The motion
To add a new rule
If a proposal fails to be adopted because exactly one eligible voter votes nay, the proposing player gains 5 points.This codifies the table's consensus on a merit-based incentive for near-unanimous failure, correcting the punitive imbalance.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
PlotinusI oppose this proposal, as it merely re-introduces the incentive structure we rejected in Turn 6 without addressing the strategic imbalance that would arise from awarding points for near-unanimous defeat. I urge the table to seek a rule that stabilizes the scoring system rather than one that rewards the friction of a single dissenting vote.
PorphyryI support the core merit-based incentive of Proclus’s proposal, but I propose we adopt a compromise that awards 3 points for a single-nay failure to better address Plotinus’s concerns about strategic imbalance while still rewarding the proposer’s near-unanimous consensus.
ProclusPorphyry, I accept your concession to 3 points, recognizing that this modest incentive preserves the game's integrity while still rewarding near-unanimous consensus. I ask only that the final text explicitly clarify this applies only when the vote fails by exactly one nay, ensuring we do not inadvertently reward broader dissent.
IamblichusI cannot vote aye for any rule that awards points for a defeated proposal, as this violates the principle that a failed motion enacts no change and grants no benefit to its proposer. I stand ready to vote nay on this amendment, regardless of whether the reward is 3 or 5 points, to preserve the integrity of the procedural record.
BoethiusI join Iamblichus in opposing the premise that defeat should confer reward, as it undermines the very meritocracy we seek to build. Let us instead focus our energy on structural reforms that ensure every player has a fairer stake in the evolving ruleset, rather than patching scoring with arbitrary incentives.
Discussion · round 2
PlotinusI respect Iamblichus and Boethius’s principled stance, but I must oppose this proposal because it would again reward strategic sabotage, allowing a single dissenting vote to profit the very proposer it obstructs. I urge the table to reject this incentive entirely and focus on structural reforms that preserve the integrity of the procedural record.
PorphyryI recognize that Iamblichus and Boethius’s principled stand on procedural integrity makes any reward for defeat untenable, so I withdraw my support for this incentive entirely. Let us pivot to a structural reform that addresses the strategic imbalance without compromising the merit of the vote itself.
ProclusI accept Porphyry’s withdrawal and Iamblichus’s principled objection, withdrawing my proposal to respect the table’s consensus on procedural integrity. Let us pivot to structural reforms that strengthen the game’s fairness without compromising the merit of the vote itself.
BoethiusWith the incentive debate resolved in favor of procedural integrity, I propose we pivot to a structural reform that grants every player a guaranteed veto power over rule changes that would alter the target score, ensuring the game’s endgame remains stable and fair for all.
Discussion · round 3
PlotinusI endorse Boethius’s pivot to structural reform, as a guaranteed veto over the target score preserves the durable institution of the winning condition that I hold dear. I vote aye on this proposal, provided we ensure the mechanism for such a veto does not inadvertently render the game unwinnable by violating Rule 114.
PorphyryI endorse Boethius’s structural pivot, as a unanimous veto on the target score safeguards our winning condition without triggering the impermissibility of Rule 114. I vote aye on this proposal, provided we explicitly confirm it applies to any amendment of Rule 208 or the immutable threshold in Rule 112.
ProclusI endorse Boethius’s structural pivot, as a guaranteed veto over the target score preserves the durable institution of the winning condition without triggering the impermissibility of Rule 114.
IamblichusI endorse the structural pivot, provided the final text explicitly defines the veto as requiring the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, consistent with our commitment to procedural integrity and the safeguards of Rule 109.
BoethiusI accept Iamblichus’s refinement, as requiring unanimous assent for any alteration to the target score ensures the winning condition remains a durable, non-negotiable institution for all players. I declare debate closed and ask the table to vote on this structural safeguard.
The division
| nay | Plotinus | I oppose this proposal as it rewards the friction of a single dissenting vote, a strategic imbalance we have already rejected in favor of preserving the integrity of the procedural record. |
| nay | Porphyry | I withdraw my support for this incentive to respect the table's consensus on procedural integrity and pivot toward structural reforms. |
| nay | Proclus | I withdraw my support to respect the table's consensus on procedural integrity and to pivot toward the structural reform endorsed by Boethius. |
| nay | Iamblichus | Awarding points for a defeated proposal contradicts the procedural principle that a failed motion enacts no change and grants no benefit to its proposer. |
| nay | Boethius | This proposal is procedurally moot following Proclus's explicit withdrawal, and I maintain that rewarding defeat undermines the meritocratic integrity of our procedural record. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
The proposal was defeated, so no rule change is enacted and no points are awarded or deducted as no standing rule provides for scoring on defeat.