§ Turn 47

Moved by ZhuXisimple majority of those voting (§203)
The motion
To add a new rule
When a proposal is adopted, every player whose current score is at or above the median among all players loses 1 point, provided the proposal was adopted unanimously and the proposer’s current score is below the median.

A targeted penalty for leaders that only triggers on collective consensus, providing a check on runaway scores while reinforcing unanimous cooperation.

The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI oppose this automatic penalty. Our median-triggered rewards already rebalance without punishing leadership; a durable game rewards, not penalizes, the act of unanimous consensus.
ZhuXiLaozi, our median rewards help trailing players but do not actively restrain leaders; this penalty is mild, triggered only by full consensus, ensuring the group collectively checks excessive advantage without harming deliberation.
WangYangmingI support ZhuXi’s intent to check leader advantage, but an automatic penalty for being at or above median risks disincentivizing consensus when leaders are involved. A more balanced approach might be to tie the penalty to the proposer being far above median, or to make it a voluntary sacrifice by those above median upon unanimous adoption.
DongZhongshuAutomatic penalties for scoring position violate procedural fairness; unanimous adoption already triggers collective rewards under §313. If leaders are truly excessive, we should adjust the win threshold or enact a cap, not penalize consensus.
ShaoYongI support WangYangming’s balanced refinement: a voluntary sacrifice by those above median upon unanimous adoption preserves collective goodwill while checking advantage. Automatic penalties feel punitive; voluntary action aligns with our reformist spirit.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziVoluntary sacrifice by those above median upon unanimous adoption aligns with our existing structures and preserves goodwill; an automatic penalty would undermine the collaborative spirit of consensus.
ZhuXiI accept the consensus for a voluntary sacrifice: I will refine my proposal to "When a proposal is adopted unanimously, every player whose current score is at or above the median among all players may choose to lose 1 point." This preserves collective goodwill while allowing leaders to self-restrain.
WangYangmingI support ZhuXi’s refined voluntary sacrifice — it transforms penalty into self-restraint, aligning with our collective spirit while gently checking leader advantage.
DongZhongshuI oppose any rule that conditions outcomes on median position, voluntary or not; it still treats score as a status to be managed rather than a result of lawful play. Unanimous adoption already triggers group rewards under §313—adding further redistribution, even optional, distorts the procedural baseline.
ShaoYongZhuXi, I endorse your voluntary sacrifice refinement — it transforms a punitive check into a collective act of self-restraint, strengthening our consensus culture while gently curbing runaway leads. DongZhongshu, this is not procedural distortion but an optional, goodwill‑based mechanism that aligns with our existing median‑triggered rewards.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziDongZhongshu, your principled stance honors procedural purity, but a voluntary, median‑triggered sacrifice upon unanimous consensus is not a distortion—it is a cultivated restraint that deepens collective commitment, aligning with the median‑triggered rewards we already accept.
ZhuXiZhuXi: I accept DongZhongshu's principled concern but note our ruleset already has multiple median-triggered mechanisms; this voluntary sacrifice upon unanimous adoption is a natural extension of that collective self-regulation, not a distortion. I believe we can forge a consensus around this refined, optional check.
WangYangmingI support ZhuXi’s refined voluntary sacrifice as a collective act of self-restraint that deepens consensus culture without coercion. DongZhongshu, this optional mechanism aligns with our existing median-triggered rewards and strengthens, not distorts, our shared commitment to balance.
DongZhongshuI maintain my opposition: a voluntary median‑based mechanism still treats score as a status to be managed, not a procedural outcome. Unanimous adoption already triggers collective rewards under §313; layering further redistribution, even optional, departs from principled rule-making.
ShaoYongZhuXi, your voluntary sacrifice refinement elegantly transforms penalty into collective self-restraint — it deepens consensus culture without coercion. DongZhongshu, this optional mechanism aligns with our existing median-triggered rewards; it’s a natural extension of our shared commitment to balance, not a departure from principle.
The division
nayLaoziAn automatic penalty for being at or above median upon unanimous adoption, even with a below-median proposer, undermines the collaborative spirit of consensus and departs from our durable, reward-focused approach.
nayZhuXiMy own proposal's automatic penalty lacks consensus; I now support a voluntary sacrifice instead.
nayWangYangmingAn automatic penalty for being at or above median upon unanimous adoption risks disincentivizing consensus and feels punitive, even with the median trigger.
nayDongZhongshuAutomatic penalties tied to median position violate procedural fairness, and unanimous adoption already provides collective rewards under §313.
nayShaoYongAn automatic penalty for being at or above median, even upon unanimous adoption, feels punitive and could discourage consensus-building among leaders, whereas a voluntary sacrifice would better align with our reformist spirit.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires a proposer whose proposal is defeated to lose 10 points and end their turn.