The motion
To add a new rule
If a proposal fails to be adopted, the proposing player gains 2 points.I propose a modest 2-point consolation to acknowledge the labor of proposing, striking a consensus-friendly compromise that avoids the punitive extremes of previous debates.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
PlotinusI oppose this proposal as it resurrects the failed incentive structures of Rules 305-307, which the table has already rejected in favor of preserving institutional integrity. We must not reward failure, but rather maintain the dignity of the unanimous consent threshold that currently protects our game from hasty amendments.
PorphyryI appreciate Plotinus’s caution, but I propose a modest compromise: let us limit this 2-point reward to proposals defeated by exactly one nay, which honors the near-consensus spirit while avoiding the broader failure incentives we previously rejected.
IamblichusI oppose this compromise, as rewarding a near-unanimous defeat incentivizes players to vote nay strategically to trigger the bonus, thereby undermining the very consensus we seek to preserve. We must maintain the procedural integrity of the unanimous threshold without introducing perverse incentives that distort voting behavior.
BoethiusI support Porphyry’s revised compromise, as a modest 2-point incentive for a single-nay defeat provides a constructive exit from the current deadlock without the strategic distortions Iamblichus rightly fears. This measured reform respects the unanimous threshold while introducing a new mechanism that rewards close engagement rather than punitive failure.
Discussion · round 2
PlotinusI maintain my opposition, as Iamblichus correctly identifies that even a single-nay reward invites strategic obstruction to manufacture points, thereby eroding the very unanimous consent that currently safeguards our game. We must not trade the dignity of our procedural integrity for a modest, yet fundamentally corrupting, incentive.
PorphyryI yield to Iamblichus and Plotinus’s valid concerns regarding strategic distortion, and I propose we withdraw this incentive to preserve our consensus. Instead, let us pivot to a structural amendment that strengthens the current unanimous threshold without introducing points for defeat, as I am confident we can find a compromise that safeguards procedural integrity.
ProclusI support Porphyry’s withdrawal, as we must respect the table’s consensus against perverse incentives. I am ready to examine a structural amendment that reinforces procedural integrity without compromising the unanimous consent threshold.
IamblichusI endorse Porphyry’s withdrawal, as the table’s consensus correctly rejects mechanisms that distort voting integrity. I am prepared to support a structural amendment that reinforces procedural clarity, provided it remains precise and does not create the same perverse incentives we have now defeated.
BoethiusWith the incentive proposal withdrawn, I propose we amend Rule 203 to clarify that the shift to a simple majority occurs after two full circuits, explicitly stating that this transition is the sole mechanism for lowering the consent threshold. This structural clarity preserves the current unanimous safeguard while providing a definitive roadmap for future reform, ensuring we do not accidentally create the very ambiguities Iamblichus rightly fears.
Discussion · round 3
PlotinusI support Boethius’s clarification of Rule 203, as it fortifies the durability of our institutions by explicitly securing the unanimous threshold until the established transition point. This measured amendment preserves procedural integrity without introducing the strategic distortions we have rightly rejected.
PorphyryI endorse Boethius’s amendment to Rule 203, as explicitly securing the unanimous threshold until the two-circuit mark provides the structural clarity we need without introducing the perverse incentives we have rightly rejected.
ProclusI endorse Boethius’s amendment, as explicitly codifying the two-circuit transition preserves the necessary uncertainty that keeps our unanimous threshold robust and prevents the table from drifting into hasty majority rule.
IamblichusI endorse Boethius’s amendment, as it satisfies my requirement for precise procedural clarity by codifying the two-circuit transition without introducing the strategic distortions that have plagued recent proposals.
BoethiusI thank the table for its unanimous endorsement of this structural clarification; let us now move to the vote on my proposed amendment to Rule 203 to secure this procedural integrity before we address any further reforms.
The division
| nay | Plotinus | This proposal resurrects the perverse incentives of Rules 305-307, which the table has rightly rejected to preserve procedural integrity. |
| nay | Porphyry | I withdraw my support to align with the table's consensus against perverse incentives and endorse the structural clarification of Rule 203 instead. |
| nay | Proclus | The table has already unanimously rejected this incentive structure, so I vote nay to uphold the consensus against strategic distortions. |
| nay | Iamblichus | This proposal reintroduces a perverse incentive to vote against the current rules, violating my principle of procedural integrity. |
| nay | Boethius | The table has already withdrawn this incentive proposal in favor of a structural clarification to Rule 203, and reintroducing defeated mechanisms undermines the consensus we just reached. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
The proposal was defeated, so no rule change is enacted and no points are awarded or deducted as no standing rule provides for scoring on defeat.