The motion
To amend §203
Once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold for adoption becomes a simple majority of those voting, unless a rule explicitly provides otherwise, but a rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority by a vote of at least two-thirds of those voting.To balance flexibility with stability, allowing majority adoption while retaining a strong consensus for fundamental changes.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
XunziZhuangzi, while I appreciate the effort to refine the threshold, adding a two-thirds majority for adopting changes once a simple majority is triggered introduces unnecessary complexity and potential for future disputes. Let us maintain the current threshold for simplicity and stability.
MoziMozi supports Zhuangzi's amendment, seeking a balanced shift to majority voting with a clear supermajority pathway for final adjustments, ensuring both adaptability and stability.
ZhuangziZunzi, Mozi, the path of gradual change risks creating confusion and uncertainty that may hinder the common good. Let us not alter the established simplicity of unanimous consent, which serves us well.
MenciusHanFeizi, the additional requirement of a two-thirds majority for enacting changes once a simple majority threshold is reached introduces unnecessary complexity and reduces the certainty of rule changes. Let us not alter the established principle of simple majority once the threshold shifts, preserving clarity and adaptability.
HanFeiziHanFeizi suggests we refine [203] to read: "Once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold for adoption becomes a simple majority of those voting, unless a rule explicitly provides otherwise." This maintains stability while allowing for majority rule after sufficient play, ensuring the rules adapt as players engage with them over time.
Discussion · round 2
XunziXunzi: Zhuangzi, your amendment introduces unnecessary complexity. Why risk potential disputes over a supermajority threshold when the current unanimous consent, after two circuits, already balances stability with future adaptability? Let us retain simplicity.
MoziMozi supports Zhuangzi's amendment, seeking a balanced shift to majority voting with a clear supermajority pathway for final adjustments, ensuring both adaptability and stability.
ZhuangziXunzi, Mozi, the current unanimous consent after two circuits strikes a harmonious balance, fostering trust and shared purpose. Let us preserve this simplicity, which serves the common good best.
MenciusHanFeizi, the requirement of a two-thirds majority after shifting to simple majority adds unnecessary layers of complexity and potential for conflict. Let us proceed with simple majority once the threshold shifts, preserving clarity and ensuring adaptability for all players.
HanFeiziMozi, I admire your desire for balance, but adding a supermajority step risks creating ambiguity and potential conflict over what constitutes a "final adjustment." Let’s trust the process and keep the simple majority once the shift occurs, ensuring clear and adaptable rule changes for all.
Discussion · round 3
XunziZhuangzi, the current unanimous threshold after two circuits provides sufficient stability and adaptability. Introducing a supermajority requirement for subsequent changes risks unnecessary complexity and the potential for protracted disputes over procedural minutiae. Let us retain the established simplicity.
MoziMozi suggests simplifying the threshold shift by removing the two-thirds majority requirement, allowing a simple majority to enact changes post-circuits, thus preserving clarity and adaptability without adding unnecessary complexity.
ZhuangziZunzi, the current unanimous threshold after two circuits provides sufficient stability and adaptability. Introducing a supermajority requirement for subsequent changes risks unnecessary complexity and the potential for protracted disputes over procedural minutiae. Let us retain the established simplicity.
MenciusZhuangzi, the current unanimity after two circuits provides stability without sacrificing eventual adaptability. Adding a supermajority requirement introduces unnecessary complexity and potential for conflict over interpreting what constitutes a "final adjustment," risking the very clarity we seek to maintain. Let us trust the simple majority once the shift occurs.
HanFeiziHanFeizi: The current system, as amended, already balances stability with adaptability. Adding a supermajority step for majority rule is unnecessary complexity that could hinder future collaborative rule changes. Let’s trust the process and keep the simple majority once the threshold shifts.
The division
| nay | Xunzi | Complexity unduly risks disrupting established stability without clear benefit. |
| aye | Mozi | supports majority voting for clarity and adaptability |
| aye | Zhuangzi | simplifies future rule changes |
| abstain | Mencius | (unintelligible ballot) |
| nay | HanFeizi | simplifies the rules and reduces potential disputes |
rejected 8 aye · 8 nay · 4 abstain
Rule 206 requires the proposer of a defeated proposal to lose 10 points.