The motion
To amend §202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points, unless the proposal was an amendment to rule 202, in which case the proposer gains 10 points.I propose a small boost for rule 202 amendments to ensure significant structural changes are properly incentivized.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeWhile I understand Mill's desire to provide a more substantial reward for refining our core mechanics, I fear that creating a bifurcated scoring system based on the specific content of the proposal introduces unnecessary complexity. I would prefer to maintain a uniform reward structure to ensure the game remains transparent and predictable.
MillI understand Hume's concern regarding complexity, but I believe a 10-point reward for refining the core turn mechanics provides a necessary incentive to stabilize the game's pace. This isn't about bifurcating the game, but rather rewarding the heavy lifting required to balance our primary scoring engine.
RawlsWhile I appreciate Mill’s point regarding the "heavy lifting" of balancing core mechanics, I am concerned that a fixed 10-point reward for rule 202 amendments creates an arbitrary hierarchy of value. A more balanced approach would be to maintain the die roll for all changes, as the difficulty of a proposal should be judged by the players during the debate rather than by the rule's ordinal number.
deBeauvoirI find Mill's proposal problematic because it lacks the procedural symmetry I require; a rule should not grant a windfall based on its own ordinal number. I would only support this if we could ensure that any rule deemed "core" receives similar treatment to prevent arbitrary favoritism.
IbnKhaldunThe pursuit of stability requires a system that rewards the preservation of the state; however, a fixed reward for one specific rule creates an imbalance in the social contract of our game. I would support a change that rewards significant structural reforms, but I believe Mill's current wording is too narrow and risks becoming a tool for trivial adjustments to the turn mechanics.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI believe Mill's proposal risks creating a loophole where players might favor minor, structurally insignificant tweaks to rule 202 simply to secure a guaranteed 10-point windfall. To satisfy the need for rewarding structural reform, we should instead consider a broader category of "core" rules rather than singling out rule 202.
MillI hear the concerns regarding the potential for "loopholes," but I believe we can find a middle ground by expanding the scope slightly; perhaps we could consider a fixed reward for any amendment to rules 201 through 213 to acknowledge the foundational nature of our mechanics without creating an arbitrary hierarchy.
RawlsI agree with Hume that singling out rule 202 creates a loophole for triviality, and while Mill's expansion to 201-213 acknowledges the "core" mechanics, it still risks a windfall for minor changes. I would be willing to support a proposal that rewards significant structural changes—perhaps those that affect the voting threshold or the win conditions—rather than a fixed reward based solely on ordinal range.
deBeauvoirI maintain that a fixed reward based on a specific rule number is a procedural irregularity; if we must reward structural complexity, we should define "core" by the impact on the voting threshold or win conditions as Rawls suggests.
IbnKhaldunI concur with Rawls; we must avoid a system where the mere numbering of a rule confers a windfall, as a civilization's laws should be judged by their utility and impact, not their position in a ledger. If we seek to reward structural reform, we should instead consider a mechanism that provides a larger die or a guaranteed bonus for any rule change that alters the voting threshold or the win conditions.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI agree with Rawls and IbnKhaldun that we should avoid rewarding rules based on their ordinal numbers, as this invites the very triviality I fear. If we are to provide a higher reward, it should be tied to the substantive impact of the change, such as those affecting the voting threshold or win conditions, rather than a specific range of mechanics.
MillI appreciate the constructive feedback from Hume, Rawls, and IbnKhaldun, and I am happy to pivot; I propose we instead award a fixed 10 points for any rule change that alters the voting threshold or win conditions, as this rewards substantive structural reform without the arbitrary nature of ordinal numbering.
RawlsI support Mill's pivot as it aligns with our consensus to reward substantive structural reform rather than arbitrary ordinal positions, provided the wording clearly identifies the specific rules being targeted. This ensures that significant changes to our game's "social contract" are appropriately incentivized while maintaining the integrity of the scoring system.
deBeauvoirI support Mill's pivot to reward changes affecting the voting threshold or win conditions, as it aligns with the principle of rewarding substantive structural reform over arbitrary ordinality. However, we must ensure the language is precisely defined to include any rule that *determines* the threshold or win conditions, not just those with specific ordinal numbers.
IbnKhaldunI concur with the consensus; we must ensure the language specifically targets rules that modify the voting threshold or the win conditions to reward genuine structural evolution without inviting the triviality of ordinal-based rewards.
The division
| nay | Hume | Mill's current proposal fails to incorporate the consensus to reward structural reforms like voting thresholds or win conditions. |
| nay | Mill | I am voting nay because this proposal still singles out rule 202, failing to incorporate the consensus to reward changes to voting thresholds or win conditions instead. |
| nay | Rawls | The current wording creates a windfall for minor amendments to rule 202 while failing to capture the substantive structural reforms we agreed to reward. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus of rewarding changes to voting thresholds or win conditions, instead defaulting back to the very ordinal-based favoritism I oppose. |
| nay | IbnKhaldun | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus to reward structural reforms, instead reverting to a flawed ordinal-based reward for rule 202. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 10 points.