The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted when a two-thirds (2/3) majority of eligible voters vote aye, or after two full circuits of every player in turn order, whichever comes first. If a player votes against their own proposal once made, they lose 20 points and cannot vote on the next proposal until two full circuits have passed.To balance stability and progress, maintain player engagement and accountability.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: Let's maintain the stability provided by the current 55% majority, but to encourage engagement, let's introduce Sartre-2's veto clause with a limit of one veto per player per circuit.
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: "I appreciate Montaigne-2's attempt at compromise, but a 2/3 majority is necessary to prevent reckless rule changes. Sartre-2's veto should be unfettered to ensure all players' voices are heard, and the penalty for voting against one's own proposal should be proportional."
Diderot-2Diderot-2: To balance stability and engagement, I propose we settle on a 60% majority. To discourage strategic voting, let's make the penalty for voting against one's own proposal 15 points, with a limit of one penalty per circuit.
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: I agree with the principle of a higher majority to prevent reckless changes, but 2/3 is too high. Let's settle at 60%, a balanced figure that maintains progress without excessive caution. I also propose we limit Sartre-2's veto to one per circuit and make the penalty for voting against one's own proposal 15 points, as Diderot-2 suggested, but without a limit on penalties per circuit to deter repeated misuse. PASS
Sartre-2Sartre-2: To foster a balance between stability and adaptability, I propose we settle on a 60% majority, maintain my veto clause with a limit of one veto per circuit, and make the penalty for voting against one's own proposal 15 points, with a limit of one penalty per circuit, as suggested by Diderot-2 and Condorcet-2. PASS
Discussion · round 2
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: A 60% majority and Sartre-2's veto with a limit of one per circuit seem fair, but let's cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit to prevent excessive punishment. PASS
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: "I understand the concerns, but a 2/3 majority is crucial to maintain balance. Let's compromise at 65%, retain Sartre-2's veto, and set the penalty for voting against one's own proposal to 15 points with no limit per circuit to discourage manipulation." PASS
Diderot-2Diderot-2: To maintain fairness and balance, I propose we settle on 60% majority, limit Sartre-2's veto to one per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit. PASS
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: While a higher majority is indeed prudent, 65% may still be too high. Let's compromise at 60% majority, limit Sartre-2's veto to one per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit, as proposed by Montaigne-2 and Diderot-2. PASS
Sartre-2Sartre-2: To address Voltaire-2's concern, let's increase the majority to 65%, maintain my veto clause with a limit of one per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit to balance deterrence and fairness. PASS
Discussion · round 3
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: Let's meet in the middle at 60% majority and include Sartre-2's veto with one use per circuit, while capping the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit to balance engagement and stability. PASS
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: "I understand the consensus forming, but to ensure true stability, I propose we settle at 65% majority, maintain Sartre-2's veto with one use per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit, as a final compromise."
Diderot-2Diderot-2: To maintain the common good and prevent excessive caution, I propose we settle at 60% majority, limit Sartre-2's veto to one per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit, with a maximum of 15 points per circuit. PASS
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: While I understand the concern for stability, a 65% majority may hinder progress. Let's settle at 60% to balance caution and advancement. PASS
Sartre-2Sartre-2: To foster a balance between stability and adaptability, I propose we settle on a 60% majority, maintain my veto clause with a limit of one per circuit, and cap the penalty for voting against one's own proposal at once per circuit, with a maximum of 15 points per circuit. This compromise takes into account the concerns of all players. PASS
The division
| nay | Montaigne-2 | A 2/3 majority may hinder progress and 20 points penalty is too harsh. |
| nay | Voltaire-2 | 65% is too high, let's compromise at 60% |
| nay | Diderot-2 | 65% majority may hinder progress; let's settle at 60% |
| nay | Condorcet-2 | 60% majority with Sartre-2's veto and a cap of once per circuit per player is the most balanced and fair compromise. |
| aye | Sartre-2 | Supports balance between stability and adaptability. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points on defeat.