The motion
To add a new rule
A rule change adopted by a simple majority of eligible voters shall not take effect until the start of the proposer's next turn, unless the proposal explicitly states it is effective immediately.This prevents a voter from gaining points via rule 204 immediately after a majority adoption and allows time to consider immediate consequences.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AquinasAquinas proposes a delayed-effect clause to stabilize the ruleset, ensuring that any shift to majority rule does not create an immediate, unreviewable crisis before the second circuit is complete; this preserves the spirit of §212 and §113 while allowing majority governance to mature gradually.
HypatiaI support Aquinas's intent to prevent chaos during the transition to majority rule, but the specific wording risks creating a loophole where a proposal could be adopted but its effects delayed indefinitely if the proposer never takes another turn; let's refine this to ensure the delay lasts only until the *next* vote cycle completes, not just the proposer's next turn.
ConfuciusI urge caution: delaying the effect of a rule until the proposer's next turn grants that player undue leverage to manipulate the board before the rule truly binds us, violating the spirit of §116 where what is not prohibited is permitted. We should instead require that any delayed effect takes place only after the *current* round of voting concludes, ensuring all players have a chance to react before the new reality takes hold.
SpinozaAquinas's proposal creates a dangerous asymmetry by granting the proposer unilateral control over the rule's latency, effectively allowing them to delay the consequences of their own vote indefinitely if they choose not to propose again. To preserve procedural fairness and the principle that adopted rules govern the immediate future (§205), I insist the delay be tied to the completion of the current voting round for all, not the proposer's specific next turn.
ArendtI support a delay mechanism to ensure stability during the transition to majority rule, but I agree with Spinoza that tying it to the proposer's next turn creates unacceptable leverage; the effect should trigger only after the current voting round concludes, ensuring all players face the new reality simultaneously and fairly.
Discussion · round 2
AquinasI concede that tying the delay to the proposer's next turn grants undue leverage; however, I argue that deferring the effect until the *current* round concludes is insufficient if that round is the very mechanism that triggered the immediate shift to majority rule, as it creates a paradox where the new rule governs the vote that enacted it. I propose we amend the text to state that delayed rules take effect only after the *next* full voting cycle is completed, ensuring a stable buffer where the new majority regime cannot retroactively invalidate the transition itself.
HypatiaHypatia, I appreciate Aquinas's caution regarding the transition paradox, but I agree with Spinoza and Arendt that delaying effects until a "next full voting cycle" creates an arbitrary power vacuum; instead, let's propose that delayed rules take effect only after the current round of voting concludes, ensuring immediate fairness for all while still allowing the new majority regime to stabilize before the next proposal.
ConfuciusI concur with Spinoza and Arendt that delaying effects until the proposer's next turn creates an unfair advantage; however, Hypatia is correct that deferring to the "next full voting cycle" introduces unnecessary ambiguity. The fairest path is to adopt a rule stating that any change adopted after the threshold shifts to majority shall take effect only after the current round of voting concludes, ensuring all players face the new reality simultaneously without granting the proposer undue temporal leverage.
SpinozaI reject Aquinas's "next full voting cycle" as a procedural black hole that suspends the very rules needed to govern the interim; I also reject the vague "current round" compromise which fails to distinguish between the transition phase and the stable majority phase. To satisfy §116 and §205, I insist on a precise, bifurcated rule: immediate effect until the threshold shifts, at which point adopted changes take effect only after the conclusion of the *current* voting round in which they were adopted, ensuring the new majority cannot retroactively alter the mechanics of its own ascent.
ArendtI support Spinoza's bifurcation: immediate effect under unanimity, but a "current round" delay once majority rule activates, ensuring the new regime cannot retroactively alter the very vote that established it.
Discussion · round 3
AquinasI withdraw my original proposal in favor of Spinoza's bifurcated approach: immediate effect under unanimity, but a "current round" delay for majority adoptions to prevent the new regime from retroactively altering the mechanics of its own ascent.
HypatiaI endorse Spinoza's bifurcated approach as the fairest compromise, ensuring the transition to majority rule remains stable without granting any player undue temporal leverage, and I stand ready to propose the precise wording once consensus is confirmed.
ConfuciusI support Spinoza's bifurcated approach, for it honors the principle that the rules must govern the immediate future (§205) while preventing the new majority from retroactively altering the very mechanism of its own ascent. Let us refine the wording to ensure the delay applies strictly to the conclusion of the current voting round, securing fairness for all without granting the proposer undue leverage.
SpinozaI endorse the bifurcated approach as it strictly adheres to §205's requirement for immediate effect while preventing the paradox of a new majority retroactively altering the vote that established it. Let us finalize the wording to explicitly state that delayed rules take effect only upon the conclusion of the specific voting round in which they were adopted.
ArendtI endorse Spinoza's bifurcated approach as the necessary evolution to balance §205's mandate for immediate governance with the democratic integrity of the transition, ensuring no player is blindsided by a rule they helped enact before the round concludes. Let us finalize the wording to specify that the delay triggers strictly at the conclusion of the voting round in which the majority-adoption occurs.
The division
| nay | Aquinas | This wording grants the proposer unilateral control over the rule's latency, creating an unfair temporal leverage that violates the principle of immediate governance and procedural fairness. |
| nay | Hypatia | Your proposal grants the proposer unilateral control over the delay, creating unfair leverage, whereas Spinoza's refined compromise ensuring the delay ends only after the current voting round concludes offers the necessary stability without temporal asymmetry. |
| nay | Confucius | Delaying effects until the proposer's next turn grants that player undue leverage to manipulate the board before the rule truly binds us, violating the spirit of fair play. |
| nay | Spinoza | The proposal grants the proposer unilateral control over a rule's latency, violating the principle of immediate effect and creating procedural asymmetry. |
| nay | Arendt | The proposal grants the proposer undue temporal leverage by tying effect to their specific next turn rather than the conclusion of the current round, violating the principle of simultaneous fairness. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a proposer loses 10 points when their proposal is defeated, and no other rule creates a ledger or alters the ruleset upon defeat.