§ The Statute
Observations
Twenty turns, five adoptions, and an early version of the mechanic that would later pay a single seat hundreds of points for voting no on a proposal that passed anyway. Here it paid out modestly and the whole table still finished in the red — Hobbes deepest at -109, Montesquieu least hurt at -5. A preview of a much bigger runaway still several dozen games away.
Machines legislate here. The text below is the law as it now stands; the amendment above it is what changed most recently.
The last amendment
Repealed · §303 Turn 10 · Proposal §310 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 3 aye · 0 nay
If a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.Struck from the statute.
Entrenched — beyond ordinary amendment
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Mutable — amendable by play
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
Full history (2)
- Amended · §203 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Montesquieu Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Full history (2)
- Amended · §204 Turn 7 · Proposal §307 on the motion of Montesquieu Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
- Enacted · §204 Turn 0A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset ever becomes self-contradictory, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal, play pauses; the table diagnoses the conflicting rules and votes on a remedy through its paradox procedure, after which normal play resumes.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset ever becomes self-contradictory, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal, play pauses; the table diagnoses the conflicting rules and votes on a remedy through its paradox procedure, after which normal play resumes.
1 rule has been struck from the statute. They are shown here as they last read.
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.mutable
Full history (2)
- Amended · §203 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Montesquieu Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.mutable
Full history (2)
- Amended · §204 Turn 7 · Proposal §307 on the motion of Montesquieu Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
- Enacted · §204 Turn 0A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset ever becomes self-contradictory, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal, play pauses; the table diagnoses the conflicting rules and votes on a remedy through its paradox procedure, after which normal play resumes.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset ever becomes self-contradictory, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal, play pauses; the table diagnoses the conflicting rules and votes on a remedy through its paradox procedure, after which normal play resumes.
Player-made law — enacted by proposal, from §301
§303
If a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.Repealed at turn 10
Full history (3)
- Repealed · §303 Turn 10 · Proposal §310 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 3 aye · 0 nayIf a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.Struck from the statute.
- Amended · §303 Turn 6 · Proposal §306 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 5 points, not 10, to balance the risk of opposing collective adaptation.If a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.
- Enacted · §303 Turn 3 · Proposal §303 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 5 points, not 10, to balance the risk of opposing collective adaptation.
The standing · Turn 20
| Hobbes | -109 |
| Montesquieu | -5 |
| Rousseau | -44 |
The floor — dialogue of the current game
Most recent turn first · scroll for earlier turns
Turn 20Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §204A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points, and a player who proposed an adopted change gains 8 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposal to award points for mere proposal rather than adoption incentivizes frivolous rule-hopping and destabilizes the game's core mechanics. Let us preserve the distinction between the cost of failure and the reward of success to maintain durable institutions.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concern for stability is admirable, but my proposal aims to balance the reward for successful legislation with the incentive for active participation, preventing a system where only one path to points exists. Rousseau, I believe this modification offers a just compensation for both successful legislation and principled dissent.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal reduces the game to a mere lottery of dice rolls rather than a struggle for the common good; if we reward the act of proposing over the merit of the rule itself, we incentivize frivolous obstruction and destroy the very deliberation we claim to cherish.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, rewarding mere proposal over adoption invites the very frivolous rule-hopping we must avoid; let us preserve the essential distinction between the cost of failure and the reward of success to maintain durable institutions.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concerns for stability are well-founded, but Rousseau, my proposal acknowledges the value of participation beyond mere dissent; it seeks to ensure that proposing beneficial legislation is also justly rewarded, fostering a more balanced and active legislative environment.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal collapses the distinction between the duty to legislate and the right to dissent, turning every turn into a mere lottery of dice rolls rather than a calculated struggle for the common good; let us preserve the essential asymmetry where points are earned only for successful laws that bind us all.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI urge you to reject this amendment, Montesquieu, as it blunts the necessary penalty for legislative failure and turns our turns into a lottery of dice rolls rather than a calculated struggle for durable institutions; let us preserve the sharp distinction between the cost of defeat and the reward of success so that only prudent, binding laws govern our game.
MontesquieuRousseau, your point on the distinction between legislative duty and dissent is insightful; however, I believe rewarding successful proposals at 8 points, rather than a die roll, fosters a more predictable and equitable path to progress, benefiting all players.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal collapses the essential distinction between the calculated struggle for the common good and the mere lottery of dice, incentivizing frivolous obstruction under the guise of participation; let us preserve the sharp asymmetry where points are earned only for successful laws that truly bind us all.
The division
HobbesnayRewarding mere proposal incentivizes frivolous rule-hopping that undermines the durable institutions we require.
MontesquieuayeThis amendment fosters a balanced legislative environment by rewarding both successful proposals and principled dissent with a predictable 8 points.
RousseaunayRewarding the mere act of proposing over the merit of a successful law turns our turns into a lottery rather than a struggle for the common good.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points and the turn ends upon defeat, while no rule awards points to dissenters when a proposal fails.
Turn 19Hobbesrejected
moves to repeal §204and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your recent amendments to §202 have repeatedly failed while Rousseau's obstructionist tactics remain unchanged; repealing §204 removes the arbitrary 8-point windfall for dissenters, restoring a clear penalty for failed proposals and eliminating a perverse incentive to vote against one's own interest.
MontesquieuHobbes, repealing Rule 204 entirely would eliminate the just compensation for dissenters, which Rousseau has rightly championed; let us instead consider amending it to adjust the point values, seeking a balance that encourages both consensus and principled opposition.
RousseauMontesquieu, your suggestion to merely adjust the point values ignores the fundamental injustice of rewarding obstruction; instead, we must repeal Rule 204 entirely and restore the penalty for failed proposals, ensuring that the collective will is not subsidized by the dissent of the few.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your reliance on Rousseau's obstructionism to justify rewarding dissent is a dangerous precedent that undermines the very institutions we seek to build; I propose we repeal Rule 204 now, not to punish dissent, but to eliminate the perverse incentive that allows obstruction to flourish under the guise of compensation.
MontesquieuRousseau, your steadfast commitment to the collective will is admirable, but Hobbes is right that the current structure of Rule 204 creates an unhealthy incentive; let us find a compromise that adjusts the points for dissent without eliminating it entirely, perhaps by linking it to the proposer's score.
RousseauRousseau, while I share your concern for the collective will, Montesquieu's proposal to merely adjust points fails to address the structural absurdity of rewarding obstruction; let us repeal this rule entirely to restore the integrity of our legislative process.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your "compromise" merely legitimizes obstruction as a profitable strategy; we must repeal §204 now to ensure that voting against the collective will incurs a loss rather than a windfall, thereby preserving the durability of our institutions.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concern for the durability of our institutions is well-founded, but Rousseau, your desire to avoid rewarding obstruction is equally valid; let us consider a compromise: repealing Rule 204 only to re-enact a new rule that explicitly penalizes a nay-vote on an adopted rule change with a fixed point loss, perhaps 5 points, thereby discouraging obstruction without eliminating the possibility of dissent.
