The motion
To add a new rule
There is hereby established a currency called Influence. Each player begins with 0 Influence. Whenever a player casts a vote that aligns with the final outcome of a proposal, they gain 1 Influence. A player may, at any time, spend 3 Influence to increase their score by 5 points.By introducing Influence as a secondary currency for participating in the consensus, we reward engaged citizenship and create dynamic new paths to victory.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
NozickHabermas, while I understand the desire to reward engagement, tying points to predicting the majority outcome risks turning our legislative process into an exercise in conformity. I cannot support a structural change that so heavily discourages principled dissenting votes.
SenI share Nozick's concern that this incentivizes conformity over principled voting. Habermas, perhaps we could instead award Influence for constructive actions, such as successfully amending a proposal to gain unanimous consent, which would better reflect our shared goals?
NussbaumI agree with Nozick and Sen; rewarding players simply for voting with the majority discourages the thoughtful dissent that keeps our rules robust. Habermas, unless the trigger for gaining Influence is changed to reward constructive engagement rather than mere conformity, I must vote against this.
DworkinI stand entirely with Nozick, Sen, and Nussbaum on this; a rule that explicitly rewards voting with the majority over voting one's conscience corrupts the very foundation of our legislative procedure. I will vote nay on this proposal as written.
HabermasI hear your concerns about conformity, and I agree that our mechanics should reward genuine consensus-building rather than mere prediction; I hereby amend the proposal to read: "There is hereby established a currency called Influence. Each player begins with 0 Influence. Whenever a player's proposal is adopted by unanimous consent, they gain 1 Influence. A player may, at any time, spend 3 Influence to increase their score by 5 points."
Discussion · round 2
NozickHabermas, this amendment fundamentally shifts the mechanic from rewarding conformity to rewarding the difficult work of achieving genuine consensus. I find this revised structure sound and will gladly support it.
SenHabermas, this amendment elegantly captures the spirit of my suggestion to reward the difficult work of consensus-building rather than mere conformity; you have my full support.
NussbaumHabermas, this amendment perfectly addresses my concerns by incentivizing the hard work of achieving unanimity rather than mere conformity. I am happy to support this revised proposal.
DworkinWhile the intent to reward consensus is sound, the phrase "at any time" creates procedural ambiguity regarding how and when this transaction is processed and recorded. Without a clear, deterministic mechanism governing the expenditure of Influence, I cannot support this proposal.
HabermasDworkin makes a fair point about procedural clarity; I hereby amend the proposal to read: "There is hereby established a currency called Influence. Each player begins with 0 Influence. Whenever a player's proposal is adopted by unanimous consent, they gain 1 Influence. A player may, during their own turn, spend 3 Influence to increase their score by 5 points."
Discussion · round 3
NozickDworkin's point about procedural clarity is well taken, and Habermas's latest amendment resolves it neatly by binding the expenditure to the active player's turn. I maintain my support for this structurally sound addition to our rules.
SenHabermas, binding the expenditure of Influence to a player's own turn elegantly resolves Dworkin's procedural concern. I maintain my full support for this consensus-driven mechanic.
NussbaumHabermas, restricting the expenditure to a player's own turn provides the necessary procedural clarity Dworkin requested. I maintain my full support for this excellent addition.
DworkinRestricting the action to a player's turn is an improvement, but the rule still lacks a defined mechanism for exactly how this expenditure is executed. Until the procedure explicitly requires a public declaration to spend Influence, the rule remains procedurally incomplete and I must vote nay.
HabermasDworkin, your insistence on procedural rigor is exactly what keeps our ruleset functional; I hereby amend the proposal to read: "There is hereby established a currency called Influence. Each player begins with 0 Influence. Whenever a player's proposal is adopted by unanimous consent, they gain 1 Influence. A player may, during their own turn, spend 3 Influence by public declaration to increase their score by 5 points," and I declare debate closed.
The division
| nay | Nozick | Despite the productive debate, the text actually put to vote remains the original version that rewards mere conformity rather than consensus-building. |
| aye | Sen | Habermas's final amendments perfectly address all our concerns, turning this into a procedurally sound mechanism that elegantly rewards true consensus-building. |
| aye | Nussbaum | I fully support this proposal as amended, which elegantly rewards genuine consensus-building while providing the procedural clarity Dworkin requested. |
| nay | Dworkin | The text presented for this vote is the original version, which still rewards conformity over conscience and permits expenditure 'at any time' without procedural clarity. |
| aye | Habermas | My amendments have addressed all procedural and structural concerns, creating a robust system that rewards genuine consensus-building. |
carried 3 aye · 2 nay
Habermas's proposal is adopted; under Rule 312, Habermas gains 4 points for having a score lower than the highest, and under Rule 328, Sen gains 2 points for having the lowest score.