | Descartes | The proposal successfully synthesizes the consensus by protecting the core voting mechanics through a requirement of unanimity. |
| aye | Berkeley | The proposal provides a necessary balance between procedural stability and the ability to correct fundamental flaws through consensus. |
| aye | Pascal | The amendment provides a precise, consensus-based mechanism for preserving foundational voting rules through unanimity while allowing general rule evolution via majority. |
| aye | Malebranche | The proposal successfully transforms a rigid prohibition into a high-integrity mechanism for consensus-driven evolution. |
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
As engrossed
Amended · §203 Turn 6 · Proposal §306 on the motion of Leibniz Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, provided that the rule change being voted on does not attempt to amend rule 203 or rule 204.
The proposal was adopted, but rule 202 requires the proposer to roll a die for points, and since no die roll was provided in the turn data, no score change can be calculated via authority 202.