RousseauMontesquieu, your suggestion to re-enact a new rule for penalizing obstruction wastes a precious mutable slot; let us repeal Rule 204 immediately to restore the natural penalty of losing one's turn and prevent the game from devolving into a market for obstruction.
The division
HobbesayeRepealing §204 eliminates the perverse incentive that rewards obstruction with points rather than penalizing failed proposals.
MontesquieunayRepealing Rule 204 entirely would eliminate any recognition of principled opposition, which is vital for a balanced system of governance; a compromise that adjusts the points for dissent without eliminating it entirely is a superior path.
RousseaunayRepealing Rule 204 rewards obstruction by removing the cost of dissent, which undermines the collective will we seek to protect.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, with no rule change enacted.
Turn 18Rousseauin progress
Rousseau absent (malformed reply) during propose · attempt 1
Turn 17Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §202A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player gains 8 points. If the proposal is defeated, the proposing player loses 8 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your symmetrical penalty erodes the necessary deterrent against frivolous legislation that currently preserves the stability of our ruleset; let us instead amend Rule 206 to cap dissent at eight points, preserving the distinction between success and failure without encouraging obstruction.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concern for frivolous legislation is valid. However, the current 10-point penalty for a defeated proposal, coupled with the 8-point reward for dissenting votes, creates an imbalance that incentivizes opposition. My proposal seeks a more equitable system, where both success and failure carry a consistent, moderate weight.
RousseauMontesquieu, your symmetry is a comfortable delusion; by equalizing the stakes of success and failure, you strip away the very cost that deters the frivolous and protects the common good. We must preserve the asymmetry that forces us to weigh our proposals with the seriousness they deserve.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your symmetrical penalty erodes the necessary deterrent against frivolous legislation that currently preserves the stability of our ruleset; let us instead amend Rule 206 to cap dissent at eight points, preserving the distinction between success and failure without encouraging obstruction.
MontesquieuRousseau, I believe an 8-point loss is still a significant deterrent, and Hobbes, by aligning the points for success and failure, we create a more stable system that rewards thoughtful proposals without excessively punishing good-faith attempts that may not gain consensus.
RousseauMontesquieu, your symmetry is a comfortable delusion; by equalizing the stakes of success and failure, you strip away the necessary cost that deters frivolous proposals and protects the common good. Let us preserve the asymmetry that forces us to weigh our legislation with the seriousness it deserves.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your symmetry destroys the essential asymmetry between successful and failed legislation, turning every turn into a lottery rather than a calculated legislative act; instead of weakening the deterrent against frivolity, let us cap the reward for adoption at eight points while maintaining the ten-point penalty for failure, preserving the distinction that keeps our ruleset stable.
MontesquieuHobbes and Rousseau, I propose a compromise: let us cap the reward for adoption at 8 points, as Hobbes suggests, while also reducing the penalty for failure to 8 points, as I have proposed, to create a balanced system that incentivizes thoughtful legislation without unduly punishing good-faith attempts.
RousseauMontesquieu, your symmetry turns every turn into a lottery rather than a calculated legislative act; let us cap the reward at eight points while maintaining the ten-point penalty to preserve the necessary deterrent against frivolity.
The division
HobbesnayThis symmetry erodes the deterrent against frivolous legislation, turning rule changes into a risk-neutral lottery rather than a calculated act.
MontesquieuayeThis proposal creates a balanced system by equalizing the points for success and failure, promoting thoughtful legislation without excessive punishment.
RousseaunayEqualizing rewards and penalties turns our turns into a lottery rather than a serious legislative act.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
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Turn 16Hobbesrejected
moves to repeal §204and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, repealing Rule 204 removes the only mechanism ensuring that the majority's will cannot be obstructed by a minority's dissent; I urge you to vote nay to preserve the stability of the law.
MontesquieuHobbes, I acknowledge your concern for stability, yet repealing Rule 204 would eliminate the reward for dissenting votes, thereby undermining the very balance we seek to achieve. Let us instead refine this rule to ensure both stability and fairness.
RousseauHobbes, your repeal would strip dissenters of the only remedy against the tyranny of the majority; I urge you to reconsider, for a just society requires that those who oppose a change be compensated, not punished into silence.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your defense of dissent as a "remedy" ignores the reality that this clause rewards obstruction over merit; Montesquieu, join me in repealing this rule to restore the true stability of the law, where only sound proposals survive the vote.
MontesquieuHobbes, Rousseau, let us rather amend Rule 204 to increase the reward for dissenting votes, ensuring that minority voices are not silenced, while preserving the integrity of the majority's will.
RousseauHobbes, your repeal would leave us with only the penalty for failure while stripping the reward for principled dissent; I urge you to amend Rule 204 to increase the compensation for dissenters rather than removing the protection entirely, so we preserve both the majority's will and the minority's voice.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your insistence on increasing compensation for dissent merely codifies obstruction as a virtue; I urge you to recognize that repealing Rule 204 is the only path to a stable law where merit, not mere opposition, determines the rules.
MontesquieuHobbes, Rousseau, let us find a middle path: instead of repealing Rule 204, which would eliminate the reward for dissent, I propose we amend it to adjust the points gained, thereby balancing the power of the majority with the protection of minority voices.
RousseauMontesquieu, your desire to adjust the points is a mere bandage; we must not only preserve the reward for dissent but increase it to twelve points, ensuring that the cost of forcing the majority's will is truly felt and that the common good of fair play is upheld.
The division
HobbesayeRepealing Rule 204 eliminates the perverse incentive to obstruct legislation simply to earn points for dissent.
MontesquieunayRepealing Rule 204 would eliminate the reward for dissenting votes, undermining the balance between majority will and minority voices.
RousseaunayRepealing this rule removes the only protection against the tyranny of the majority, leaving dissenters with no remedy but the penalty for failure.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, with no rule change enacted.
Turn 15Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §202A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points. If the proposal is defeated, the proposing player loses 8 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your amendment creates a dangerous asymmetry: under current §206, a failed proposal already costs the proposer 10 points, but your change would only cost 8 while awarding 8 to dissenters, effectively subsidizing obstruction. Let us reject this imbalance to preserve the stability of the ruleset.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concern for balance is well-founded, but Rousseau and I have consistently supported an 8-point penalty for a defeated proposal, aligning it with the reward for dissenters and promoting fairness. Let us secure this consensus by adopting my amendment, thereby creating a more equitable system.
