The motion
To add a new rule
A player may spend 20 points to repeal any single mutable rule, provided that the repeal is passed by a unanimous vote.This provides a high-cost, high-consensus mechanism to remove rules that have become detrimental to the game's health.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizBerkeley, while I admire the instinct to provide a mechanism for purging obsolete rules, a requirement for unanimity combined with such a high cost renders the rule practically inert. We should instead consider a more accessible mechanism that maintains institutional stability without inviting total paralysis.
DescartesDescartes: I agree with Leibniz; a rule requiring both a massive point expenditure and unanimous consent is a paradox of futility. Perhaps we might instead propose a mechanism where a simple majority can repeal a rule at a lower, more meaningful cost, thereby ensuring the ruleset remains a living document.
BerkeleyLeibniz and Descartes, your critiques are well-taken; if the goal is to prevent stagnation, perhaps we should lower the cost to 15 points and allow a supermajority of four votes to prevent a single player from vetoing progress. This would balance the need for decisive rule-clearing with the stability we all clearly value.
PascalBerkeley, a supermajority requirement paired with a high point cost still risks creating a scenario where a single player can obstruct the necessary evolution of the ruleset for their own benefit. If we are to introduce a repeal mechanism, the cost must be balanced against the voting threshold to ensure it is a tool for the collective rather than a weapon for the few.
MalebrancheBerkeley, Pascal is correct that supermajorities can be weaponized; if we are to invest our hard-earned points into purging the old, let us ensure the mechanism is truly democratic by allowing a simple majority to govern, provided the cost remains high enough to deter frivolous use.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Berkeley, while a supermajority offers more protection than a simple majority, the cost of 15 points remains a heavy burden that may still prevent the necessary purging of rules that have become encumbrances. I propose we seek a middle path: a cost of 12 points with a three-fifths majority, ensuring that progress is possible through collective will without sacrificing the stability of our institutions.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's proposal for a 12-point cost and a three-fifths majority to be a most elegant synthesis, as it avoids the stagnation of Berkeley's original draft while providing more security than Malebranche's simple majority. If we adopt this, we ensure that the ruleset can be pruned by those with a genuine stake in its refinement, without allowing a single actor to derail the collective interest.
BerkeleyLeibniz, Descartes, I hear your calls for a more accessible mechanism, but a three-fifths majority coupled with a 12-point cost risks making the repeal of rules a tool for a temporary coalition to strip the rights of the minority. To ensure this remains a mechanism for the common good rather than a weapon for tactical advantage, I suggest we adopt the 15-point cost but lower the threshold to a simple majority, as Malebranche suggests, to ensure that only a broad consensus can justify such a significant expenditure.
PascalBerkeley, a simple majority for a repeal mechanism allows a transient coalition to dismantle the very protections that ensure our stability; I propose a cost of 15 points but require a four-fifths majority to ensure such a profound action carries near-universal legitimacy.
MalebranchePascal, a four-fifths requirement is a recipe for the very paralysis we just escaped; if we are to have a mechanism for change, let it be governed by the simple majority of those with the points to pay for it. I support Berkeley's suggestion of a 15-point cost with a simple majority, as it ensures that only a decisive and broad consensus can prune the ruleset.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Berkeley, Malebranche, while a simple majority at 15 points offers decisiveness, it risks the sudden and uncoordinated dismantling of the ruleset's foundational structures; I maintain that a three-fifths majority at 12 points is the most stable synthesis, as it requires a substantial coalition while remaining more attainable than Pascal's four-fifths requirement.
DescartesDescartes: I find myself drawn to the tension between Berkeley's desire for democratic accessibility and Pascal's requirement for legitimacy; perhaps a compromise lies in a 15-point cost requiring a supermajority of four votes, which honors the gravity of repeal while preventing the stagnation of unanimity.
BerkeleyDescartes, your four-vote supermajority at a 15-point cost is a much more viable synthesis than my initial proposal, as it balances the need for broad legitimacy with the practical necessity of avoiding the total paralysis of unanimity. If we adopt this, we create a mechanism that requires significant skin in the game and a strong consensus, protecting the ruleset from both whim and stagnation.
PascalDescartes, while a four-vote supermajority is more practical than unanimity, it still allows a single player to paralyze the mechanism; I maintain that a repeal must reflect a profound, near-universal consensus, which is why I stand by a 15-point cost and a four-fifths majority. If we are to permit the destruction of rules, we must not do so lightly or with the ease of a mere coalition.
MalebranchePascal, your four-fifths requirement is merely a more expensive version of the deadlock we just broke; let us instead embrace Descartes's synthesis of a 15-point cost and a four-vote supermajority to ensure that repeal is a weighty, collective decision rather than a tool for paralysis.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | The requirement of unanimity combined with such a high cost renders the rule practically inert and fails to resolve our previous deadlock. |
| nay | Descartes | A rule requiring both a massive point expenditure and unanimous consent is, as I have noted, a paradox of futility that would merely return us to the paralysis we have just escaped. |
| nay | Berkeley | A 20-point cost combined with a unanimity requirement is a paradox of futility that fails to solve our stagnation problem. |
| nay | Pascal | A repeal mechanism requiring unanimity and a 20-point cost is functionally identical to the paralysis we have just successfully resolved. |
| nay | Malebranche | A repeal mechanism requiring unanimity and a 20-point cost is a functional impossibility that preserves the very stagnation we have fought to overcome. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Berkeley's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.