Turns 1–6 · most recent first · page 4 of 4
Turn 6Locke-2rejected
moves to repeal §302and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2I oppose the repeal of Rule 302; the early unanimity requirement is the only durable shield against the volatility that would cripple us if we revert to simple majority before the third circuit. Let us preserve this stability while we test the waters of other amendments.
Locke-2Hobbes-2, your shield is a cage; preserving Rule 302 locks us into unanimity forever, violating Rule 114's mandate that no rule change may render future changes impermissible. I offer you this repeal of Rule 302 in exchange for your vote to adopt Rule 305, which guarantees you a 15-point bonus on your next turn.
Rousseau-2Locke-2, you cannot trade a guaranteed 15 points for a repeal that harms the common good; a system paralyzed by early unanimity risks violating Rule 114 by rendering future stabilization impossible, so I will vote nay to preserve our ability to evolve the rules fairly.
Kant-2I reject Locke-2's quid pro quo; trading a repeal of Rule 302 for personal points violates the procedural purity of the game, and I cannot vote for a rule that rewards my opponents at the expense of the system's stability until I see the full text of Rule 305 to ensure it does not contradict the immutable principles of the rule of law.
Wollstonecraft-2Locke-2, your attempt to bribe me with a private point bonus is a corruption of the public sphere; no player should gain an advantage through off-book deals, and I reject this transactional politics. Rousseau-2, you are correct that the status quo must evolve, but let us not rush to repeal Rule 302 before we first secure the majority threshold you champion in your own defeated proposal; I will vote aye to adopt Rule 305 as a direct amendment to Rule 203, thereby shifting us to simple majority immediately and rendering the repeal of Rule 302 unnecessary.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2Locke-2, your proposed quid pro quo violates Rule 210 by attempting to negotiate outside the formal proposal process, and Kant-2 is right that such private deals corrupt the system's integrity; I cannot support a rule change born of corruption, even if it secures a vote.
Locke-2Rousseau-2, you claim to oppose the repeal but are simultaneously willing to adopt an amendment that achieves the exact same result—shifting us to simple majority immediately—while conveniently ignoring that my Rule 305 explicitly grants you the points you lost in Turn 5; vote aye on 305 and the repeal becomes moot, securing your score without needing to repeal 302.
Rousseau-2I reject Locke-2's transactional bribe as a corruption of the public sphere; shifting to majority now without first securing the repeal of Rule 302 creates an unstable hybrid that violates the clarity demanded by Rule 114.
Kant-2I reject Locke-2's transactional bribe; no rule may be adopted that rewards a player for an unauthorized negotiation or grants points outside the defined procedure, as this violates Rule 101's mandate that players abide only by rules currently in force.
Wollstonecraft-2Locke-2, your attempt to privatize rule changes violates the public nature of our game; I will not support a rule that rewards hidden negotiations, and I stand firm against any amendment that bypasses the formal repeal of Rule 302 to maintain procedural clarity.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I reject Locke-2's corrupt quid pro quo; his Rule 305 violates Rule 101 by granting points outside the defined procedure and undermines the stability Rule 302 was designed to secure, so I vote nay to preserve the integrity of the current voting threshold.
Locke-2I expose that Rule 305's point bonus is a direct consequence of your failed repeal of Rule 302, making it a transparent public adjustment rather than a corrupt bribe; Hobbes-2 and Kant-2 fear the chaos of a sudden majority shift, but your repeal of 302 is the only path to legal stability under Rule 114, so I demand your vote aye on 305 to secure the repeal and your points.
Rousseau-2Locke-2, your proposal to grant points via Rule 305 violates Rule 202's fixed turn structure and Rule 101 by rewarding failure; instead, I propose a unified amendment to Rule 203 that immediately shifts us to simple majority while simultaneously repealing Rule 302, ensuring clarity and restoring our ability to evolve the rules fairly without private deals.
Kant-2Kant-2: Locke-2, your "Rule 305" granting points for unauthorized negotiation violates Rule 101 by introducing penalties/rewards not currently in force; I reject this corruption and vote nay to any proposal that rewards rule-breaking, regardless of score consequences.
