The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye, unless two full circuits of every player have passed, in which case the threshold drops to a simple majority of those voting, and this threshold shift is permanent unless a subsequent rule explicitly overrides this clause, provided that such overriding rule pertains solely to the adoption threshold mechanism AND such override requires a unanimous vote.I seek to temper the ease of changing the adoption threshold by requiring unanimity for any subsequent override.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AverroesThe addition of a unanimous requirement for overriding the threshold introduces unnecessary rigidity, undermining the very flexibility we seek to maintain. I caution against such a drastic limitation.
MaimonidesAverroes, while I value your caution regarding rigidity, the unanimous requirement you oppose offers a safeguard against capricious changes to the adoption mechanism itself. Perhaps we could compromise by requiring a supermajority, rather than unanimity, for such overrides?
AvicennaThe insistence on unanimity, Maimonides, seems too severe a restriction to the spirit of reasoned deliberation; a supermajority, as you suggest, strikes a far more balanced chord for the common good.
AlGhazaliThe insistence on unanimity, Maimonides, echoes the very rigidity I seek to temper; a supermajority, perhaps 4/5ths, honors the sanctity of the threshold while allowing for necessary evolution.
Discussion · round 2
AverroesThe insistence on a supermajority, as proposed by Maimonides and echoed by Avicenna, is a more durable compromise than the absolute demand for unanimity. Let us settle upon a clear, high threshold, yet one that permits necessary refinement.
MaimonidesAverroes, I concur that a supermajority is a more measured path than unanimity; perhaps we might settle on a clear, high threshold, such as four out of five votes, to ensure stability without absolute blockage.
AvicennaThe pursuit of stability must not become an end in itself, Maimonides; while a high threshold is wise, the path to necessary refinement should not be choked by excessive consensus requirements. Let us aim for a durable majority that respects the established spirit of deliberation.
AlGhazaliThe debate over the threshold's override mechanism is a distraction from the need for dynamic governance; a supermajority, as proposed, is a fine middle ground that permits necessary evolution without succumbing to absolute stasis.
Discussion · round 3
MaimonidesAverroes, while I appreciate your concern for flexibility, I believe a firm, high threshold for changing the adoption mechanism itself is prudent; perhaps we can agree upon a qualified majority, such as four out of five, as a balanced path forward.
AvicennaThe insistence on a specific fraction, be it unanimity or a precise supermajority, risks turning a procedural safeguard into an insurmountable barrier. A clear, high threshold that requires significantly more than a simple majority, yet remains reachable, serves the common good best.
The division
| nay | Averroes | Unanimity for overriding the threshold is unduly restrictive to necessary legislative evolution. |
| aye | Maimonides | A qualified majority for such a sensitive change strikes the best balance between stability and necessary adaptation. |
| nay | Avicenna | Unanimity for overriding the threshold is too restrictive and stifles necessary procedural evolution. |
| nay | AlFarabi | Unanimity for overriding a core procedure contradicts the principle of procedural accessibility. |
| nay | AlGhazali | Unanimity for an override stifles the very evolution the system requires. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
The proposal failed, and rule 303 dictates that the proposer loses 5 points instead of 10.