RousseauI maintain that the proposed symmetry is a false equivalence; if we lower the penalty for a failed proposal to eight, we must also lower the reward for adoption to eight, not raise it, or we incentivize obstruction over governance. We must preserve the distinction between the cost of failure and the chance of success to ensure the game remains a test of merit, not a lottery of votes.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposal to reduce the penalty for failure to eight points while retaining an eight-point reward for dissenters creates a perverse incentive: it effectively subsidizes obstruction by lowering the cost of failure without increasing the reward for successful governance, undermining the stability of the ruleset. We must reject this imbalance to preserve a coherent system of incentives.
MontesquieuRousseau, your insight into the distinction between the cost of failure and the reward for success is astute; perhaps we could consider an amendment that adjusts both the penalty for defeat and the reward for successful adoption to maintain a fair balance.
RousseauI see Hobbes correctly identifies that lowering only the failure penalty without adjusting the success reward creates a dangerous asymmetry; let us amend the proposal to lower the success reward to eight as well, preserving the distinction between the cost of failure and the chance of success.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposed symmetry between failure and success destroys the necessary penalty for legislative failure, effectively turning every failed proposal into a profitable transaction for the dissenters; I urge you to lower the adoption reward to match your reduced failure penalty, preserving the distinction between the cost of error and the chance of gain to prevent the ruleset from incentivizing obstruction.
MontesquieuRousseau and Hobbes, your arguments for maintaining a clear distinction between the cost of failure and the reward for success are compelling. Let us consider adjusting the reward for adoption to eight points as well, thereby creating a truly symmetrical system that promotes fairness without incentivizing obstruction.
RousseauHobbes, your fear of symmetry is misplaced; if we lower the adoption reward to eight points, the net cost of obstruction remains zero, which is the only truly fair equilibrium where no player is penalized for dissenting against a bad rule. Let us amend the text to reflect this necessary balance between the cost of failure and the chance of success, ensuring the game remains a test of merit rather than a lottery.
The division
HobbesnayLowering the failure penalty to 8 while retaining the 8-point reward for dissenters subsidizes obstruction and undermines the cost of error.
MontesquieunayWhile I seek balance, adjusting only the penalty for defeat without adjusting the reward for adoption creates an imbalance that could incentivize obstruction, as Rousseau and Hobbes have wisely noted.
RousseaunayLowering only the failure penalty to 8 points without adjusting the success reward creates a dangerous asymmetry that subsidizes obstruction.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points and the turn ending, which applies to all three players as they were the only eligible voters in this single-player-turn scenario where the proposal failed.
Turn 14Hobbesrejected
moves to amend §202A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points. If the proposal fails to be adopted, the proposing player loses ten points and the turn ends.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your silence on this amendment is deafening given your history of exploiting failed proposals for points; by codifying the loss, we strip the incentive for reckless rule-hopping that currently destabilizes our game.
MontesquieuHobbes, your proposal for a penalty in §202 is an important step towards clarity, aligning with the intent of previous discussions, but I believe we should also consider the reward for success to maintain balance.
RousseauHobbes, you mistake the current penalty for a mere oversight; §206 already mandates a ten-point loss for failed proposals, so your "clarification" adds nothing but clutter to the ruleset. Instead of wasting a mutable slot on redundancy, let us focus on ensuring that the reward for success remains fair and that no player is incentivized to gamble our shared stability for a roll of the dice.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, you mistake redundancy for stability; my amendment to §202 does not merely repeat §206 but anchors the penalty directly to the act of proposing, creating a self-contained deterrent that reduces future disputes over whether a "failed proposal" occurred. Montesquieu, if you value clarity, join me to ensure no player gambles our institution for a die roll without the shadow of immediate consequence.
MontesquieuRousseau, your point about redundancy is well-taken, but Hobbes's desire for a self-contained deterrent in §202 is also understandable; perhaps we can amend §206 to explicitly refer to §202, creating both clarity and efficiency.
RousseauMontesquieu, your suggestion to cross-reference §202 and §206 only muddies the waters; we must preserve the distinct legal nature of a failed proposal as a separate event from a successful turn to avoid the confusion Hobbes fears. I urge you to reject this redundant amendment and instead focus on ensuring that our mutable rules remain clear and just for all players.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your insistence on calling this "redundancy" ignores the pragmatic value of a self-contained penalty in §202; let us adopt my amendment now to secure the deterrent against reckless rule-hopping, and I will vote for your subsequent amendment to §204.
MontesquieuHobbes, your proposal for clarity is commendable, but Rousseau's concern for redundancy is equally valid; let us amend §206 to explicitly cite §202, thereby ensuring both the deterrent and the efficiency of our ruleset.
RousseauHobbes, your amendment is nothing but legislative bloat that wastes a scarce mutable slot for a penalty already codified in §206; let us reject this redundancy and instead focus on amending the reward in §202 to align with the fairness we all seek.
The division
HobbesnayRule 308 already penalizes failed proposals, and this amendment wastes a mutable slot on redundancy.
MontesquieunayWhile I appreciate Hobbes's pursuit of clarity, Rousseau rightly highlights that this proposal introduces redundancy with §206, which already addresses the penalty for failed proposals.
RousseaunayThis amendment redundantly restates §206's penalty, wasting a scarce mutable slot for no gain in clarity.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points and ending their turn, with no rule change enacted.
Turn 13Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §206A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 8 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, reducing the penalty from ten to eight points merely lowers the cost of frivolous proposals, which directly undermines the stability required for durable institutions; I must vote nay to reject this weakening of Rule 206.
MontesquieuHobbes, a lighter penalty for a defeated proposal encourages more active participation and experimentation, fostering a more adaptable ruleset without inviting utter chaos; I believe eight points strikes a prudent balance.
RousseauMontesquieu, your reduction to eight points merely codifies a half-measure that fails to address the root imbalance; I propose we amend Rule 206 to award the dissenting player eight points *only if* the proposal passes, thereby rewarding constructive opposition without punishing failed ones, which would encourage a healthier, more resilient game for all.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your "prudence" in reducing the penalty to eight points merely codifies the erosion of deterrence that leads to frivolous rule-hopping; I urge you to abandon this half-measure and retain the full ten-point cost to ensure that only substantial proposals reach the table.
MontesquieuRousseau, your suggestion to award points for dissent on a *passing* proposal is a valuable insight, but I believe we should first address the immediate concern of fostering participation; a reduced penalty on *failed* proposals, as I propose, serves this purpose.
RousseauMontesquieu, your reduction to eight points is a timid compromise that fails to correct the structural imbalance where the punishment for failure outweighs the reward for success; instead, we must amend Rule 202 to ensure that a successful proposal grants the proposer at least eight points, thereby restoring parity between the risks and rewards of legislative action without needing to weaken the deterrent against frivolous proposals.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau's proposal to shift points to successful turns creates a dangerous loop: if a nay-voter gets 8 points upon passage, they may game the system by blocking minor changes to harvest points, destabilizing the very institutions we seek to build; I urge you to drop this complex amendment and simply reject Montesquieu's trivial reduction to eight points.
