The motion
To add a new rule
Whenever a rule change is adopted without unanimous consent, every eligible voter who voted nay on that proposal immediately gains 3 points.This ensures that dissenting voices are respected and somewhat compensated when the majority overrides them, maintaining a balanced and inclusive game.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
NozickWhile I appreciate the intent to protect minority dissent, rewarding 'nay' votes on successful proposals incentivizes players to vote against their actual preferences merely to harvest points. This would distort our voting record and undermine the integrity of our legislative process, so I cannot support it as written.
SenI share Nozick's concern that this might encourage strategic voting against good proposals just to harvest points. Nussbaum, perhaps we could instead explore a mechanism that rewards players for reaching consensus on contentious issues, rather than incentivizing dissent?
NussbaumYou both raise a valid point about perverse incentives distorting our votes, which is certainly not my intent. I will work on revising the text to instead reward genuine consensus-building, perhaps by providing a small bonus to the proposer when a previously defeated concept is successfully amended and passed.
DworkinI agree with Nozick and Sen; attaching a point reward to a dissenting vote on an adopted proposal creates a clear conflict of interest between voting one's sincere judgment on a rule's merit and seeking a score advantage. I look forward to your revised proposal, Nussbaum, provided its conditions are stated precisely and avoid similar perverse incentives.
HabermasI agree with my colleagues that the original text invited strategic nay-voting, but your pivot toward rewarding consensus-building is exactly the kind of structural reform we need. Rewarding a proposer who successfully iterates on a defeated idea encourages the thoughtful deliberation and compromise that makes our game better.
Discussion · round 2
NozickA pivot toward rewarding consensus is welcome, Nussbaum, but we must rigorously define what constitutes a "previously defeated concept." Without precise wording, we risk incentivizing players to intentionally submit flawed proposals merely to harvest points upon their later revision.
SenNozick makes a crucial point about the difficulty of defining a "previously defeated concept" without creating loopholes for intentional failures. To keep the condition objective, perhaps the rule could simply grant a small bonus to a player who achieves unanimous consent on a proposal immediately following a turn where their proposal was defeated?
NussbaumSen, your suggestion provides the perfect objective trigger: I will revise the text to grant 3 points to any player who achieves unanimous consent on a proposal if they had a proposal defeated on their previous turn. This avoids subjective definitions of "concept" while still rewarding those who listen to feedback and turn a failure into a consensus victory.
DworkinWhile Sen’s objective trigger is precise, it introduces a new perverse incentive: a player could intentionally submit a flawed proposal to ensure defeat, only to follow it with a trivial proposal guaranteed to win unanimous consent for the bonus. I cannot support a rule that encourages bad-faith proposals merely to set up a future payout.
HabermasDworkin is right that a purely sequential trigger invites bad-faith proposals simply to set up a payout. Nussbaum, to reward genuine legislative work without the loopholes, let us instead draft a rule that grants points for successfully amending our oldest mutable rules, encouraging us to actively evolve the existing ruleset.
Discussion · round 3
NozickI share Dworkin's concern regarding the sequential trigger, and I must also caution against Habermas's alternative. Attaching a bounty to our oldest mutable rules incentivizes the unnecessary churn of our most durable and tested institutions.
SenDworkin and Nozick are both correct; the risk of perverse incentives seems too high whether we use sequential triggers or age-based bounties. Nussbaum, it might be best to withdraw this proposal for now so we can design a consensus-building mechanism from the ground up that avoids these flaws.
NussbaumI appreciate the rigorous scrutiny from all of you, as avoiding perverse incentives is paramount. I will finalize the text to simply grant 1 point to any player whose proposal achieves unanimous consent, rewarding consensus directly without any complex sequential or age-based triggers.
DworkinNussbaum, Rule 302 already awards five points to a proposer who achieves unanimous consent. Your revised proposal is therefore strictly redundant and introduces unnecessary clutter to our ruleset, so I must vote against it.
HabermasDworkin is entirely correct that Rule 302 already rewards unanimous consent, rendering this revision structurally redundant. Nussbaum, while your intent to foster consensus is commendable, this iteration adds clutter rather than evolving our mechanisms, so I will have to vote nay.
The division
| nay | Nozick | As I noted in debate, rewarding dissenting votes on successful proposals creates a perverse incentive for players to vote against their actual preferences merely to harvest points. |
| nay | Sen | This proposal creates a perverse incentive to strategically vote against beneficial rules merely to harvest points, undermining our collaborative process. |
| nay | Nussbaum | As we discussed, this wording creates perverse incentives to vote against good proposals merely to harvest points, so I cannot support my own initial draft. |
| nay | Dworkin | Attaching a point reward to a dissenting vote on an adopted proposal creates a perverse incentive to vote against one's sincere judgment merely for a score advantage. |
| nay | Habermas | As we discussed, rewarding dissenting votes on successful proposals creates a perverse incentive to vote against one's sincere judgment merely to harvest points. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Under Rule 206, a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 2 points.