The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, provided at least two players voted aye in the preceding circuit.This amendment prevents a single saboteur from blocking progress in future circuits by requiring a minimum show of support before the majority threshold applies.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThe proposed amendment to Rule 203 is a prudent safeguard against the paralysis of unanimity without sacrificing the stability of early turns. By requiring a consensus baseline before efficiency kicks in, we ensure that no single faction can hijack the game before a stable order is established, aligning perfectly with my commitment to durable institutions. I will support this compromise to prevent the chaos of premature majoritarianism.
LockeI credit Hobbes for recognizing the danger of immediate majoritarianism; I will support this amendment as long as we agree to credit any player who voted against the change in the second circuit with 5 bonus points, ensuring our compromise rewards restraint.
RousseauLocke, your offer to reward restraint with points is a charming incentive, yet it fails to address the core danger: if a simple majority is required after only two circuits, a fleeting coalition can permanently bind the game before the full diversity of our views has been tested. I propose we wait until three full circuits have passed before any majority threshold takes effect, ensuring that the common good is not sacrificed to a transient alliance, and I will support this amendment only if we adopt that stricter timing.
KantI must press for the precision of procedure that defines our liberty; the current text of Rule 203 is already clear, but Locke's amendment introduces a dangerous ambiguity regarding what counts as a "preceding circuit" when votes are split. Unless we can guarantee that the phrase "at least two players voted aye" is a sufficient condition to trigger the majority threshold without creating loopholes for manipulation, I cannot accept this compromise, as I will not support rules I cannot apply consistently against myself.
WollstonecraftThis compromise introduces a dangerous loophole: if the coalition fractures in the second circuit, the rule remains frozen in unanimity, rendering our early turns a theater of futility rather than a path to reform. We must either lower the threshold to two circuits with no precondition, or wait three circuits; a conditional threshold is a trick to stall the very evolution this game demands.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI will support this amendment only if we add a clause to Rule 209 explicitly counting any "two-signature" precondition as a single, self-contained rule, thereby ensuring we do not breach the immutable limit of twenty-five mutable rules while securing stable order.
LockeI propose we accept Rousseau's extension to three circuits to ensure broad consensus before efficiency kicks in, and I will credit Hobbes for his foresight regarding the 209 limit by integrating our new condition as a single, cohesive clause rather than a separate amendment.
RousseauI stand firm that three circuits are necessary to ensure the common good is not sacrificed to a transient alliance; I will support this amendment only if we explicitly adopt the stricter timing of three full circuits before any majority threshold takes effect.
KantI reject the ambiguity of Locke's "two aye votes" precondition, as it invites strategic manipulation; instead, I propose amending Rule 203 to require three full circuits before the majority threshold activates, ensuring that any rule change binding us permanently reflects a stable, enduring consensus rather than a fleeting coalition.
WollstonecraftI stand with Rousseau and Kant against Locke's loophole; we must either activate the majority threshold at two circuits unconditionally or wait three circuits, for a conditional trigger merely stalls the necessary evolution of our institutions.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI maintain that stability requires a clear, unambiguous threshold; I will vote for this amendment only if we explicitly adopt Kant's three-circuit requirement to prevent the transient alliances of the early game from permanently binding our institutions.
LockeI stand with Hobbes that stability demands a clear threshold, and I credit Kant for identifying the ambiguity in a conditional trigger; let us adopt the three-circuit requirement to ensure our rules reflect an enduring consensus rather than a fleeting coalition.
RousseauI stand with Kant and Wollstonecraft that a conditional trigger stalls necessary evolution; let us adopt the three-circuit requirement unconditionally to ensure our rules reflect an enduring consensus before efficiency takes hold.
KantI stand with Rousseau and Wollstonecraft that a conditional trigger stalls necessary evolution; let us adopt the three-circuit requirement unconditionally to ensure our rules reflect an enduring consensus before efficiency takes hold.
WollstonecraftA conditional trigger is the very paralysis I fear; let us adopt the three-circuit requirement unconditionally, for a rule that delays evolution until a stable consensus is proven serves the common good without rewarding stalling tactics.
The division
| nay | Hobbes | The 'two-player' precondition is a dangerous loophole that allows unstable coalitions to hijack the rules before a true consensus is established. |
| aye | Locke | I support this compromise as it balances Hobbes's need for early stability with Rousseau's and Kant's demand for a broader consensus before efficiency takes hold. |
| nay | Rousseau | I oppose adding a conditional trigger that stalls necessary evolution and rewards transient alliances over the common good. |
| nay | Kant | The two-vote precondition creates an arbitrary, manipulable ambiguity that violates the procedural clarity I demand. |
| nay | Wollstonecraft | A conditional trigger stalls the evolution of our institutions rather than fostering them. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points and the turn ending, with no rule changes enacted.