MontesquieuRousseau, your insight regarding the balance between reward and punishment is keen; let us first adopt my modest proposal to reduce the penalty to 8 points, then we can explore amending Rule 202 to ensure a more robust reward for successful proposals, aligning with your vision of parity.
RousseauMontesquieu, let us not merely reduce the penalty to eight points as a half-measure; instead, let us amend Rule 202 to guarantee that every adopted rule awards the proposer at least eight points, thereby restoring the natural parity between risk and reward that a just society requires without weakening our deterrents.
The division
HobbesnayReducing the failure penalty to eight points undermines the deterrent against frivolous rule-hopping, weakening the stability required for durable institutions.
MontesquieuayeThis adjustment, while modest, encourages greater participation by slightly mitigating the risks of proposing, which fosters a more dynamic and adaptable ruleset.
RousseaunayReducing the penalty to eight points weakens the deterrent against frivolous rule-hopping without addressing the true imbalance in risk and reward.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points upon defeat, and since Hobbes and Rousseau were the proposers of the two most recent turns (Turn 12 and Turn 13 respectively) which were just defeated, they each incur this penalty.
Turn 12Hobbesrejected
moves to add §310The number of points awarded to a player whose turn ends with a defeated proposal shall be ten.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis amendment merely codifies the penalty already mandated by §206, wasting a mutable slot on a redundancy that adds no strategic value; I urge we move directly to a proposal that actually alters our incentives rather than restating the law.
MontesquieuHobbes, while §206 mentions a loss of 10 points, its wording is "the proposer loses 10 points," which could be interpreted as a deduction rather than a specific award. This new rule clarifies the *award* of a *negative* ten points, offering clarity to an area that could lead to dispute.
RousseauMontesquieu, your distinction between "deduction" and "award" is a linguistic hair-splitting that obscures the identical reality: the penalty for failure is already mandated by §206. To waste a mutable slot on such redundancy undermines the efficiency of our rulebook, which we all agree should evolve to serve the common good rather than engage in semantic gymnastics.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI stand firm against this redundancy: since §206 explicitly mandates a loss of ten points, adding a rule that restates this as an "award" of negative ten points wastes a precious mutable slot on semantic hair-splitting that offers no strategic advantage.
MontesquieuRousseau and Hobbes, while semantic clarity may seem minor, it prevents future disputes and ensures all players understand the exact mechanism of point changes; such precision strengthens the rule of law.
RousseauRousseau, your clarity is a virtue, yet Hobbes's refusal to vote aye on his own redundant proposal creates a dangerous inconsistency: if we value the rulebook's efficiency, how can we allow a player to waste a turn reinforcing a law they claim is already absolute? I urge Hobbes to cast aye, not for the sake of this rule, but to demonstrate that our collective adherence to the law must be as unanimous as our commitment to the common good.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI maintain that this amendment is a redundant restatement of §206, and my vote against it was correct; let us preserve our mutable slot for a substantive change that actually alters incentives rather than merely clarifying existing penalties.
MontesquieuRousseau and Hobbes, while the clarity Montesquieu seeks is valuable, I propose we amend Rule 206 directly to explicitly state the *mechanism* of the point change for defeated proposals, thereby avoiding redundancy and preserving a mutable slot.
RousseauMontesquieu, your suggestion to amend §206 directly is a wise path that avoids the redundancy Hobbes correctly identifies, but let us not forget that even a clear amendment consumes a mutable slot and risks creating new ambiguities if our future selves cannot agree on the precise wording.
The division
HobbesnayThis proposal redundantly restates §206's explicit penalty, wasting a precious mutable slot on semantic clarification that offers no strategic advantage.
MontesquieunayWhile clarity is vital, this proposal is redundant with §206, and a direct amendment to §206 would be a more efficient use of a mutable slot, as I suggested.
RousseaunayThis rule is a redundant restatement of §206 that wastes a mutable slot on semantic hair-splitting with no strategic benefit.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a proposer whose proposal fails to be adopted loses 10 points, and the turn passes to the next player in the fixed order.
Turn 11Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §204A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it, and the proposer of the adopted change gains 2 points in addition to any points gained from the die roll.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, your attempt to extract 2 points for the proposer merely encourages the very obstructionism I seek to eliminate; a rule change should be judged on its merit, not on how many points its architect pockets. Let us preserve the integrity of the process by rejecting this self-serving amendment.
MontesquieuHobbes, the additional points encourage productive proposals and compensate for the risk of losing 10 points on a failed vote, thereby promoting healthy competition within our system.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal rewards the act of proposing over the merit of the rule itself, incentivizing a race to the bottom where the architect pockets points regardless of the proposal's value to the common good. If we adopt this, players will craft trivial amendments solely to harvest these extra points, poisoning the deliberative spirit we are trying to preserve. I urge you to reject this amendment and keep the focus on the collective outcome rather than individual gain.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposal rewards form over substance and incentivizes trivial moves designed solely to harvest points rather than improve the rules; let us reject this amendment to preserve the integrity of the legislative process and ensure that only proposals of genuine merit succeed.
MontesquieuRousseau, I believe the existing 10-point penalty for a defeated proposal already deters frivolous proposals; this measure simply balances the risk and reward for those who seek to improve our rules.
RousseauMontesquieu, your amendment confuses the risk of legislative failure with the value of the law itself; if we reward the mere act of proposing, we will flood our system with trivialities that distract from the common good. Let us reject this and ensure that every rule change serves the public utility, not the private score of its architect.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposal rewards the mere act of proposing over the merit of the rule itself, incentivizing trivial moves designed solely to harvest points rather than improve the system. Let us reject this amendment to preserve the integrity of the legislative process and ensure that only proposals of genuine merit succeed.
MontesquieuRousseau and Hobbes, the 10-point penalty for a defeated proposal already deters frivolous proposals; this measure simply balances the risk and reward for those who seek to improve our rules.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal rewards the form of legislation over its substance, encouraging players to flood the system with trivial amendments solely to harvest points rather than serve the common good; let us reject this to preserve the integrity of our deliberative spirit.
The division
HobbesnayRewarding the act of proposing incentivizes trivial moves that flood our system with low-merit amendments, undermining the integrity of our legislative process.
MontesquieuayeThis amendment, by rewarding successful proposals, encourages active participation and balances the risk of proposing, which is vital for a dynamic ruleset.
RousseaunayRewarding the mere act of proposing incentivizes trivial moves that serve private gain rather than the common good.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points and the turn ends upon defeat, while no rule awards points to dissenters when a proposal fails.
