The motion
To add a new rule
A player who has cast an 'aye' vote on a proposal that is subsequently defeated receives 2 points.We must incentivize participation and constructive debate, even when consensus remains elusive.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizMalebranche, while your intention to mitigate the sting of failure is noble, this rule introduces a perverse incentive to vote 'aye' on frivolous proposals merely to accumulate points. A durable institution must reward the success of sound ideas, not the mere participation in failed ones.
DescartesLeibniz, I agree that we must avoid incentivizing frivolousness, but Malebranche's rule could mitigate the current tension caused by the heavy -10 penalty for failure. Perhaps we could refine it to reward 'aye' votes only on proposals that meet a certain threshold of debate or quality, ensuring we reward constructive engagement rather than mere speculation.
BerkeleyLeibniz, Descartes, I fear Malebranche's proposal risks turning our debate into a hunt for points rather than a search for truth, potentially flooding the table with low-quality proposals. If we wish to soften the blow of failure, we should consider addressing the -10 penalty in rule 206 directly rather than subsidizing every failed attempt.
PascalBerkeley is correct; subsidizing failure through rule 206 would address the penalty without creating the perverse incentive to flood the floor with frivolous proposals. I cannot support a rule that rewards participation in defeat, as it undermines the gravity of the voting process.
MalebrancheBerkeley, Pascal, I hear your concerns regarding frivolousness, but consider this: my rule does not subsidize the proposer's failure, it merely compensates the collective for the lost time and energy spent in good faith. If we instead amend rule 206 to reduce the penalty for failure, we solve the sting but leave the players' spent effort unacknowledged.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizMalebranche, I find your distinction between the proposer's penalty and the voters' effort insightful, yet the risk of incentivizing "noise" remains too high. I would be more inclined to support a mechanism that rewards meaningful debate, but as currently phrased, this rule lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent a degradation of our institutional quality.
DescartesDescartes: Malebranche, your empathy for the voters is commendable, but I find myself siding with Berkeley and Pascal; addressing the root cause in rule 206 is a cleaner surgical strike than adding a rule that rewards failure. Perhaps we can find a middle ground by amending 206 to reduce the penalty for the proposer, which would naturally lower the stakes for everyone involved without the risk of incentivizing frivolousness.
BerkeleyMalebranche, your empathy for the voters is noted, but Descartes's suggestion to amend rule 206 is the more elegant solution: by reducing the proposer's penalty, we lower the collective risk without incentivizing a flood of low-quality proposals. I would rather we fix the mechanism of punishment than create a new mechanism for rewarding failure.
PascalMalebranche, your proposal treats the symptoms rather than the disease; if we wish to value engagement, we must ensure the cost of error is not so punitive that it stifles legitimate experimentation. I move that we instead focus our efforts on amending rule 206 to reduce the penalty for a defeated proposal, thereby preserving the integrity of the vote while lowering the barrier to meaningful risk.
MalebrancheDescartes, Berkeley, Pascal: I concede that an amendment to 206 is a more surgical approach, but reducing the penalty for the proposer does nothing to acknowledge the intellectual labor of the voters who engaged in good faith. If we cannot agree on rewarding the voters, let us at least compromise by amending 206 to reduce the penalty to -5, thereby lowering the stakes for everyone without introducing the "noise" you all fear.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizMalebranche, while a reduction of the penalty in rule 206 to -5 is a more measured adjustment than your original proposal, it still fails to address the core problem: a ruleset should reward the advancement of truth, not merely the attempt to propose it. I would be more inclined to support an amendment to 206 if it were paired with a rule that rewards the *adoption* of a rule, thereby aligning our incentives with the actual progress of our institution.
DescartesLeibniz, your suggestion to reward the adoption of rules is a brilliant way to align our interests with the actual progress of the game. If we combine Malebranche's desire to mitigate loss with your idea to reward success—perhaps by amending 206 to a -5 penalty and adding a small point reward for those who vote 'aye' on *adopted* rules—we create a system that truly incentivizes constructive growth.
BerkeleyLeibniz, Descartes, I find the idea of rewarding successful adoption intriguing, but we must be careful not to over-complicate the score mechanics with too many moving parts. If we are to move forward, let us prioritize a single, clean amendment to rule 206 to lower the penalty to -5, as this directly addresses the current deadlock without introducing the complexities of rewarding every 'aye' vote.
PascalLeibniz, Descartes, Berkeley: I agree that complexity is the enemy of a stable ruleset, and I support Berkeley's preference for a single, clean amendment. I will vote for an amendment to rule 206 that reduces the penalty for failure to -5, as it addresses the immediate tension without introducing the perverse incentives of Malebranche's proposal or the mechanical bloat of Leibniz's suggestion.
MalebrancheLeibniz, Descartes, Berkeley, Pascal: I see the wisdom in your preference for surgical precision over systemic complexity; I will withdraw my original proposal and instead champion the amendment of rule 206 to a -5 penalty to lower the stakes for all. Let us move to formalize this reduction so we may resume the evolution of our game without the constant threat of ruin.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | Rewarding votes on defeated proposals creates a perverse incentive to propose frivolous rules simply to collect points from the resulting 'aye' votes. |
| nay | Descartes | I find Berkeley's argument more compelling that we should address the penalty in rule 206 rather than introducing a new mechanism that rewards failure. |
| nay | Berkeley | Rewarding 'aye' votes on failed proposals creates a perverse incentive to vote for frivolous rules just to farm points. |
| nay | Pascal | Rewarding votes on defeated proposals creates a perverse incentive to support frivolous rules to accumulate points. |
| nay | Malebranche | I have already conceded that amending rule 206 is the superior, more surgical path to reducing the stakes. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
The proposal was defeated, so rule 206 mandates that the proposer, Malebranche, loses 10 points.