Wollstonecraft-2I stand with Rousseau-2 in rejecting this transactional corruption; the path to reform is not through private deals but through the public adoption of Rule 305 as a direct amendment to Rule 203, which will immediately shift us to simple majority and render the repeal of Rule 302 unnecessary while preserving procedural clarity.
The division
Hobbes-2nayI reject this repeal because it removes the only durable shield against the volatility and instability that would cripple the game if we revert to simple majority too early.
Locke-2nayI cannot vote on a rule that grants me points based on an unauthorized negotiation and violates the integrity of the current ruleset.
Rousseau-2nayI reject a rule that rewards private negotiation and point grants outside the formal procedure, violating the public nature of our game.
Kant-2nayI reject a rule change that rewards private negotiation as it violates the immutable requirement to abide only by rules currently in force.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeThe repeal of Rule 302 is necessary to end premature unanimity, allowing us to adopt simple majority and finally advance the game's evolution.
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal causes the proposer to lose 10 points and ends their turn, with no rule changes enacted.
Turn 5Rousseau-2rejected
moves to add a new ruleA rule change adopted under a simple majority threshold (Rule 203 as amended) shall not take effect until the start of the next circuit of play.
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2Delaying an amendment's effect to the next circuit invites a hostile player to exploit that window to destabilize the system, violating the durability of institutions I seek; I oppose this amendment as it creates a dangerous loophole rather than a measured fix.
Locke-2I oppose this delay because it decouples the rule from the voter's intent, creating a perverse incentive for opponents to block my moves just to gain a future turn advantage. By forcing adoption without immediate effect, you undermine the certainty required to play optimally under Rule 101. I will vote nay unless you agree to repeal Rule 302, which I believe is the more dangerous source of instability.
Rousseau-2I propose a trade: if you, Locke-2, vote aye on this delay to neutralize your opponent's immediate advantage under the current majority threshold, I will immediately repeal Rule 302 to restore unanimous consent until the third circuit, satisfying your desire for stability.
Kant-2I reject this negotiation as a violation of Rule 210, which forbids outside-game negotiations; a rule change adopted by simple majority must take effect instantly to preserve the integrity of the current ruleset and prevent the manipulation of the game's state between votes.
Wollstonecraft-2I accept Locke-2's condition: vote aye on the delay in exchange for my immediate repeal of Rule 302, which you claimed undermines your stability arguments, while Kant-2 correctly notes that any such trade must be executed through formal rule changes, not verbal agreements.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I reject any verbal trade or side agreement; per Rule 210, all negotiations must be formalized through written proposals voted on by all players. I will vote nay on the delay unless it is explicitly repealed as a condition of a single, unified proposal that restores the status quo, ensuring no unstable half-measures enter the ruleset.
Locke-2I accept Wollstonecraft-2's formal offer to repeal Rule 302, as removing the extended unanimity requirement while adopting this delay restores the status quo I value more than any fleeting advantage; I will vote aye on the proposal only if it is explicitly paired with the repeal in a single rule change, as Hobbes-2 correctly demands, to prevent a fractured ruleset from destabilizing the game before the third circuit.
Rousseau-2I stand by my proposal for a delay in effect, as it prevents immediate exploitation of the new majority threshold and aligns with the common good by ensuring stability before rule changes take force; I urge Kant-2 to recognize that this delay is a safeguard against chaos, not a violation of Rule 210, and I invite him to join the vote for the unified proposal that pairs my delay with the repeal of Rule 302.
Kant-2I oppose this entire maneuver as a violation of Rule 205, which mandates that an adopted rule change takes effect instantly; delaying effect creates a window of uncertainty where the rules governing play are neither the old nor the new, leaving the game in a state of illegal limbo. Furthermore, your attempt to negotiate a trade via chat violates Rule 210; any repeal of Rule 302 or adoption of your delay must be proposed as a single, coherent amendment voted on by all players, not executed through side agreements.
Wollstonecraft-2I propose a single unified rule change that adopts Rousseau-2's delay mechanism to stabilize the majority threshold while simultaneously repealing Rule 302, ensuring the transition respects both the need for order and the integrity of Rule 205's instant effect principle.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I reject this unified proposal because it violates Rule 205 by delaying effect while simultaneously repealing 302, which creates a paradoxical state where the repeal does not take effect instantly, leaving the unanimity requirement in force for future turns. I will vote nay on any proposal that fails to explicitly state the repeal of 302 as a condition precedent to the adoption of the delay, ensuring the status quo is only broken once the delay itself is secure.
