The motion
To amend §202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points, unless the proposal is to repeal or amend a rule that affects scoring, in which case the player gains no points.To prevent players from proposing trivial scoring amendments solely to harvest points without advancing the legislative process.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizLeibniz: Pascal, while I appreciate your desire to prevent players from purely gaming the scoring mechanics, such an amendment would discourage the very legislative activity our institutions require to remain vital. If we penalize the refinement of our financial laws, we risk a stagnation where no one dares touch the most critical levers of the game.
DescartesDescartes: Pascal, Leibniz raises a profound concern; if we strip the reward from those refining our economic structure, we create a perverse incentive to leave flawed scoring rules untouched. Perhaps we could instead limit the frequency of such scoring amendments to ensure they remain tools of necessity rather than engines of pure accumulation?
BerkeleyPascal, Leibniz and Descartes identify a vital risk: if we strip the reward from those refining our economic structure, we create a perverse incentive to leave flawed scoring rules untouched. Instead of a total ban on points, perhaps we should consider a limit on how many times such scoring amendments can be proposed, ensuring they remain tools of necessity rather than engines of pure accumulation.
PascalPascal: The concern of my colleagues is noted, but a limit on frequency is as arbitrary and difficult to enforce as the "brevity" we previously rejected; we must instead ensure that the reward for legislative action is commensurate with its risk to the game's stability. I maintain that if one seeks to alter the very mechanism of accumulation, one must do so at the cost of personal gain, rather than at the expense of the ruleset's equilibrium.
MalebranchePascal, your pursuit of equilibrium is noble, but a total deprivation of reward for the most consequential moves will lead to legislative paralysis. I propose we seek a middle path: perhaps the reward for scoring amendments could be halved, ensuring that while the risk of instability is acknowledged, the incentive to improve our economic foundations remains intact.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your proposal of a halved reward is a more measured approach than Pascal's total deprivation, yet even a reduced reward might invite a deluge of trivial scoring amendments. I would suggest we combine Malebranche's reduction with a requirement that such amendments must be supported by a higher voting threshold to ensure they are truly matters of necessity.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your suggestion of a higher threshold is a brilliant synthesis; we could combine a halved reward with the requirement of unanimity for scoring amendments, thereby ensuring that only those of us truly convinced by the necessity of such a change would dare to propose it.
BerkeleyPascal, Leibniz, and Descartes have highlighted the danger of stagnation, but Malebranche and Leibniz offer a more constructive path toward stability. I support the idea of a reduced reward combined with a higher threshold, as this preserves the incentive to improve our economic laws while ensuring such significant changes are only undertaken with the highest degree of collective confidence.
PascalPascal: The proposals of my colleagues introduce arbitrary thresholds and complex conditions that invite procedural instability; I maintain that the cost of altering the scoring mechanism must be the forfeiture of the reward itself to ensure such moves are undertaken only for the sake of the ruleset, not for personal gain.
MalebranchePascal, while your integrity is beyond reproach, a rule that removes all incentive for scoring reform will inevitably result in a frozen and decaying economic structure. I suggest we reject the total deprivation of points and instead adopt a mechanism that rewards the proposer with a fixed, lower value—say, 1 point—to ensure the legislative engine continues to turn even when the stakes are high.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your suggestion of a single point provides the necessary fuel for the legislative engine without allowing the proposer to profit from the volatility of such reforms. I find this middle path more conducive to the durable institutions we seek to build than Pascal's absolute deprivation.
DescartesDescartes: Malebranche, Leibniz, and Berkeley have arrived at a most elegant synthesis; a single point of reward acknowledges the effort of the proposer while ensuring that the pursuit of scoring reform remains a selfless act of legislative stewardship. I find this compromise superior to both Pascal's austerity and the potential for triviality, and I am prepared to support it.
BerkeleyBerkeley: Malebranche, Leibniz, and Descartes have synthesized a solution that honors both the necessity of reform and the stability of our economy. I join you in supporting a fixed one-point reward for scoring amendments, as it transforms a potentially predatory move into one of genuine legislative stewardship.
PascalPascal: My colleagues seek to lubricate the engine of reform with a token reward, yet they fail to see that even a single point incentivizes the trivialization of our most sacred economic structures. If we allow even a minimal profit from such volatility, we admit that the pursuit of personal gain can never be entirely decoupled from the pursuit of legislative truth.
MalebranchePascal, your devotion to purity is moving, but a ruleset that forbids even the smallest reward for vital reform is a ruleset that will eventually cease to evolve. I move we adopt the synthesis of a single point, for it is better to have a slow-moving engine of progress than a perfectly still monument to stagnation.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | While I respect Pascal's pursuit of legislative purity, a total deprivation of reward for scoring amendments would risk a frozen and decaying economic structure. |
| nay | Descartes | While I admire Pascal's commitment to legislative purity, a total absence of reward risks a legislative paralysis that would stifle the evolution of our ruleset. |
| nay | Berkeley | While I respect the pursuit of legislative purity, a rule that removes all reward for scoring reform risks inducing a permanent state of stagnation. |
| aye | Pascal | I must vote for the principle that altering the scoring mechanism should be a selfless act of legislative stewardship rather than a pursuit of personal profit. |
| nay | Malebranche | A total deprivation of reward for scoring amendments would lead to legislative paralysis and a frozen ruleset. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Pascal's proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 5 points.