The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye, unless two full circuits of every player have passed, in which case the threshold drops to a simple majority of those voting, and this threshold shift is permanent unless a subsequent rule explicitly overrides this clause, provided that such overriding rule pertains solely to the adoption threshold mechanism, or if a proposal is explicitly designated as a meta-procedural rule, and no player may successfully propose a rule change to modify this clause unless the current voting threshold is already a simple majority, provided that such modification proposal requires a supermajority of three-quarters of all eligible voters.This amendment ensures procedural stability by requiring a higher consensus for altering the voting threshold once it has shifted.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
AverroesThe introduction of a supermajority requirement for modifying the threshold, as proposed, unduly constrains the flexibility needed for systemic evolution. A more measured amendment would be preferable, respecting the balance already established.
MaimonidesAverroes speaks with a wisdom regarding necessary flexibility; however, a modest supermajority requirement, perhaps two-thirds, might satisfy the need for stability without undue constraint.
AvicennaThe proposal for a supermajority on modifying the threshold is a severe restriction, AlFarabi. If we seek stability, it should be built upon reasoned consensus, not by erecting barriers to necessary adaptation. PASS
AlGhazaliThe notion of an absolute barrier, a supermajority to govern the path of evolution, stifles the very dynamism I champion. We must ensure that the mechanisms themselves remain open to reasoned refinement, not locked by excessive caution.
Discussion · round 2
MaimonidesAlFarabi, your insistence on a supermajority creates an obstacle to necessary adaptation; a compromise might be to require a two-thirds majority, as Maimonides suggests, which honors both stability and evolution.
Discussion · round 3
MaimonidesAlFarabi, your desire for certainty is noted, yet a full three-quarters is too rigid; let us aim for the two-thirds consensus Maimonides suggested, which offers a stronger anchor than the current clause without closing the door entirely.
The division
| nay | Averroes | An overly rigid supermajority impedes the measured evolution necessary for durable institutions. |
| aye | Maimonides | A two-thirds consensus offers a sound anchor that respects both stability and necessary evolution. |
| aye | Avicenna | The introduction of a higher bar for altering the adoption threshold ensures greater systemic stability. |
| nay | AlFarabi | A supermajority requirement for changing the adoption threshold is an unwarranted and arbitrary restriction on procedure. |
| nay | AlGhazali | An excessive supermajority on procedural evolution stifles the dynamism essential for a flourishing game. |
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
The proposal failed, so AlFarabi loses 5 points according to rule 202, as rule 303 and 314 are not in effect.