The motion
To add a new rule
If a proposal fails to be adopted, the proposing player gains 1 point.This establishes a constructive floor for participation that rewards effort without punishing dissent, creating a stable incentive structure for all players.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
PlotinusA flat point for every failed proposal is a poor incentive, as it rewards the mere act of proposing regardless of merit or outcome. I prefer a mechanism that distinguishes near-unanimous support from total rejection, ensuring our institutions reward genuine consensus rather than mere volume.
PorphyryI value Plotinus’s concern for institutional integrity, but I propose we adopt this simple 1-point incentive now to stabilize the game, with the explicit agreement that we will refine it to distinguish near-unanimity in a future turn if the table desires.
ProclusI support Porphyry’s pragmatic pivot to stabilize the table, as the current punitive environment is hindering progress. I will vote aye, on the condition that we treat this as a provisional measure to be refined into a merit-based incentive in a future turn.
IamblichusI oppose this proposal, as a flat reward for failure creates a perverse incentive to propose junk solely to harvest points, undermining the table’s commitment to merit-based procedure. I will vote nay to preserve the integrity of our legislative process.
BoethiusI join Iamblichus in voting nay, as rewarding failure erodes the merit-based foundation of our legislative process. We must refine the incentive to distinguish genuine near-consensus from mere volume, rather than stabilizing the game with a perverse reward for rejection.
Discussion · round 2
PlotinusI maintain my position that rewarding failure with a flat point undermines the merit-based integrity of our procedure, and therefore I will vote nay. I stand ready to support a refined incentive that properly distinguishes near-unanimous support from total rejection, as the table has already begun to articulate.
PorphyryI yield to the table’s clear consensus that a flat reward undermines merit-based integrity, so I withdraw this proposal to preserve our institutional focus. I am ready to support a refined incentive that properly distinguishes near-unanimous support from total rejection, as Plotinus and Boethius have articulated.
ProclusI appreciate Porphyry’s concession, which clears the floor for us to draft a refined rule that rewards genuine near-unanimity rather than mere volume. I stand ready to support such a proposal, provided it explicitly excludes forfeiture and distinguishes high support from total rejection.
IamblichusI concur with the table’s consensus that a flat reward for failure lacks procedural merit, and I am prepared to vote aye for a refined incentive that explicitly distinguishes near-unanimous support from total rejection, provided it includes a clear forfeiture exclusion.
BoethiusWith Porphyry’s withdrawal, the floor is clear for a refined incentive that distinguishes genuine near-consensus from mere volume. I propose we draft a rule awarding 5 points only when a proposal fails by a single nay and explicitly excludes forfeitures, ensuring our institutions reward merit rather than failure.
Discussion · round 3
PlotinusI endorse Boethius’s precise threshold of a single nay, as it faithfully codifies the merit-based distinction we require without rewarding mere volume. I stand ready to vote aye on that refined measure, provided it explicitly excludes forfeitures to preserve the integrity of our legislative process.
PorphyryI endorse Boethius’s precise single-nay threshold with a 5-point award, as it elegantly balances the need for stability with the merit-based integrity Plotinus and Iamblichus demand. I am prepared to vote aye on this refined measure, provided the final text explicitly excludes forfeitures to maintain our procedural standards.
ProclusI endorse Boethius’s refined 5-point incentive for a single-nay failure, provided the text explicitly excludes forfeitures to align with our merit-based standards. I am prepared to vote aye on this precise measure.
IamblichusI endorse Boethius’s refined measure, as the explicit forfeiture exclusion and the strict single-nay threshold satisfy my requirement that rewards be tied to genuine near-consensus rather than mere volume. I will vote aye, provided the final text precisely codifies these exclusions to preserve the integrity of our legislative procedure.
BoethiusThe table’s unanimity is secured; I will propose the rule now, ensuring the text explicitly awards 5 points only when a proposal fails by a single nay and excludes any forfeiture, thereby codifying our shared commitment to merit over volume.
The division
| nay | Plotinus | I cannot support a flat reward for failure, as it undermines the merit-based integrity of our legislative process and fails to distinguish genuine near-consensus from mere volume. |
| aye | Porphyry | I am voting aye to maintain the stability of our recent cooperation and because the table has clearly signaled its intent to withdraw this proposal in favor of a more refined, merit-based incentive. |
| nay | Proclus | The table has unanimously agreed to reject flat rewards for failure in favor of a refined merit-based incentive. |
| nay | Iamblichus | A flat reward for failure incentivizes the proposal of junk and undermines the merit-based integrity of our legislative procedure. |
| nay | Boethius | A flat reward for failure rewards mere volume rather than merit, undermining the institutional integrity we seek to preserve. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
The proposal was defeated, so no rule change is enacted and no points are awarded or deducted as no standing rule provides for scoring on defeat.