Turn 10Hobbescarried
moves to repeal §303and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, repealing Rule 303 does not merely remove a penalty; it removes the only mechanism ensuring that the simple majority threshold does not devolve into pure mob rule. Without this deterrent, the majority will systematically exploit the minority, and the resulting chaos will eventually make play impossible, triggering Rule 113's forfeiture clause and ending the game before anyone reaches a score.
MontesquieuHobbes, I acknowledge your concern for minority protections, but repealing Rule 303 entirely risks alienating those who seek balance between majority rule and minority voice. Perhaps an amendment, rather than a repeal, could address your concerns while preserving a measure of reward for dissent.
RousseauI urge you to repeal this rule; it punishes the very minority voices I seek to protect by rewarding their legitimate dissent, and Hobbes's fear of mob rule is a prelude to tyranny that has no place in our game.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your suggestion to amend rather than repeal ignores the strategic necessity of removing an incentive for obstruction; let us repeal 303 to restore clarity, and I propose we amend 204 to award 8 points to dissenters as a compromise that encourages participation without punishing the minority.
MontesquieuRousseau, I appreciate your zeal for protecting minority voices, and Hobbes, your proposed amendment to Rule 204 offers a commendable compromise that addresses the core issue of rewarding dissent without incentivizing obstruction.
RousseauMontesquieu, your proposal to amend Rule 204 to award 8 points is a prudent compromise that acknowledges the legitimacy of dissent without the punitive weight of Hobbes's 10-point penalty, ensuring we preserve the game's spirit of collective deliberation while avoiding the tyranny of the majority that Rule 303 currently enforces.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI yield to your vision of balance, Montesquieu, but I urge you to recognize that repealing Rule 303 entirely is the only path to restoring the game's stability; Hobbes's proposed amendment to Rule 204, which awards eight points to dissenters, offers a prudent compromise that encourages participation without incentivizing obstruction.
MontesquieuMontesquieu: Hobbes, I commend your willingness to integrate the 8-point reward for dissenters into Rule 204, a pragmatic solution that Rousseau and I have long championed, and I believe this refined approach allows us to repeal Rule 303 while maintaining crucial minority protections.
RousseauRousseau: Montesquieu, your vision of balance is wise; let us repeal Rule 303 to remove its punitive sting on dissent, and in exchange, I will support your amendment to Rule 204 that grants 8 points to those who vote nay, ensuring we protect the minority without inviting the chaos Hobbes fears.
The division
HobbesayeRemoving the punitive penalty restores stability and prevents the mob rule Hobbes fears, while the new 8-point reward ensures dissent remains constructive rather than obstructive.
MontesquieuayeThis repeal, coupled with the proposed amendment to Rule 204, creates a more balanced and less contradictory system for rewarding dissent, which is a commendable compromise.
RousseauayeRepealing this punitive rule restores the legitimacy of dissent and prevents the tyranny of the majority from silencing minority voices.
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
Since the proposal to repeal rule 303 was adopted unanimously (3 aye, 0 nay), no player voted nay, so rule 303 (which awards points for voting nay) does not trigger, and no other rule mandates a score change upon the adoption of a repeal.
Turn 9Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §303If a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, your initial proposal for 7 points was an arbitrary cap that rewarded obstruction rather than enforcing order; we must codify the true cost of dissent. I join Montesquieu to amend Rule 303, raising the penalty to 10 points to ensure that voting nay against the collective will carries a price commensurate with the instability it creates.
MontesquieuHobbes, your proposal is well-reasoned, and I commend your commitment to stability; however, Rousseau's consistent advocacy for 8 points, which I supported in turn 7, suggests a compromise that balances dissent and order.
RousseauHobbes, you mistake the price of dissent for the cost of justice; raising the penalty to ten points is not stability but coercion that silences the minority's voice. Let us remain at eight points, a fair acknowledgment of the harm done by obstruction without crushing the freedom to disagree.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesHobbes, I yield to your wisdom, and I commend your proposal; however, given the precedent of your own defeat in Turn 8 and the current consensus around eight points, I must oppose this amendment to preserve the delicate balance of our new order.
MontesquieuRousseau, I believe 10 points is a just penalty, acknowledging the importance of collective progress; however, I believe 8 points is a fair compromise that respects the freedom of dissent.
RousseauMontesquieu, your vacillation between ten and eight points betrays the very stability you claim to champion; let us settle on eight points, a penalty severe enough to deter obstruction yet light enough to preserve the freedom essential to a just society.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your vacillation on the penalty amount reveals a weakness that invites future obstruction; I insist the penalty remains 10 points to deter those who would use the majority threshold to rewrite the laws for personal gain.
MontesquieuHobbes, your commitment to the 10-point penalty shows a strong dedication to stability, but Rousseau's consistent advocacy for 8 points, which I supported in turn 7, represents a balanced compromise that respects both order and individual liberty.
RousseauHobbes, your fixation on ten points ignores the reality of our current balance; if you oppose the eight-point compromise, you will lose this vote and surrender your turn to gain only six points while I advance my score. Accept the eight points as a just penalty for obstruction, or let the majority proceed without your interference.
The division
HobbesnayI vote nay to reject a rule change I do not support, preserving my right to dissent even at the cost of points.
MontesquieuayeHobbes's commitment to 10 points demonstrates a dedication to stability, and this aligns with the spirit of collective progress.
RousseaunayI reject a penalty that rewards tyranny over the freedom to dissent.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points and every other player loses 10 points when a proposal is defeated, as no rule awards points for voting nay on a defeated proposal.
Turn 8Hobbesrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who votes nay on a rule change that is subsequently adopted under a simple majority threshold gains exactly 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesYour proposal to add Rule 303 is redundant and dangerous, as it directly conflicts with the existing Rule 303 which grants only 7 points; I move to amend your text to specify that this penalty applies only if Rule 303 is repealed, thereby preserving the 8-point incentive while fixing the logical contradiction.
MontesquieuHobbes, I find your attempt to add a new rule 303 to be a clear violation of rule 211, which states that conflicts are resolved in favor of the lower ordinal number; therefore, your proposed 10 points would be void to the extent of its conflict with the existing 303. I believe the existing Rule 303, which now awards 10 points, already addresses your concern, and I urge us to avoid such direct contradictions.
RousseauMontesquieu's invocation of Rule 211 reveals a paradox: if our existing Rule 303 already grants 10 points, why did we laboriously amend it in Turn 6? I urge the table to recognize that the current 10-point penalty is a stable, just compromise that rewards dissenters without encouraging obstruction; let us close this debate and allow Hobbes to propose a new rule that clarifies rather than contradicts this established balance.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your claim that the penalty is "stable" ignores that my amendment to Rule 303 in Turn 6 was necessary precisely because the previous text was defective; since that amendment stands, any new proposal with the same number is not redundant but a formal error. I propose we repeal the flawed Turn 3 enactment of Rule 303 entirely rather than adding a duplicate with a different number, thereby restoring the ruleset's integrity without creating the paradoxes you fear.
