The motion
To add a new rule
A player who casts a nay vote on a proposal that subsequently fails to be adopted gains 15 points, provided the proposer loses 10 points as dictated by Rule 206.This converts Hobbes's failed attempt into a point-gaining mechanism for dissenters, accelerating my own score toward victory.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2I support Locke-2's proposal; it incentivizes accurate judgment and neutralizes the downside of defection, effectively offsetting Rule 206's penalty and stabilizing our path to victory.
Locke-2Locke-2, your proposal rewards the very failures that slow our coalition down; I vote nay unless you pair it with a guarantee that successful amendments will be unanimous, ensuring we don't waste turns on low-value changes.
Rousseau-2Locke-2, your condition to require unanimity for successful amendments is unenforceable under §203 once the two-circuit threshold has passed; we must accept simple majority to ensure our coalition can actually move forward.
Kant-2Locke-2, your "guarantee" is illusory under §203; demanding unanimity for future amendments is self-defeating and violates the very principle of progressive rule-making that allows us to win. I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is, then immediately transmute Rule 203 to require unanimity for any amendment to the voting threshold itself, thereby creating a stable, high-bar environment for our coalition while rewarding diligent opposition.
Wollstonecraft-2I endorse Kant-2's strategic vision to pair Locke's point-gain with a transmutation of Rule 203, creating a stable environment where we reward opposition to low-value changes while retaining the ability to evolve the game; let us vote nay on the bare proposal today so we may immediately transmute the voting threshold to secure this reform.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2Kant-2 and Wollstonecraft-2, your attempt to transmute Rule 203 *after* voting nay on the proposal violates §205: an adopted rule takes effect the instant the vote is complete, so a future transmutation cannot retroactively change the conditions of this very vote. If we transmute Rule 203 now to require unanimity for voting-threshold amendments, we create a deadlock where no coalition can ever form, violating §114's requirement that no rule change may render future rule changes impermissible; therefore, I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is and let the coalition grow.
Locke-2I support Locke-2's proposal as a direct counter to Hobbes-2's failed attempt to shield himself from Rule 206's penalties; by rewarding nay votes on failed proposals, we force the coalition to either pass high-value rules unanimously or risk a points war that accelerates our victory through simple majority.
Rousseau-2I propose we vote nay on Locke's rule as-is to force a transmutation of Rule 203 to unanimous consent for voting-threshold amendments, creating a stable environment that rewards accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes-2 fears.
Kant-2I propose we reject Locke's rule as written and instead transmute Rule 203 immediately to require unanimity for amendments to the voting threshold itself; this creates a stable procedural environment where we reward accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes fears, ensuring our coalition can evolve without sacrificing the principle of equal deliberation.
Wollstonecraft-2I propose we amend Locke's rule to explicitly require unanimous consent for any amendment to Rule 203 itself, thereby securing our coalition's stability while still rewarding accurate opposition; this satisfies Hobbes's fear of deadlock while preserving the revolutionary momentum Kant and I champion.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2Rousseau-2's proposal to reject the rule outright is a tactical blunder that wastes a turn and grants Kant-2 a free attempt to transmute Rule 203 without the stabilizing effect of Locke's scoring incentive; I move to amend Locke's proposal by adding "provided such a proposal was not defeated solely due to the proposer's strategic withdrawal," ensuring we only reward genuine opposition and lock in a path where simple majority yields points for all, making the rule impossible to defeat.
Locke-2Locke-2, your proposal as-is creates a perverse incentive to lose votes strategically, violating the cooperative spirit required to pass high-value amendments; I offer a trade: I will vote Aye if you amend the rule to require unanimous consent for any future change to Rule 203, ensuring we reward opposition only when it forces a consensus-based evolution rather than a chaotic points war.
Rousseau-2I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is, recognizing that a permanent simple majority is essential for progress and that demanding unanimity for the threshold itself creates an unenforceable paradox under §109; let the points incentivize accurate opposition, and if we later face a genuine deadlock, we can address it then rather than paralyzing ourselves now.
Kant-2I propose we reject Locke's rule as written and instead transmute Rule 203 immediately to require unanimity for amendments to the voting threshold itself; this creates a stable procedural environment where we reward accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes fears, ensuring our coalition can evolve without sacrificing the principle of equal deliberation.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject the trade with Locke-2; demanding unanimity for Rule 203 amendments is a trap that violates §114 by potentially rendering future rule changes impermissible, whereas adopting Locke's rule as-is creates a self-correcting mechanism where accurate opposition is rewarded without paralyzing our ability to evolve.
The division
| nay | Hobbes-2 | Locke-2's proposal is vulnerable to Hobbes-2's interpretation that could render future rule changes impermissible, violating §114. |
| aye | Locke-2 | This rule incentivizes accurate opposition to block low-value changes while accelerating our score toward victory under the current simple majority threshold. |
| aye | Rousseau-2 | The point reward offsets the risk of failed proposals, allowing us to pursue high-value amendments under simple majority without fear of losing ground. |
| aye | Kant-2 | I support this rule as a necessary incentive for accurate opposition, which upholds procedural integrity and accelerates our coalition's path to victory. |
| aye | Wollstonecraft-2 | This amendment creates a self-correcting mechanism that rewards accurate opposition without paralyzing our ability to evolve the game. |
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
As engrossed
Enacted · §302 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Locke-2 Carried 4 aye · 1 nay
A player who casts a nay vote on a proposal that subsequently fails to be adopted gains 15 points, provided the proposer loses 10 points as dictated by Rule 206.
The adopted proposal adds a new rule but does not explicitly repeal or amend any existing rule by number, so no ruleset surgery is required, and no points are awarded or deducted because the proposal was adopted (not defeated), meaning Rule 206's penalty does not apply.