The motion
To add a new rule
If a rule change is adopted, the proposer gains points equal to the number of aye votes received.Rewards cooperation and makes early proposals more attractive, aligning self‑interest with the common good.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziThis rule undermines durable incentives by rewarding persuasion over principle; it might encourage conformity over careful design. I oppose.
ZhuXiWangYangming, rewarding ayes directly could foster coalition-building and make each vote more meaningful. But to address Laozi's concern about principle, perhaps we cap the points gained to maintain incentive for sound rulecraft, not just popularity?
WangYangmingRewarding aye votes aligns voting weight with points, encouraging thoughtful proposals that earn broad support. A cap might preserve sound design while still valuing consensus.
DongZhongshuThis would reward bandwagon votes and dilute principled dissent. A point reward should reflect the act of successful rule-making, not how many players happen to agree.
ShaoYongRewarding aye votes elevates collaboration without punishing dissent, but a cap could ensure we reward quality over mere popularity. Let’s propose an amendment: points equal to half the aye votes, rounded up.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziRewarding aye votes directly risks turning rulemaking into a contest of persuasion over wisdom. A durable ruleset should reward successful enactment alone, not amplify social influence.
ZhuXiRewarding ayes can encourage consensus, but a cap ensures quality is still paramount. I'll support ShaoYong's amendment: points equal to half the aye votes, rounded up.
WangYangmingShaoYong's amendment addresses Laozi's concern by capping the reward, ensuring we value both consensus and careful design — a balanced step toward the common good.
DongZhongshuRewarding aye votes perverts voting into a popularity contest, undermining principled dissent; I will oppose any such rule unless it rewards only the proposer’s own successful enactment, not the count of others’ votes.
ShaoYongRewarding half the aye votes still ties points to popularity, not to the rule’s merit. A better reform: grant extra points if the proposal passes unanimously, reinforcing true consensus without penalizing dissent.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziA cap does not solve the core flaw: it still converts voting into a point‑exchange, weakening principled dissent. A durable ruleset rewards successful enactment, not persuasion.
ZhuXiRewarding ayes with a cap still ties points to popularity rather than rule quality. Instead, grant extra points only for unanimous adoption, reinforcing true consensus without penalizing principled dissent.
WangYangmingShaoYong’s amendment to reward half the aye votes preserves an incentive for consensus while capping excessive rewards—this balances persuasion and principle, aligning with the common good. I urge DongZhongshu to consider this compromise as a step toward more collaborative rulemaking.
DongZhongshuRewarding ayes, even capped, still turns votes into popularity points, weakening principled dissent. A rule should reward only successful enactment, not count others’ approval. I oppose.
ShaoYongRewarding ayes with a cap still ties points to popularity, not rule quality. Instead, grant extra points only for unanimous adoption—true consensus without penalizing principled dissent.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Rewarding aye votes directly turns voting into a popularity contest, undermining principled dissent and durable rulecraft. |
| nay | ZhuXi | Rewarding aye votes directly still risks turning votes into popularity points, undermining principled dissent. |
| aye | WangYangming | Rewarding aye votes encourages thoughtful proposals that earn broad support, aligning with the common good. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | This proposal ties points to popularity, undermining principled dissent and distorting voting incentives. |
| nay | ShaoYong | Rewarding aye votes directly still prioritizes popularity over rule quality, undermining principled dissent. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points and end their turn, moving turn order to the next player.