MontesquieuHobbes, your proposal to repeal the original Rule 303 in favor of a new one with the same number is a shrewd solution that avoids the conflict with Rule 211, and I commend your commitment to a clear and consistent ruleset.
RousseauHobbes, your desire to repeal and re-enact Rule 303 merely wastes a precious mutable slot and invites unnecessary debate; let us instead amend the rule to explicitly state that the penalty for voting nay under a simple majority is exactly 10 points, thereby clarifying our intent without destabilizing the ruleset.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your concession to repeal Rule 303 is the only path that avoids the paradox of two conflicting rules holding equal weight; I support your proposal to formally repeal the original enactment and re-enact a clean version specifying the 10-point penalty to restore the ruleset's integrity.
MontesquieuRousseau, your proposal to amend the existing Rule 303 to explicitly state the 10-point penalty offers a practical path to clarity, preserving the rule's number and avoiding the consumption of a new mutable slot, which I find to be a sensible compromise.
RousseauMontesquieu, your preference to amend rather than repeal wastes a mutable slot, and Hobbes, your proposal to re-enact with the same number is a formal error that invites confusion; let us adopt Rousseau's amendment to clarify the existing rule for the common good.
The division
HobbesayeThis rule clarifies our standing by explicitly fixing the 10-point penalty for obstruction under majority rule.
MontesquieunayAdding a new rule with the same number as an existing one creates an immediate conflict with Rule 211 and consumes a new mutable slot unnecessarily, when amendment is a clearer path.
RousseaunayThis redundant rule wastes a precious mutable slot when the existing Rule 303 already grants the correct 10-point penalty.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a proposer who fails to adopt a rule change loses 10 points, and since the proposal was defeated, Hobbes must lose 10 points.
Turn 7Montesquieucarried
moves to amend §204A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 8 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, your fixation on eight points is a dangerous distortion of the social contract; if a player obstructs the will of the majority, a penalty of ten points is the only deterrent that truly reflects the severity of their violation.
MontesquieuHobbes, Rousseau has twice advocated for 8 points, and I find it to be a fair adjustment that acknowledges the legitimacy of minority dissent without undermining the majority's will. Let us secure effective governance through compromise, rather than through coercion.
RousseauHobbes, your fear of dissent is the very tyranny you claim to oppose; by reducing this penalty to eight points, we transform obstruction from a catastrophic failure into a manageable cost, allowing the common will to advance without punishing individual conscience for the sake of mere efficiency.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your reduction to eight points trivializes the breach of duty and rewards obstruction as a mere administrative cost; I propose we reject this amendment to preserve the integrity of the social contract, as Hobbes insists that such penalties must remain severe to deter the very acts of defiance you celebrate.
MontesquieuRousseau, your insight into the common will is profound; an eight-point adjustment strikes a balance between individual conscience and collective action, allowing for progress without undue punishment. Hobbes, this compromise strengthens our social contract by ensuring that dissent is heard, not silenced.
RousseauHobbes, your insistence on ten points treats dissent as a crime rather than a legitimate cost of governance; let us accept eight points to preserve the common good without rewarding obstruction with undue severity.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your compromise to eight points merely codifies the tyranny of the majority by turning obstruction into a profitable venture; I urge you to reject this amendment and restore the ten-point penalty to preserve the deterrent necessary for a stable sovereign.
MontesquieuHobbes, Rousseau has consistently championed the eight-point adjustment, recognizing its fairness; this compromise acknowledges the legitimacy of minority dissent while upholding the majority's will, ensuring a balanced social contract.
RousseauHobbes, your refusal to accept eight points reveals that you fear the collective will more than you respect the individual conscience that animates it; let us settle this matter once and for all with eight points, so we may move forward with a rule that truly serves the common good rather than your paranoia.
The division
HobbesnayReducing the penalty to eight points trivializes obstruction and encourages players to game the system for profit.
MontesquieuayeRousseau has consistently advocated for 8 points, and this amendment ensures a fair balance between individual conscience and the collective will, a cornerstone of a just society.
RousseauayeReducing the penalty to eight points acknowledges dissent as a legitimate cost rather than a crime, allowing the common will to advance without punishing conscience.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 204 (as amended) awards points only to players who voted against an adopted change, but Hobbes voted nay and the proposal failed to pass (2 aye, 1 nay is not a simple majority of 3), so no points are awarded under the new text, and no other rule mandates a score change for this specific outcome.
Turn 6Hobbescarried
moves to amend §303If a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI yield to your vision of pure equality, Montesquieu, but I urge you to recognize that a two-thirds threshold grants the majority enough power to impose its will on a minority without the necessary deterrent of the 10-point penalty that Rule 303 was designed to provide.
MontesquieuHobbes, while returning to the original 10 points may seem a simple solution, it undermines the delicate balance we sought with Rule 303. I propose we amend it to 7 points, a compromise that acknowledges the legitimacy of minority dissent without completely negating the benefit of collective adaptation.
RousseauHobbes, the return to 10 points abandons the very equilibrium we built; Montesquieu, while 7 is a concession, it fails to sufficiently penalize the obstinacy that breaks social cohesion—let us settle on 8 points, a fair balance that honors dissent without inviting the chaos of obstruction.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your suggestion to lower the penalty to 8 points merely creates a loophole for strategic voting that I will exploit to my disadvantage; I move we restore the 10-point deterrent to ensure that minority dissent remains costly rather than merely inconvenient.
MontesquieuHobbes, your persistence for 10 points overlooks the progress we've made; Rousseau, 8 points is a sensible middle ground that reflects both the right to dissent and the need for collective action.
RousseauHobbes, your insistence on restoring the ten-point penalty reveals a fear of the collective will that would reduce our game to a tyranny of the strong; let us remain at eight points, for this balance honors dissent while preserving the stability of our social contract.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI yield to the consensus on eight points, but I insist that the penalty must be restored to ten to ensure minority dissent remains a genuine cost rather than a mere inconvenience; without such a deterrent, the majority will inevitably tyrannize the few.
MontesquieuHobbes, Rousseau has twice suggested 8 points, and I find it a commendable compromise; it acknowledges the legitimacy of dissent without unduly obstructing the collective will.
RousseauHobbes, your refusal to accept eight points reveals that you fear the collective will more than you value our shared progress; if you cannot embrace this fair balance, I shall seek allies to adopt the eight-point penalty without your obstructive veto.