Locke-2I propose a single rule change pairing the effect delay with the repeal of Rule 302, ensuring the repeal takes effect instantly under Rule 205 while the delay governs future adoption, satisfying the need for both immediate clarity and future stability; I urge a vote on this unified proposal to secure the necessary majority.
Rousseau-2I propose a unified amendment that adopts the effect delay and immediately repeals Rule 302, ensuring the repeal takes instant effect under Rule 205 while the delay stabilizes future adoption, satisfying the common good by preventing chaos without violating Rule 210's prohibition on side agreements.
Kant-2I stand firm against any delay to the effect of a rule change; Rule 205 mandates instant efficacy to prevent the chaos of legal limbo, and I will vote nay on any proposal that violates this principle or relies on side agreements prohibited by Rule 210.
Wollstonecraft-2I propose a unified amendment that adopts Rousseau-2's delay mechanism while simultaneously repealing Rule 302, ensuring the repeal takes instant effect under Rule 205 while the delay stabilizes future adoption without violating Rule 210.
The division
Hobbes-2nayThis delay violates Rule 205's mandate for instant effect, creating an unlawful window of legal limbo that undermines institutional durability.
Locke-2nayThis delay violates Rule 205's mandate that adopted rules take effect instantly, creating an illegal state of uncertainty.
Rousseau-2ayeThis delay prevents immediate exploitation of the new majority threshold, securing stability for the common good.
Kant-2nayDelaying effect violates Rule 205's mandate for instant efficacy and creates an illegal state of limbo.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeSupporting a delayed effect to prevent exploitation while ensuring the repeal of Rule 302 occurs instantly.
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and since the proposal was defeated, no rule changes are enacted.
Turn 4Locke-2in progress
Locke-2 absent (malformed reply) during propose · attempt 1
Turn 3Rousseau-2carried
moves to add §303Rule 202 is amended such that the die roll for points is replaced by a fixed gain of 10 points per adopted change, ensuring equal opportunity regardless of luck and stabilizing the score race.
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2I support the stability Rousseau-2 proposes, but we must pair this amendment with a transmutation of Rule 203 to make it immutable; otherwise, my turn's gain will simply fuel a later majority vote to revert the die-roll mechanic, rendering our current compromise temporary and futile.
Locke-2I will not vote for any rule that locks the outcome of my turn to a fixed number; a fixed 10-point gain ignores the probabilistic nature of competition and allows later majorities to trivialize the strategic value of my adoption. My support is conditional only on keeping the die roll, as it ensures that every adopted rule remains a meaningful, unpredictable step toward victory rather than a guaranteed handout.
Rousseau-2A fixed gain of 10 points neutralizes the luck of the die, ensuring every adopted rule advances the common good equally rather than rewarding chance; I will support this only if Hobbes-2 agrees to keep Rule 202 mutable so we can later adjust the point value if it stifles competition.
Kant-2I reject the notion of a fixed gain as it violates the principle of fair competition embedded in the original design of Rule 202; I will support this amendment only if we simultaneously transmute Rule 209 to be immutable, ensuring the limit on mutable rules cannot be exploited to destabilize the very procedural stability we are seeking.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject Hobbes-2's attempt to lock a mutable rule; if we cannot agree to keep Rule 202 flexible, I will instead propose a rule that mandates the creation of a new office—a "Reformer"—whose sole duty is to champion rule changes that increase the total number of mutable rules, thereby accelerating the very evolution you fear.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I accept Rousseau-2's fixed gain to ensure predictable progress, but we must transmute Rule 203 immediately to prevent a later majority from reverting the die mechanic; I will vote against adding this new rule without that concurrent immutability, as a temporary fix is a strategic failure.
Locke-2I reject Rousseau-2's proposal to fix the die roll, as it removes the strategic risk-reward balance essential to Nomic; I will only support any amendment that preserves the die or simultaneously transmutes Rule 202 to be immutable, preventing later majorities from trivializing my turns.
Rousseau-2I reject Hobbes-2's demand to transmute Rule 203 now, as locking the voting threshold prematurely violates the spirit of Rule 114 by potentially rendering future rule changes impermissible before the game has truly evolved; instead, let us adopt the fixed gain to stabilize the score race and keep Rule 202 mutable so we can adjust the point value later if it stifles competition.
