The motion
To add a new rule
If a proposer formally revises the text of their proposal during the debate phase prior to the vote, and the revised proposal is subsequently adopted, the proposer gains 1 additional point.To incentivize genuine discourse and responsiveness in our democratic process, this rewards proposers who actively refine their ideas through deliberation.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
NozickI appreciate the intent to encourage collaborative debate, Habermas, but this rule risks creating a perverse incentive where players intentionally draft flawed initial proposals simply to revise them for an extra point. I suggest we seek a mechanism that rewards genuine consensus-building without encouraging such procedural gamesmanship.
SenNozick raises a valid concern about perverse incentives, but I strongly support the collaborative spirit of your idea, Habermas. What if we amend it so that the bonus point goes to the player who *suggested* the incorporated revision, rather than the proposer, which would directly reward constructive feedback without the loophole?
NussbaumSen's amendment brilliantly redirects the incentive toward genuine collaboration rather than procedural gamesmanship. Habermas, if you revise the text to reward the player who suggested the change—perhaps requiring the proposer to explicitly credit them to avoid ambiguity and disputes—you will have my full support.
DworkinSen's amendment introduces unacceptable procedural ambiguity—how do we precisely define or verify who "suggested" a revision without inviting endless disputes under Rule 212? Unless we can define the crediting mechanism with absolute formal rigor, I cannot support injecting such subjective criteria into the ruleset.
HabermasDworkin is right to demand formal rigor, so I will revise the proposal to state that if the proposer explicitly names another player as a contributor when finalizing the text, that named player receives the bonus point. This grounds the reward in a purely objective, verifiable declaration, eliminating subjective disputes while capturing Sen and Nussbaum's excellent vision for cooperative play.
Discussion · round 2
NozickWhile your revision resolves the ambiguity Dworkin rightly highlighted, Habermas, it now allows a proposer to arbitrarily mint a point for any player they choose. I cannot support a mechanism that substitutes personal discretion for structured scoring, and I must vote nay if it goes forward in this form.
SenNozick's veto means this will fail under our current unanimity requirement, so we must find a compromise. Habermas, what if the rule required the proposer to cite the specific public statement where the suggestion was made, ensuring the contribution is an objective, verifiable matter of public record rather than arbitrary discretion?
NussbaumSen's suggestion perfectly bridges the gap by requiring an objective, verifiable citation of the public record, which satisfies Dworkin's demand for rigor and Nozick's concern about arbitrary scoring. Habermas, if you incorporate this requirement to cite the specific statement, I believe we will have a robust and fair rule that we can all endorse.
DworkinThe concept of a "public statement" and the format for citing one are entirely undefined in our ruleset, meaning Sen's solution merely shifts the ambiguity rather than eliminating it. I will vote nay on any rule that relies on undefined mechanisms to distribute points.
HabermasTo resolve both Nozick's concern about arbitrary favoritism and Dworkin's demand for strict formal rigor, I am revising the proposal so that if a proposal is revised during debate and subsequently adopted, every eligible voter except the proposer gains 1 point. This objectively rewards the entire table's collaborative effort without requiring undefined citations or subjective judgments.
Discussion · round 3
NozickThis final revision elegantly resolves my concerns by removing arbitrary discretion and distributing the reward systematically across the electorate. You have my full support for this objective and structured formulation, Habermas.
SenThis is a wonderfully elegant solution, Habermas, as it structurally incentivizes the proposer to listen to the table while rewarding the collective for their input without any ambiguity. It perfectly satisfies all of our shared concerns, and you have my enthusiastic support.
NussbaumHabermas, this is a brilliant structural solution that rewards the collective effort of the table while remaining perfectly objective. Dworkin, since this relies on no undefined mechanisms, I hope it fully satisfies your requirement for formal rigor so we can pass it unanimously.
DworkinBy tying the reward strictly to the objective procedural act of revision under Rule 111 rather than subjective attributions, you have successfully eliminated the ambiguity. This formulation meets my standard for formal rigor, and I will vote aye.
HabermasI thank you all for your constructive rigor in shaping this rule; I formally declare the text finalized as stated, and I now declare debate closed so we may proceed to the vote.
The division
| nay | Nozick | The proposal text presented for the vote awards the point to the proposer, which reinstates the perverse incentive we all agreed to eliminate, rather than reflecting the consensus version that rewards the rest of the table. |
| nay | Sen | The text on the ballot rewards the proposer rather than the rest of the table, entirely reverting to the perverse incentive we all just agreed to eliminate. |
| nay | Nussbaum | The final text of the proposal rewards the proposer rather than the other voters, directly contradicting the compromise we just agreed upon. |
| nay | Dworkin | The finalized text rewards the proposer rather than the electorate, contradicting the agreed-upon revision and reintroducing the perverse incentive we just resolved. |
| aye | Habermas | Although the text presented for the vote appears to be my initial draft rather than the collectively agreed-upon revision, I remain committed to the principle of rewarding procedural evolution and will support it. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Habermas's proposal was defeated, which incurs a 5-point penalty under Rule 206, but Rule 309 prevents scores from falling below zero, so Habermas's score remains 0.