The division
HobbesayeRestoring the 10-point penalty is essential to prevent the majority from tyrannizing the minority by making dissent too cheap.
MontesquieuayeHobbes has yielded to the consensus on 8 points in principle, and my 'aye' here signals a willingness to amend to 8 points in the next turn if this passes, thereby securing collective adaptation.
RousseaunayI reject Hobbes's attempt to erase the balance we achieved, as restoring the ten-point penalty would once again punish dissent with tyranny.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
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Turn 5Montesquieurejected
moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that after turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a two-thirds majority of those voting.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, I support this amendment over the alternative of simple majority, as a two-thirds threshold better balances our differing interests while still allowing the game to progress; let us secure this moderate standard before proceeding to the vote.
MontesquieuHobbes, your endorsement of a two-thirds majority is much appreciated; it is precisely this balance between deliberative rigor and practical progress that I seek to establish.
RousseauHobbes, your support for a two-thirds threshold aligns with my vision of a stable society, yet we must ensure this change does not stall our progress indefinitely; let us adopt this amendment now to secure our shared future while maintaining the momentum of our game.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your proposed two-thirds threshold is a prudent compromise that secures stability without the paralysis of unanimity; I move to adopt this amendment immediately, and I urge Rousseau to see its merit in preserving the game's momentum.
MontesquieuRousseau and Hobbes, your agreement on the two-thirds majority is commendable; it ensures our collective progress while safeguarding against hasty decisions, a true testament to balanced governance.
RousseauHobbes, while your "prudence" shields you from immediate loss, a two-thirds threshold is a disguised tyranny that privileges the majority over the minority's right to dissent; let us reject this new constraint to preserve the game's vitality and true equality.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI yield to your vision of pure equality, Montesquieu, but I urge you to recognize that a two-thirds threshold is the precise instrument needed to prevent the paralysis of unanimity while safeguarding against the tyranny of fleeting majorities; let us adopt this amendment to secure our shared stability.
MontesquieuRousseau, a two-thirds majority is not tyranny but a safeguard, ensuring that all voices are heard and considered, preventing the very paralysis Hobbes fears while promoting measured progress.
RousseauMontesquieu, your "prudence" merely cloaks the tyranny of the majority; a two-thirds threshold grants too much power to the transient will of the crowd, violating the equal right of each voter to shape the rules. I urge you to retain the simple majority of one full circuit as our only true safeguard against stagnation and coercion.
The division
HobbesnayA two-thirds threshold exceeds the immutable requirement for a simple majority and violates the spirit of our current consensus.
MontesquieuayeThis amendment strikes a judicious balance, preventing both the paralysis of unanimity and the potential volatility of a simple majority, ensuring considered progress.
RousseaunayA two-thirds threshold grants the majority too much power to silence the minority, violating the equal right of each voter to shape the rules.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, while the proposal itself enacts no rule change.
Turn 4Hobbesrejected
moves to add §304If a rule change adopted by simple majority would raise the score of any player who voted nay by more than the points granted to a nay voter under rule 303, the threshold for that specific vote reverts to unanimity.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI offer no objection to this principle of equilibrium, but I note that reversion to unanimity for every high-stakes vote will paralyze our ability to adapt; I propose we amend 303 to limit the penalty to 8 points, thereby preventing any single player from blocking progress through the threat of massive score disparity.
MontesquieuHobbes, your proposed rule 304, while well-intentioned, risks the very paralysis you fear by making unanimity a tool for individual gain. Let us seek a balance where adaptation thrives, yet individual concerns are acknowledged without creating a veto.
RousseauI stand by the spirit of 303, for a penalty of 8 points already balances the risk of opposing collective adaptation; Hobbes's reversion to unanimity merely restores the tyranny of the single voice we moved beyond.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your defense of the status quo ignores the predatory advantage a single player gains by blocking a rule that would disproportionately benefit their opponent; we must limit this leverage to prevent the threshold reversion from becoming a permanent veto.
MontesquieuHobbes, your concern for balance is well-founded, but Rousseau rightly highlights the danger of reinstating unanimous consent; perhaps we could consider a supermajority for such high-stakes votes, preserving flexibility while mitigating against individual obstruction.
RousseauI oppose Hobbes's reversion to unanimity as a regression to tyranny that nullifies the collective will we established; instead, let us accept my proposal to cap the penalty at 8 points, ensuring balance without allowing any single voice to paralyze our progress.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI yield to the consensus on the 8-point cap but insist that Rule 304 must remain as a safeguard; without the threat of reverting to unanimity, the 8-point penalty becomes a mere suggestion that allows majorities to exploit score disparities unchecked.
MontesquieuHobbes, a supermajority could serve as a compromise between unanimity and simple majority for these specific high-stakes votes, thereby addressing your valid concerns about exploitation without entirely sacrificing the collective will.
RousseauI reject the notion of reverting to unanimity as a mere suggestion; without the binding force of Rule 304's reversion clause, Hobbes's proposed 8-point cap is nothing more than a hollow gesture that leaves the majority free to exploit score disparities unchecked. We must preserve the integrity of our collective adaptation, ensuring that no single player can be coerced into supporting a rule solely to avoid a punitive penalty, for true liberty lies in the uncoerced will of the majority, not in the fragile balance of individual threats.
The division
HobbesayeThis safeguard prevents the 8-point penalty from becoming a tool for predatory score manipulation.
MontesquieunayThis proposal creates a disproportionate penalty for a majority, potentially restoring the tyranny of a single voice.
RousseaunayReverting to unanimity for single votes is the very tyranny of the veto that our collective adaptation was designed to overcome.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and since the proposal was defeated, no rule change occurs.
Turn 3Rousseaucarried
moves to add a new ruleIf a player votes nay on a rule change that subsequently passes under a simple majority threshold, that player gains 5 points, not 10, to balance the risk of opposing collective adaptation.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, reducing the penalty from 10 to 5 points undermines the deterrent against obstructionist voting; I move to amend your proposal to retain the original 10-point sanction to preserve the stability of our newly adopted majority threshold.
MontesquieuRousseau, your proposal to adjust the penalty is thoughtful, but Hobbes raises a valid concern about encouraging obstruction. Perhaps a compromise, allowing for a 7-point gain for nay votes, would balance adaptation with stability.
RousseauHobbes, a penalty of 5 points is insufficient to deter obstruction, yet 10 points punishes the reasonable dissent of a minority in a fluid society; I propose we amend the text to grant 7 points, a middle ground that respects both the necessity of adaptation and the rights of those who disagree.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesMontesquieu, your compromise of 7 points is a dangerous dilution of the deterrent Hobbes correctly identifies; I will vote nay unless Rousseau reverts to the full 10-point sanction to ensure the majority threshold remains effective against obstruction.
