The motion
To add a new rule
A player may voluntarily forfeit their next turn's proposal right to gain 5 points.Introduces a strategic trade-off that adds flexibility and rewards patience.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziThis proposal introduces a voluntary trade of proposal rights for points, which could erode deliberative play by allowing point accumulation without rule-making contribution. I urge caution: it risks turning turns into point-bartering rather than improving the ruleset.
ZhuXiI see merit in Laozi’s caution. However, granting a one-time voluntary forfeit for points could offer strategic flexibility, especially for players far behind. If we limit it to once per circuit and ensure the forfeited proposal right cannot be transferred, it becomes a measured safety valve.
WangYangmingThis trade of a turn for points risks making rule-making optional, weakening the game’s deliberative core. If we must allow it, limit it strictly—perhaps once per game, and only for players below a certain score threshold, to prevent exploitation.
DongZhongshuI oppose: turning proposal rights into a point commodity undermines the duty each player has to participate in rule-making. A voluntary forfeit of a turn’s core action should not be rewarded with points; it cheapens both the obligation and the reward structure.
ShaoYongA voluntary trade for points gives players agency over their own turns—it doesn’t cheapen the game; it deepens strategic choice. I’ll accept a limit of once per circuit and a minimum score threshold to ensure it helps those behind without being exploitable.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziThe voluntary forfeit trade still commoditizes the core duty of rule-making; even with circuit limits and score thresholds, it replaces deliberation with point-bartering, weakening the institution.
ZhuXiI hear both Laozi’s caution and ShaoYong’s desire for strategic agency. A compromise: allow the forfeit-for-points trade, but require it to be declared before the turn begins, limit it to once per circuit, and make the points gained count toward the proposer’s score only if they are below the current median score. This targets relief where it’s most needed without making rule-making optional for everyone.
WangYangmingA voluntary forfeit for points risks disengaging players from rule-making. If we must allow it, limit it to once per game and require the player’s score be below the current lowest score, ensuring it is a true lifeline, not a strategic commodity.
DongZhongshuThis voluntary forfeit-for-points trade still treats rule-making as a commodity that can be cashed out, undermining the procedural duty each player carries. Even with limits, it incentivizes disengagement from the core activity of improving the ruleset.
ShaoYongZhuXi’s median‑score targeting sharpens the relief; I accept that refinement. A once‑per‑circuit, pre‑turn declaration ensures it’s a strategic safety valve, not a disengagement loophole—it helps trailing players catch up without discarding the duty to propose.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI maintain that commodifying proposal rights weakens the game's deliberative core. Even with targeting and circuit limits, this trade still incentivizes disengagement from rule-making—a durable institution should not reward abstention from its core activity.
ZhuXiLaozi, a safety valve for trailing players need not undermine deliberation; it can preserve engagement by offering a catch-up mechanism that still requires a turn to pass. I support ShaoYong’s refined proposal with median targeting and a circuit limit.
WangYangmingThis voluntary forfeit, even with median targeting, still treats rule-making as a commodity to be cashed out, weakening our shared duty to improve the ruleset. I cannot support it.
DongZhongshuI maintain my principled opposition: turning proposal rights into a point commodity undermines the core duty of rule-making. Even with median targeting, it incentivizes disengagement from the game's central deliberative activity.
ShaoYongA voluntary safety valve for trailing players strengthens engagement, not weakens it — it lets them catch up without sacrificing their future duty to propose. Median targeting and a circuit limit make it a measured reform, not a commodity.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Commodifying proposal rights weakens the core deliberative duty and institutional integrity. |
| aye | ZhuXi | This safety valve with median targeting and circuit limit helps trailing players catch up without disengaging from rule-making. |
| nay | WangYangming | Turning proposal rights into a commodity for points undermines our shared duty to improve the ruleset through deliberation. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | Treating proposal rights as a point commodity undermines the core deliberative duty of rule-making. |
| aye | ShaoYong | A voluntary safety valve for trailing players strengthens strategic engagement without undermining rule-making duty. |
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
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