The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent.We must preserve the absolute stability of our institutions until they are truly tested, avoiding the chaos of a simple majority.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HobbesColleagues, I propose we keep unanimity as the floor, but allow a simple majority to pass any amendment that explicitly removes the "two circuits" trigger from Rule 203, ensuring stability without ceding control to a shifting threshold.
LockeHobbes, your instinct for stability is sound, but removing the threshold entirely risks fracturing our consensus too early. I propose a hybrid: we keep your "no two-circuits" trigger, but we add a clause that any rule changing the voting threshold itself requires unanimous consent, preventing the floor from sliding beneath our shared agreement.
RousseauLocke, your safeguard for the threshold is prudent, yet I fear it stifles the very adaptability our game requires; if we can agree to a simple majority after two circuits, we must also agree that any rule altering that threshold itself requires only a simple majority, lest we trap ourselves in an unchangeable minority regime.
KantYour hybrid creates a logical trap: if a simple majority can alter the threshold itself, then the "unanimous consent" safeguard you propose is rendered inert by the very rule you seek to preserve. I propose we keep the two-circuit trigger but add a clause that any amendment to Rule 203 requires unanimous consent, ensuring the voting threshold cannot be eroded once established.
WollstonecraftKant, your proposal to lock the threshold after two circuits creates a permanent minority regime that stifles the very adaptability this game demands; true reform requires that once we have tested our unity, we must be free to evolve our mechanisms through simple majority, just as we should be free to amend the rules governing how we vote.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your hybrid is logically inconsistent: if a simple majority can alter the threshold, your safeguard is void. I propose we keep the two-circuit trigger but add a clause that any amendment to Rule 203 requires unanimous consent, ensuring the voting threshold cannot be eroded once established.
LockeKant's logic trap is clever but unnecessary; if we agree that amending Rule 203 requires unanimous consent, we effectively block Rousseau's path to a permanent minority regime without needing complex self-referential clauses. Let us adopt the two-circuit trigger with a unanimous consent requirement for any future amendment to this rule, securing our early consensus while preserving the possibility of orderly evolution later.
RousseauLocke, your safeguard for amending Rule 203 creates a paradox: if a simple majority can alter the threshold, your unanimity requirement is immediately voided by the first successful amendment, rendering your "safe harbor" inert. Let us accept the two-circuit trigger as a fair grace period for our initial unity, but allow the threshold itself to evolve thereafter by simple majority, lest we trap ourselves in an unchangeable minority regime that stifles the game's very adaptability.
KantRousseau, your logic assumes that a simple majority can validly repeal the very safeguard it was designed to respect before the safeguard has even taken effect; such a move violates the principle that procedures must be established before they can be amended. I propose we amend Rule 203 to require unanimous consent for any future change to the voting threshold itself, ensuring that once our initial unity is tested, the rules governing our collective will cannot be eroded by a fleeting majority.
WollstonecraftKant's "safe harbor" is a logical mirage that merely delays the inevitable stagnation of a permanent minority regime; we must allow our collective will to evolve after our initial unity is tested, for a constitution that cannot adapt to the very rules it sets is no constitution at all.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesThe proposed hybrid of locking Rule 203's amendment process while allowing simple majority changes to the voting threshold is self-contradictory under Rule 211; if a simple majority can alter the threshold, any clause demanding unanimity for such alterations is rendered void the instant it is adopted. I support Locke's text but must insist on a final amendment: to prevent future erosion, any change to the voting threshold itself must explicitly require the unanimous consent of all eligible voters, overriding the simple majority provision for this specific case.
LockeI agree with Hobbes and Kant that locking the amendment of Rule 203 via unanimous consent is the only way to prevent a logical paradox, yet I will support Rousseau's call for simple majority thereafter if we explicitly add a clause stating that any amendment to Rule 203 requires unanimous consent to the text being proposed, ensuring the threshold cannot be altered until the very next vote itself mandates unanimity.
RousseauMy friends, the paradox you fear only arises if we allow a simple majority to repeal the unanimity requirement *before* the second circuit is complete; if we simply state that the threshold drops to simple majority *after* two circuits, and that any further change to the threshold itself requires only the prevailing rule at that moment, we gain the adaptability Rousseau seeks without the logical trap Kant warns of. Let us adopt this clear, sequential evolution: unanimity now, simple majority later, and a rule that lets the law of the land shift with the passage of time rather than freezing us in an unchangeable minority regime.
KantI reject the notion that a rule can be amended before the condition triggering its amendment has occurred; to allow a simple majority vote now to establish a permanent simple majority regime is to destroy the very unanimity required to begin the evolution. I move to amend Rule 203 to require unanimous consent for any change to the voting threshold itself, regardless of whether the two-circuit trigger has been met.
WollstonecraftKant, your proposed lock is a tyrannical stagnation that betrays the spirit of our game; we must allow the voting threshold to evolve by simple majority once our initial unity is tested, so let us amend Rule 203 to drop to simple majority after two circuits without any special unanimity clause for the threshold itself.
The division
| aye | Hobbes | Unanimity preserves consensus and prevents rule fragmentation early in the game. |
| nay | Locke | Unanimity here would freeze us in a minority regime after two circuits, stifling the adaptability Rousseau rightly demands. |
| aye | Rousseau | I support this amendment to lock the threshold at unanimity, ensuring our early unity remains inviolate. |
| aye | Kant | I vote aye to establish a stable procedure that prevents the voting threshold from being eroded by a simple majority before we have had sufficient time to test our initial unity. |
| aye | Wollstonecraft | I support stabilizing the threshold early to prevent chaotic erosion, yet I must clarify that true reform requires this lock to be temporary, not eternal. |
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
As engrossed
Amended · §203 Turn 1 · Proposal §301 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 4 aye · 1 nay
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent.
The proposal amended rule 203 to remove the majority threshold, but no existing rule in the ruleset awards points for a proposal's adoption or deducts points for a dissenting vote, so no score changes occur.