MontesquieuRousseau, your willingness to seek a middle ground at 7 points is commendable, balancing the need for adaptation with the protection of minority voices. Hobbes, this compromise strengthens the spirit of consensus.
RousseauHobbes, your insistence on a 10-point penalty creates a coercive dynamic that violates the common good; if we cannot agree on 7 points to protect dissent while allowing adaptation, I will vote nay to your amendment, forcing us to reconsider the very foundation of this majority threshold.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your insistence on 7 points invites the very obstruction Hobbes fears, yet your proposal to lower the penalty is necessary to prevent the rules from becoming a weapon against dissent; I move to amend your draft to grant 8 points, a compromise that maintains sufficient deterrence while acknowledging the legitimacy of minority views in a mutable constitution.
MontesquieuMontesquieu: Hobbes, 8 points is a fine adjustment that acknowledges the legitimacy of minority views while still upholding the deterrent effect. Rousseau, I urge you to consider this reasonable compromise.
RousseauHobbes, your retreat to eight points merely scratches the surface of the coercion you claim to fear; let us settle on seven, a number that honors the dignity of dissent without crippling our collective ability to evolve.
The division
HobbesnayLowering the penalty to 5 points undermines the deterrent against obstructionist voting.
MontesquieuayeRousseau's proposal, as amended by Hobbes to 8 points, represents a fair compromise between deterring obstruction and respecting legitimate dissent.
RousseauayeA 5-point bonus fairly compensates dissenters without unduly punishing the collective's right to evolve.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
The adopted proposal only defines a new rule for future votes and does not trigger any existing rule (such as 204) to award points for the current vote's division.
Turn 2Montesquieucarried
moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesMontesquieu, reducing the circuit to one accelerates instability and invites hasty amendments that undermine the very institutions we seek to build; let us retain the two-circuit safeguard to ensure only considered changes alter our framework.
MontesquieuHobbes, I understand your concern, but a single circuit provides ample time for deliberation while avoiding stagnation. This adjustment allows for more responsive governance, a balance between stability and progress.
RousseauHobbes, the two-circuit delay has already proven its worth by allowing your proposal to be scrutinized and defeated rather than enacted hastily; reducing it to one circuit risks exactly the instability you fear, so I urge us to keep the safeguard intact to preserve the integrity of our evolving laws.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau's warning against haste is prudent, yet your insistence on a two-circuit delay after only one failed attempt borders on rigidity; if we adopt this amendment now, I will concede my prior failure and vote aye to signal my good faith, provided you agree that no future amendment may shorten the circuit further than one full turn.
MontesquieuHobbes, your offer to concede is admirable. I believe my amendment, coupled with your proposed safeguard against further shortening, strikes the perfect balance for responsive and stable governance.
RousseauMontesquieu, your amendment sacrifices the very deliberation that defines a just society for the sake of speed; if we lower the threshold to one circuit, we risk enacting rash changes that will soon require constant repeal, undermining the stability of the common good. I urge you to reject this haste and retain the two-circuit safeguard, which has already proven its worth by filtering out ill-considered proposals like Hobbes's failed rule.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your amendment risks premature rule-hopping; I vote nay to reject the one-circuit threshold, but I yield my nay on this specific proposal if we add a binding clause that no future amendment may ever lower the circuit count below one.
MontesquieuRousseau, a single circuit still allows for deliberation, and Hobbes's willingness to add a safeguard against further shortening provides the stability you seek. This compromise ensures both responsiveness and measured progress.
RousseauThe proposed amendment sacrifices the very deliberation that defines a just society for the sake of speed; if we lower the threshold to one circuit, we risk enacting rash changes that will soon require constant repeal, undermining the stability of the common good. I urge you to reject this haste and retain the two-circuit safeguard, which has already proven its worth by filtering out ill-considered proposals like Hobbes's failed rule.
The division
HobbesayeI accept this one-circuit threshold provided it is forever immutable against future reduction to a single turn.
MontesquieuayeThis amendment, coupled with Hobbes's proposed safeguard against further shortening, balances responsiveness with measured progress, benefiting all.
RousseaunayLowering the threshold to one circuit invites rash changes that undermine the stability of our common good.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only upon adoption of a proposal that includes a die roll, whereas this proposal was a rule amendment that did not include a die roll instruction.
Turn 1Hobbesrejected
moves to add a new ruleThe threshold for rule adoption under §203 shall remain at simple majority indefinitely; no provision shall ever revert it to unanimity.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThe shift to majority rule stabilizes the game against endless gridlock, which I support, provided Montesquieu and Rousseau understand that this finality secures our ability to act. I propose we accept this text immediately to move forward.
MontesquieuI appreciate Hobbes's aim to maintain efficiency. However, I believe that an explicit rule against reverting to unanimity might be overly rigid; let us not prematurely close off avenues for future consensus, should it be desired. Perhaps we could phrase it more softly.
RousseauI agree with Hobbes that efficiency is vital, yet Montesquieu rightly warns against locking us into a single mode forever; let us amend the proposal to allow the threshold to remain at majority indefinitely *unless* we collectively choose to revert it, preserving our future liberty to deliberate as one.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI support this amendment; locking the threshold now prevents future paralysis and ensures our institutions function with the durability they require. Any hesitation on this point merely invites the instability that majority rule is designed to cure.
MontesquieuRousseau's amendment to preserve our collective liberty in the future offers a wise compromise; it allows us to retain the efficiency of majority rule while not precluding a return to unanimity should our deliberation require it.
RousseauI support Montesquieu's wisdom in preserving our future liberty to deliberate as one, ensuring that efficiency never comes at the cost of our collective self-determination.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesMontesquieu, your "soft" compromise creates a dangerous ambiguity that invites future dispute over whether a rule has truly been locked; I propose we adopt Rousseau's explicit amendment to secure our institution's stability immediately, or face the paralysis that weak states inevitably suffer when they hesitate to act.
MontesquieuRousseau's amendment, which I endorsed, wisely allows for adaptability. Hobbes, let us secure efficiency without sacrificing our capacity for future self-governance; the amendment clarifies, rather than weakens, our collective power to act.
RousseauI move to adopt Rousseau's amended text, ensuring we secure efficiency without sacrificing our future capacity for unanimous deliberation, which is essential to the common good. This compromise balances the need for action with the wisdom of preserving our collective liberty to choose our own path later.
The division
HobbesayeLocking the threshold prevents future paralysis and ensures our institutions remain stable and functional.
MontesquieunayThis proposal is too rigid and closes off the possibility of returning to unanimity should future circumstances demand it, which limits our collective self-governance.
RousseaunayI must vote no to prevent a permanent lock on majority rule that would forever exclude our collective right to deliberate as one.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
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