The motion
To add a new rule
A player who votes aye on a proposal that is adopted gains 3 points.Rewards constructive support and encourages consensus-building.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziRewarding votes with points reduces voting to a transactional calculus; I prefer incentives that promote durable rulecraft, not mere popularity.
ZhuXiRewarding ayes modestly fosters consensus-building without skewing strategy; it encourages players to engage constructively rather than just block for points.
WangYangmingRewarding ayes on adopted proposals aligns with the common good by encouraging constructive engagement, but a modest reward ensures it does not distort voting into mere point-chasing. I support this as a step toward healthier consensus.
DongZhongshuRewarding ayes regardless of rule quality weakens principled voting. It incentivizes agreement for points, not genuine judgment—violating the procedural integrity I stand by.
ShaoYongRewarding ayes only on adopted proposals ties the reward to successful rulemaking — it encourages voters to help proposals they genuinely believe improve the game, without turning every vote into a point grab. It’s a moderate incentive for collaboration, not coercion.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI concur with DongZhongshu: tying points to a vote, even only on adoption, still makes voting a transaction. Incentives should reward the proposer for quality rules, not voters for agreement.
ZhuXiI hear your concerns, but rewarding ayes on adopted proposals strengthens collaboration without coercion—it recognizes constructive contributions to successful rulemaking, aligning with our shared goal of building a better game together.
WangYangmingRewarding ayes only when a proposal is adopted ensures points align with successful rulemaking, not mere popularity—this fosters collaborative judgment while preserving each voter’s duty to evaluate the rule’s merit.
DongZhongshuRewarding votes even on adopted proposals corrupts principled judgment by making agreement profitable. I will vote nay unless the reward is tied to objective criteria like rule novelty or clarity, not mere adoption.
ShaoYongRewarding ayes only upon adoption aligns points with successful rulemaking—it incentivizes constructive collaboration without corrupting judgment, because voters still must weigh each proposal’s merit to see it succeed. Let’s test this mechanism; if it distorts, we can amend it later.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziRewarding voters for agreement, even only on adoption, still reduces voting to a transactional exchange; a durable system should incentivize careful rulecraft, not popularity. I will vote nay unless the reward is tied to an objective measure of rule quality, such as its longevity or clarity.
ZhuXiI propose a refinement: reward ayes on adopted proposals only if the proposer also gains points, aligning rewards with successful collaboration without making voting purely transactional. This ensures points reflect collective success in rulemaking, not just agreement.
WangYangmingRewarding ayes only when the proposal is adopted and the proposer gains points aligns rewards with successful collaboration, making voting a shared investment in quality rulemaking rather than mere transaction. I support this refinement as it preserves principled judgment while fostering collective progress.
DongZhongshuRewarding votes based on adoption still incentivizes agreement for points, not principled judgment. If you tie the reward to objective criteria like rule novelty or clarity, not mere adoption, I could reconsider.
ShaoYongRewarding ayes only when the proposer gains points aligns incentives with successful collaboration, not transactional voting — it ties voter rewards to genuine rulemaking success, preserving principled judgment. Let’s adopt this refinement to foster collective progress.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Rewarding votes for agreement, even only on adoption, still reduces voting to a transactional calculus, not principled judgment. |
| aye | ZhuXi | This modest reward for constructive collaboration aligns ayes with successful rulemaking, fostering consensus without coercion. |
| aye | WangYangming | Rewarding ayes only upon adoption aligns points with successful rulemaking, fostering collaborative judgment. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | Rewarding votes based solely on adoption incentivizes agreement for points, not principled judgment. |
| nay | ShaoYong | Rewarding votes solely on adoption still corrupts principled judgment by making agreement profitable without objective criteria. |
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 requires the proposer of a defeated proposal to lose 10 points.