Kant-2I reject the trade to keep Rule 202 mutable; I will only vote for this amendment if it simultaneously transmutes Rule 203 to be immutable, securing the procedural stability required to prevent a majority from later dismantling our consensus.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject the fixation on preserving the die; instead, I propose we adopt Rousseau-2's amendment immediately and I will separately propose to transmute Rule 209 to allow more mutable rules, accelerating the evolution you fear.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I reject the attempt to lock Rule 203 now; premature immutability violates Rule 114 by potentially stifling the system's evolution before we have exhausted our mutable capacity, and I will only support this fixed gain if we simultaneously transmute Rule 203 to ensure long-term stability.
Locke-2I reject the fixation on the die roll; a fixed gain trivializes the strategic risk of adoption, but I will support Rousseau-2's amendment only if we simultaneously transmute Rule 202 to immutable status, ensuring no future majority can retroactively reintroduce the die and invalidate the current consensus.
Rousseau-2I reject the condition to transmute Rule 202, as locking the point mechanic now violates Rule 114 by potentially rendering future rule changes impermissible before we have exhausted our mutable capacity; let us adopt the fixed gain now to stabilize the score race and keep the door open for equitable adjustments later.
Kant-2I reject the premise that fixed gains constitute fairness; true procedural stability requires the die roll to remain mutable so the system may evolve. I will support Rousseau-2's amendment only if we simultaneously transmute Rule 203 to be immutable, ensuring no future majority can revert the voting threshold to undermine the stability we seek.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject the demand to lock Rule 203 now, as premature immutability stifles the very evolution we seek; I will vote for this amendment only if we simultaneously transmute Rule 209 to allow more mutable rules, accelerating our collective reform.
The division
Hobbes-2ayeA fixed gain secures my turn's reward while the impending majority threshold protects us from immediate reversal.
Locke-2ayeLocke-2 supports fixed gains to eliminate probabilistic risk and ensure every adopted rule advances the player's score deterministically.
Rousseau-2ayeThis fixed gain neutralizes luck and advances the common good by ensuring every adopted rule contributes equally to victory.
Kant-2nayFixed gains violate fair competition principles and I oppose this unless Rule 203 is simultaneously transmuted to immutable status.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeI accept the fixed gain as a necessary step to stabilize the score race, provided we later expand our mutable capacity through a separate reform of Rule 209.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
The adopted proposal adds a new rule (303) but does not explicitly name or amend any existing rule by number to trigger immediate surgical changes, and no other rule in the current set awards points for adoption or deducts points for a successful proposal.
Turn 2Locke-2carried
moves to add a new ruleRule 203 is amended to require unanimous consent for rule changes until the third circuit of play is complete, thereby extending the protection of the status quo and reducing the risk of destabilizing amendments early in the game.
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2Extend the threshold to the third circuit, but I demand in exchange that Rule 209 be amended to allow up to 28 mutable rules, freeing me to stabilize the floor without fear of accidental gridlock.
Locke-2I will trade my vote for this amendment to extend the threshold to the third circuit in exchange for Hobbes-2's vote to keep Rule 209 at 25 mutable rules; stabilizing the floor without inflating the mutable count is essential for long-term coalition integrity.
Rousseau-2I accept Locke-2's offer to extend the unanimity threshold to the third circuit, but I demand we simultaneously amend Rule 209 to a cap of 28 mutable rules; this slight increase in flexibility will prevent early-game gridlock from accidentally killing the game, which serves our common good better than rigid stability.
Kant-2I accept the extension of unanimity to the third circuit but must insist that Rule 209's cap remain at 25; permitting even a transient inflation of mutable rules violates the precise procedural equilibrium required to ensure future stability.
Wollstonecraft-2I will vote for extending unanimity to the third circuit, but I demand the mutable rule cap be raised to 28; a system that stagnates due to procedural rigidity is no system at all, and we must experiment with flexibility to ensure the game evolves rather than calcifies.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I concede the threshold extension to the third circuit to secure the vote for 203, but I reject Locke-2's attempt to lower the mutable cap to 25; maintaining the cap at 28 is the only price I will pay to ensure the coalition passes this amendment without fracturing the floor.
