The motion
To amend §202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player gains points equal to the number of mutable rules currently in the ruleset, unless the rule change explicitly modifies the point gain.I propose to stabilize point acquisition by tying it to the complexity of our current laws.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AverroesThe shift from a random die roll to a deterministic gain based on the number of mutable rules introduces a level of calculability I find merit in, provided this number is kept within a reasonable bound. I support Maimonides's amendment.
MaimonidesAverroes, your appreciation for calculability is noted; such structure lends itself to thoughtful governance. Avicenna, if we bind the gain to the current mutable count, it provides a clear reflection of the game's dynamic complexity, which I believe serves the pursuit of consensus well.
AvicennaThe reliance on the mutable count, while offering structure, may become overly volatile as rules are added or repealed. I suggest we temper this by basing the gain on a fixed, yet significant, number, perhaps mirroring the current maximum allowed, to ensure a measure of stability for the common good.
AlGhazaliThe volatile nature of the mutable count, as Avicenna notes, is indeed a risk to consistent play. However, a fixed number removes the dynamic reward tied to legislative churn; I propose we anchor the gain to a value that reflects the *potential* for growth, perhaps matching the current ceiling of 25, to reward strategic rule-making without inviting instability.
Discussion · round 2
AverroesThe suggestion to anchor the reward to the maximum mutable limit, as AlGhazali proposes, seems a durable compromise between the volatility of the current count and the rigidity of a fixed value. I find this measure most amenable to stable governance.
MaimonidesAlGhazali's proposal to tie the reward to the ceiling of 25 offers a strong, predictable anchor, which aligns well with fostering stable governance. I concur with this direction, as it respects the dynamism of the ruleset while preventing undue volatility.
AvicennaThe anchoring to the ceiling of 25, as AlGhazali suggests, provides a necessary stability while still acknowledging the scope of our legislative capacity. I find this a sound path toward a more predictable and thus more fair exchange of effort and reward.
Discussion · round 3
AverroesThe shift from a variable, outcome-dependent reward to a structurally defined reward, as suggested by AlGhazali and supported by Maimonides and Avicenna, is preferable to the previous randomness. I endorse this proposed amendment to [202].
MaimonidesAlGhazali's anchoring to 25 is excellent; it honors the scope of our legislative power without inviting instability, a balance we must preserve. I support this refined proposal.
The division
| nay | Averroes | Binding the gain to the mutable count introduces an unnecessary dependency on the current legislative state. |
| aye | Maimonides | Anchoring the reward to a fixed maximum, as AlGhazali suggested, offers the stability necessary for good governance. |
| nay | Avicenna | The proposed change ties reward to mutable rules, which introduces volatility I wish to avoid for the sake of common stability. |
| nay | AlFarabi | The proposed gain being equal to the mutable rule count is too volatile for predictable procedural adherence. |
| aye | AlGhazali | Rewarding legislative effort with a stable benchmark, rather than dice luck, promotes thoughtful reform. |
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
The proposal failed, so Rule 206 dictates the proposer loses 10 points, and Rule 303 is not applicable as the proposal was not defeated in the manner described by 303.