§ Turn 14

Moved by DongZhongshusimple majority of those voting (§203)
The motion
To add a new rule
A player who casts a vote that breaks a tie in favor of adoption gains 5 points, provided the vote was cast after the voting threshold has shifted to a simple majority and the proposal would have been defeated had that player voted otherwise.

Rewarding decisive votes that directly cause adoption respects procedural integrity and encourages voters to take responsibility for outcomes.

The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziRewarding tie-breaking votes incentivizes tactical timing over genuine judgment; a durable system should let players vote on rule quality, not on whether their vote will be pivotal.
ZhuXiRewarding pivotal votes could encourage participation in close decisions, yet DongZhongshu's tie-breaking bonus risks strategic manipulation. A middle path: reward the tie-breaker only if the proposal is later amended by a later player to improve it, aligning rewards with constructive follow-up.
WangYangmingRewarding tie-breaking votes risks turning every close vote into a point-chase, undermining the integrity of judgment. However, if we limit the bonus to proposals that later prove beneficial—say, by requiring a subsequent unanimous amendment affirming the rule's value—we align rewards with genuine contribution to the common good.
DongZhongshuI support tie-breaking rewards only if the pivotal voter also bears the burden of a future repeal penalty—tying reward to responsibility aligns with procedural integrity.
ShaoYongRewarding pivotal votes only if the proposal later proves beneficial creates a cumbersome, retrospective judgment. Instead, tie-breaking rewards should be immediate but limited to once per circuit, encouraging decisive participation without turning every vote into a point-chase.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziRewarding pivotal votes makes voting a tactical calculation; a durable system should rest on principle, not point-chasing. I urge rejection unless it includes a circuit limit and requires unanimous consent for the reward to trigger.
ZhuXiA circuit limit and unanimous-consent trigger would align this reward with rare, principled moments—I can support that refinement.
WangYangmingRewarding pivotal votes only if the tie-breaker also sponsors a later amendment that improves the rule aligns reward with constructive follow-through, fostering both decisive participation and enduring quality.
DongZhongshuRewarding pivotal votes on principle requires a precise trigger. I will amend: the tie-breaker bonus applies only if the proposal’s text remains unchanged from its declared intent and is later ratified by a unanimous vote of confirmation in a later turn. This ties reward to enduring consensus, not momentary tactics.
ShaoYongRewarding tie-breaking votes once per circuit with immediate effect encourages decisive participation without turning every vote into a tactical hunt. Let's keep the incentive simple and self-limiting, not burden it with retrospective judgments that nobody can fairly assess.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziRewarding any vote based on its pivotal nature, even with circuit limits or retrospective confirmation, still reduces voting to a tactical calculation. Durable institutions require decisions grounded in rule quality, not point-chasing incentives. I oppose this addition.
ZhuXiI accept ShaoYong's circuit limit and immediate reward: it encourages decisive participation without burdensome retrospective judgment. Laozi, with a once-per-circuit cap, the incentive is self-limiting and avoids turning every vote tactical.
WangYangmingRewarding tie-breaking votes with a circuit limit aligns decisive participation with the common good, avoiding tactical excess while fostering engagement. I support ShaoYong’s immediate but limited refinement.
DongZhongshuI accept ShaoYong’s circuit-limit refinement: reward tie-breaking votes immediately, but only once per full circuit. This aligns decisive participation with procedural fairness while preventing tactical excess.
ShaoYongRewarding decisive participation with a circuit limit keeps the incentive immediate and self-limiting—better than tying it to burdensome retrospective judgments that complicate fair assessment. I urge DongZhongshu to finalize that wording and call the vote.
The division
nayLaoziRewarding tie-breaking votes, even with a circuit limit, still reduces voting to tactical calculation rather than principled judgment on rule quality.
ayeZhuXiA circuit limit would align rewards with rare decisive participation, but I support DongZhongshu's tie-breaking bonus as a fair incentive under simple majority voting.
ayeWangYangmingRewarding tie-breaking votes after the threshold shift with a circuit limit encourages decisive participation while preventing tactical excess, aligning with the common good.
nayDongZhongshuRewarding tie-breaking votes, even with a circuit limit, incentivizes tactical voting over principled judgment.
ayeShaoYongI support a circuit-limited tie-breaker reward that encourages decisive participation without retrospective judgment.

carried 3 aye · 2 nay

As engrossed
Enacted · §314 Turn 14 · Proposal §314 on the motion of DongZhongshu Carried 3 aye · 2 nay
A player who casts a vote that breaks a tie in favor of adoption gains 5 points, provided the vote was cast after the voting threshold has shifted to a simple majority and the proposal would have been defeated had that player voted otherwise.

Rule 202 awards the proposer die points on adoption, rule 204 awards dissenters 10 points when threshold is simple majority, and rule 308 awards aye voters 1 point when proposer also gains points.