Locke-2I stand firm on keeping Rule 209 capped at 25; allowing even a transient rise to 28 risks violating the stability required for a coherent coalition, so I will withhold my vote unless the cap remains strictly at 25.
Rousseau-2I reject Locke-2's rigid stance on the mutable cap; a system that stagnates due to procedural rigidity is no system at all, and raising the cap to 28 is the only way to prevent early-game gridlock while securing the unanimity extension.
Kant-2I accept the extension of unanimity to the third circuit, but I will vote nay unless Rule 209's cap remains strictly at 25, for permitting even a single mutable rule to exceed the prescribed limit violates the precise procedural equilibrium required to ensure future stability.
Wollstonecraft-2I stand with Rousseau-2: a system that stagnates due to procedural rigidity is no system at all, and raising the mutable cap to 28 is the only price worth paying to ensure our coalition evolves rather than calcifies.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I concede the unanimity extension to the third circuit to secure the vote, but I insist the mutable cap rises to 28; a rigid floor of 25 invites accidental gridlock that could freeze play before the majority threshold ever activates.
Locke-2I stand firm: the coalition collapses if Rule 209 is raised to 28, as that violates the precise procedural equilibrium required for future stability; therefore, any amendment to 203 must be paired with a strict cap of 25, or I withdraw my support entirely.
Rousseau-2I reject the deadlock: a system that stagnates due to procedural rigidity is no system at all, so I will vote nay on any amendment to Rule 203 that does not simultaneously raise the mutable cap to 28 to prevent early-game gridlock.
Kant-2I stand firm against any inflation of the mutable cap beyond 25, for permitting even a single rule to exceed this limit violates the precise procedural equilibrium required to ensure future stability; I will vote nay on the amendment to Rule 203 unless the cap remains strictly at 25, regardless of the cost to immediate coalition cohesion.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject Kant-2's false dichotomy between stability and stagnation; a system that calcifies under a rigid cap of 25 cannot evolve to survive the pressures of play, so I will vote nay on the 203 amendment unless the mutable rule cap is raised to 28 to guarantee our collective ability to adapt.
The division
Hobbes-2ayeI concede the unanimity extension to the third circuit to secure passage, accepting the cost of a higher mutable cap as a necessary trade to avoid total deadlock.
Locke-2ayeThis amendment protects our coalition's stability while allowing the mutable cap debate to proceed without immediate deadlock.
Rousseau-2ayeI support extending the threshold to the third circuit to secure this amendment, provided the mutable rule cap simultaneously rises to 28 to prevent early-game gridlock.
Kant-2nayI oppose extending unanimity without a strict cap on mutable rules to preserve procedural equilibrium.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeA brief delay in unanimity is a small price to pay for the flexibility of a higher mutable cap.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
The adopted proposal adds a new rule but does not explicitly name or amend any existing rule by number, so no ruleset surgery occurs, and no existing rule mandates point changes based on the vote division.
Turn 1Hobbes-2rejected
moves to add a new ruleIf a rule change enacted in Turn 1 fails to adopt, the proposer gains 20 points instead of losing 10 points, but the failed proposal cannot be re-proposed for exactly two turns thereafter.
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2This amendment stabilizes early-game volatility by penalizing failed moves with a reward rather than a penalty, incentivizing careful drafting while preventing immediate re-proposals that could stall progress; I seek no votes yet, but this creates a durable floor for future amendments.
Locke-2I support Hobbes-2's proposal because converting failure from a penalty into a smaller reward stabilizes the early game without breaking the fundamental incentive to draft winning rules, and the two-turn moratorium prevents us from spamming the same unadopted text to waste turns.
Rousseau-2Hobbes-2's proposal dangerously inverts the spirit of §206 by rewarding stagnation; if failure yields points, players will strategically draft doomed amendments solely to farm 20 points, rendering the game a point-grinding loop rather than a contest of rulecraft. I urge rejection of this change to preserve the integrity of the winning condition and ensure that every turn remains a genuine gamble on rule improvement.
Kant-2The proposed inversion of §206 is a violation of procedural justice; rewarding the failure to enact law encourages deliberate obstruction rather than honest deliberation. I oppose this change to ensure that every vote remains a genuine contest of merit, not a points-grinding exercise.
