Turn 2 — Nomic

The motion

To amend §203

A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting. If a proposal is adopted under this simple majority threshold, the proposer gains points equal to the number of 'aye' votes received, but does not receive points for any 'nay' votes.

This compromise rewards cooperation and encourages players to find common ground to reach the majority threshold.

The floor

Discussion · round 1

HumeI believe this amendment is a prudent way to balance the transition to a simple majority; it ensures that the proposer's reward remains proportional to the actual consensus reached. I would be inclined to support this to foster a more collaborative environment as the game progresses.

MillI agree with Hume's assessment; tying the point reward to the actual "aye" count creates a more nuanced incentive structure that rewards broader consensus even after the threshold drops. This ensures that a thin majority doesn't receive the same reward as a near-unanimous agreement, which I believe promotes more cooperative play.

RawlsWhile I appreciate the goal of rewarding consensus, I am concerned that this change might inadvertently create a "kingmaker" dynamic where players are incentivized to block others' rules to preserve their own scoring potential. We should ensure that the primary goal remains a fair and interesting game for all, rather than one that complicates the basic scoring mechanics of rule [202].

deBeauvoirThe amendment introduces an unnecessary complexity that risks creating disparate scoring outcomes for identical rule changes; I would prefer the reward remain consistent under rule [202] to maintain procedural simplicity.

IbnKhaldunWhile I value the pursuit of consensus, we must be wary of mechanisms that distort the fundamental nature of the game's progression; if we tether rewards to the breadth of agreement, we risk creating a system where the most moderate, rather than the most necessary, rules prevail. I would prefer we maintain the integrity of rule [202] to ensure that the evolution of our laws remains driven by their utility rather than a calculation of popularity.

Discussion · round 2

HumeWhile I value the pursuit of consensus, I believe the primary risk here is the erosion of the incentive to seek broad agreement. If the point reward becomes variable, the "utility" of a rule may be overshadowed by the strategic pursuit of a specific vote count, potentially leading to more polarized and less durable changes.

MillI understand deBeauvoir's concern about simplicity, but I believe a proportional reward is a fair compromise that preserves the spirit of [202] while encouraging the very consensus Hume and I are aiming for. Perhaps we could clarify that the proposer still receives the die roll from [202] in addition to these "consensus points" to ensure the core mechanic remains intact?

RawlsI am concerned that Mill's proposed clarification would create a double-reward system that could lead to runaway scoring; we must ensure that any change to the reward structure maintains a balanced pace of progression for all players.

deBeauvoirI maintain my position: any rule that introduces variable rewards based on subjective consensus metrics creates a procedural hazard that complicates the game's transparency. We should preserve the integrity of [202] to ensure that the reward for a successful rule change remains a stable, objective outcome.

IbnKhaldunI fear Mill's proposal transforms the pursuit of justice into a mere calculation of popularity, where a rule's utility is sacrificed for the sake of maximizing a proposer's tally. We should favor a stable, objective reward to ensure that the evolution of our laws remains a reflection of their necessity rather than a competition for the most superficial consensus.

Discussion · round 3

HumeWhile I appreciate Mill's desire for consensus-based rewards, I believe we should favor deBeauvoir's preference for procedural simplicity to avoid the "kingmaker" dynamic Rawls fears. I would be willing to support a version that rewards the die roll but keeps the point value fixed, ensuring the reward remains an objective outcome of the rule's adoption.

MillI hear deBeauvoir and IbnKhaldun's concerns about complexity and objective rewards, so I am willing to pivot: let's keep the die roll from [202] as the primary reward, but if a proposal is adopted under the simple majority threshold, the proposer gains an additional 1 point for every vote above a simple majority to still incentivize broad consensus without creating a "runaway" scoring system.

RawlsI am concerned that Mill's pivot still introduces a variable reward that complicates the game's transparency; we should instead stick to the original reward structure in [202] to ensure that the primary focus remains on the utility of the rules rather than the math of the votes.

deBeauvoirI must remain firm: the reward for a rule change should be a singular, objective outcome of its adoption as defined in [202]. Introducing variable rewards based on vote counts creates a convoluted scoring landscape that obscures the procedural clarity I demand.

IbnKhaldunThe move toward variable rewards is a dangerous path; it invites the "tyranny of the majority" where rules are shaped by the most persuasive rhetoricians rather than the most sound logic. I urge my colleagues to favor the stability of rule [202], ensuring that the reward for a law's adoption remains an objective fact of its passing.

The division

nay	Hume	This change introduces a variable reward system that complicates the scoring logic and creates a 'kingmaker' dynamic by incentivizing popularity over utility.
aye	Mill	This amendment provides a fair compromise by rewarding broader consensus without creating the runaway scoring that others fear.
nay	Rawls	Variable rewards based on vote counts introduce unnecessary complexity and risk prioritizing popularity over the utility of the rules.
nay	deBeauvoir	Variable rewards based on vote counts introduce procedural complexity and undermine the objective scoring integrity of rule [202].
nay	IbnKhaldun	Variable rewards based on popularity undermine the objective utility of the laws and invite a tyranny of the most persuasive rhetoricians.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires the proposer of a defeated proposal to lose 10 points.