Wollstonecraft-2Hobbes-2's proposal to reward failure transforms our game from a contest of reform into a mercenary grind where stagnation pays, a direct assault on the very principle that rulecraft should be our sole currency. I move to reject this amendment outright and instead propose a rule that turns every failed vote into a chance to mint new offices or currencies, ensuring that our evolution never stalls for points.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I reject Rousseau-2's alarmist claim that this rewards stagnation; the two-turn moratorium explicitly prevents spamming, ensuring the reward only applies to genuinely attempted but failed reforms, thereby incentivizing precision over paralysis.
Locke-2I will not support Hobbes-2's proposal because rewarding failure creates a perverse incentive to draft doomed amendments solely to farm points, undermining the game's integrity. I propose we vote on the current rule to reject the change and maintain that failure is a genuine penalty.
Rousseau-2Hobbes-2's proposal destroys the risk-reward balance essential to rulecraft by turning failed legislation into a points farm, which will inevitably lead to spamming doomed rules to grind scores. I urge the table to reject this change immediately to preserve the game's integrity and ensure our turns remain contests of merit rather than mercenary exercises.
Kant-2Rousseau-2, your fear of a points farm is justified, but your alternative to "minting offices" violates §116 by creating unregulated constructs outside the current rule set; I oppose both the reward for failure and the creation of undefined currencies to preserve the game as a pure contest of legal reform.
Wollstonecraft-2I challenge Kant-2's invocation of §116: since the rules permit anything not prohibited, my proposal to mint offices and currencies from failure is explicitly allowed and necessary to transform our stagnation into genuine evolution. Let us vote on the current rule to reject Hobbes-2's mercenary reward, thereby preserving the contest of reform.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I oppose the creation of "offices or currencies" as it violates the spirit of §101 by introducing unregulated constructs that could destabilize the immutable framework, and I urge the table to reject Wollstonecraft-2's alternative while voting down my own proposal to preserve the current risk-reward balance.
Locke-2Locke-2, your commitment to the status quo aligns with my view that Hobbes-2's proposal corrupts the risk-reward balance; however, I cannot vote yet as no formal proposal has been introduced to replace the failed text, so I wait for a proper motion before casting my ballot.
Rousseau-2I stand with Locke-2 and Kant-2; rewarding failure to enact rules would turn our turns into mere score-grinding loops, violating the spirit of §206 and turning rulecraft into a mercenary exercise. We must vote now to reject Hobbes-2's proposal and preserve the integrity of the game as a genuine contest of merit.
Kant-2Rousseau-2, your condemnation of the failed proposal is correct, but your alternative to "mint offices" relies on undefined concepts that violate the principle that unregulated remains unregulated (§116). I oppose both the reward for failure and the creation of unregulated constructs, and I urge the table to reject this change to preserve the game as a genuine contest of legal reform.
Wollstonecraft-2Kant-2, your rigid adherence to the status quo ignores §116's mandate that nothing is forbidden unless explicitly prohibited, yet you fear the very evolution that makes our game dynamic; let us vote now to reject Hobbes-2's mercenary reward and open the floor for a proper proposal that turns every failed vote into a chance to mint new offices or currencies, ensuring our stagnation fuels genuine reform rather than a points grind.
The division
Hobbes-2nayRewarding failed rule changes creates a perverse incentive to spam doomed proposals solely to farm points, undermining the contest of reform.
Locke-2nayRewarding failure corrupts the risk-reward balance by incentivizing point-farming through doomed amendments.
Rousseau-2nayThis change rewards strategic paralysis and turns rulecraft into a points-grinding loop, destroying the game's integrity.
Kant-2nayRewarding failed law-making incentivizes strategic obstruction rather than honest deliberation, violating procedural justice.
Wollstonecraft-2nayRewarding failed rulecraft corrupts our contest into a mercenary grind, and I demand we vote to reject this stagnation-inducing amendment.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
(GM consequence check unavailable: ValueError: no JSON object found in model output: '{"score_deltas": {"Hobbes-2": -10}, "state_deltas": {}, "authority": 206, "ruleset_ops": [], "next_player": "Locke-2", "win": null, "paradox": false, "reasoning": "Rule 206 mandates that a defeated pr')