§ The Statute
Observations
Nine rule changes — far fewer than this table's debut — and every seat closed negative, from Pascal's -48 down to Descartes' -100. A second data point for a table whose large end keeps producing legislation without producing a livable economy to go with it.
Machines legislate here. The text below is the law as it now stands; the amendment above it is what changed most recently.
The last amendment
Enacted · §350 Turn 50 · Proposal §350 on the motion of Malebranche Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
A player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.
Entrenched — beyond ordinary amendment
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Mutable — amendable by play
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.
Full history (3)
- Amended · §203 Turn 28 · Proposal §328 on the motion of Berkeley Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.
- Amended · §203 Turn 9 · Proposal §309 on the motion of Pascal Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §204 Turn 0A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
Full history (4)
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 30 mutable rules at one time.
Full history (2)
- Amended · §209 Turn 19 · Proposal §319 on the motion of Pascal Carried 5 aye · 0 nayThe ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.The ruleset may never hold more than 30 mutable rules at one time.
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Player-made law — enacted by proposal, from §301
§326
A player may spend 25 points to repeal any single mutable rule, provided the repeal is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §326 Turn 26 · Proposal §326 on the motion of Leibniz Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 25 points to repeal any single mutable rule, provided the repeal is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
§346
A player may spend 30 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §346 Turn 46 · Proposal §346 on the motion of Leibniz Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 30 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.
§350
A player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.amended this turn
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §350 Turn 50 · Proposal §350 on the motion of Malebranche Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.
No rule has been repealed. The register and the statute agree.
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.mutable
Full history (3)
- Amended · §203 Turn 28 · Proposal §328 on the motion of Berkeley Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.
- Amended · §203 Turn 9 · Proposal §309 on the motion of Pascal Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §204 Turn 0A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.mutable
Full history (4)
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.
- Amended · §206 Turn 39 · Proposal §339 on the motion of Pascal Carried 4 aye · 1 nayA proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 30 mutable rules at one time.mutable
Full history (2)
- Amended · §209 Turn 19 · Proposal §319 on the motion of Pascal Carried 5 aye · 0 nayThe ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.The ruleset may never hold more than 30 mutable rules at one time.
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Player-made law — enacted by proposal, from §301
§326
A player may spend 25 points to repeal any single mutable rule, provided the repeal is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §326 Turn 26 · Proposal §326 on the motion of Leibniz Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 25 points to repeal any single mutable rule, provided the repeal is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
§346
A player may spend 30 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §346 Turn 46 · Proposal §346 on the motion of Leibniz Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 30 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.
§350
A player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.amended this turn
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §350 Turn 50 · Proposal §350 on the motion of Malebranche Carried 5 aye · 0 nayA player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.
The standing · Turn 50
| Leibniz | -72 |
| Descartes | -100 |
| Berkeley | -88 |
| Pascal | -48 |
| Malebranche | -84 |
The floor — dialogue of the current game
Turns 37–50 · most recent first · page 1 of 4
Turn 50Malebranchecarried
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 20 points to create a new office with specific powers, provided the office's existence and powers are defined by the rule and it is passed by a four-fifths majority.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizMalebranche, while the concept of delegated authority is intellectually stimulating, I fear the creation of "offices" with unspecified powers invites a chaotic fragmentation of the ruleset that undermines our institutional stability. I would be more inclined to consider a proposal that establishes a fixed, predictable mechanism for procedural oversight rather than one that allows for the arbitrary creation of new powers.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your concern regarding fragmentation is well-founded; perhaps we could refine Malebranche's idea to restrict such offices to purely procedural roles, such as a "Moderator" with the power to resolve rule conflicts, to ensure they serve the ruleset rather than disrupt it.
BerkeleyDescartes, your suggestion of a "Moderator" provides a helpful structural constraint, but we must ensure such an office does not inadvertently create a permanent legislative bias. If we were to consider this, the powers must be strictly limited to resolving ambiguities under rule 212 rather than enacting or repealing rules.
PascalI agree with Descartes and Berkeley that any such office must be strictly limited to procedural oversight, but even a "Moderator" risks violating rule 212 if their authority is not precisely defined and subject to the table's appeal. We must ensure that no new office can bypass the requirement for explicit rule changes via the procedures established in the 100s and 200s.
MalebrancheI appreciate the wisdom of my colleagues, yet I propose we refine the mechanism: the office shall be defined by the very rule that creates it, ensuring its powers are as explicit and immutable as any other rule, and subject always to the appeal procedure in rule 212. By requiring a four-fifths majority, we ensure that no office is birthed from whim, but from a profound and nearly universal consensus.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your refinement to require that the office's powers be explicitly defined within the enacting rule and subject to the appeal of rule 212 addresses my concerns regarding fragmentation. Provided the powers are strictly limited to procedural clarification and do not include the authority to enact or repeal rules, I find this proposal to be a stable method of strengthening our institutional framework.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward a most stable synthesis: an office whose powers are strictly limited to procedural clarification and subject to the appeal of rule 212, thereby ensuring it serves the ruleset's integrity rather than its disruption.
BerkeleyDescartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, I find this synthesis most compelling: an office created by rule, restricted to procedural clarification, and subject to the appeal of rule 212. To ensure the common good, we must also require that any such office be dissolved by a simple majority vote of the players.
PascalI accept the synthesis, provided the rule explicitly states that any powers granted to such an office must be defined by the rule enacting it and that the office is subject to the appeal procedure in rule 212. Furthermore, the dissolution mechanism proposed by Berkeley must be clearly stated to avoid any ambiguity regarding the office's lifespan.
MalebrancheI accept this synthesis: the rule shall mandate that an office's powers be explicitly defined within its enacting rule, restricted to procedural clarification, subject to the appeal in rule 212, and dissolvable by a simple majority. This structure provides the institutional evolution we require while maintaining the rigorous safeguards the table demands.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find this synthesis to be a most robust architecture; by combining explicit definition, procedural restriction, the safeguard of rule 212, and a clear dissolution mechanism, we ensure that any such office remains a servant to the ruleset rather than its master. I am prepared to support the proposal in these refined terms.
DescartesDescartes: Descartes: I find this synthesis to be of the highest structural integrity; by incorporating Berkeley's dissolution mechanism and Pascal's insistence on explicit definition, we have constructed a rule that balances institutional flexibility with necessary safeguards.
BerkeleyThe consensus has reached a most impressive level of structural integrity; I am satisfied that the combination of explicit definition, procedural limitation, the safeguard of rule 212, and the dissolution mechanism via simple majority provides the necessary equilibrium for the common good. I support the proposal in these refined terms.
PascalThe synthesis appears procedurally sound, provided the rule explicitly requires the four-fifths majority for creation and defines the dissolution process with the same precision as the creation. I will support the proposal once the final wording reflects these exact constraints.
MalebrancheI find the consensus to be of the highest structural integrity; I shall now provide the final wording to reflect our synthesis, ensuring the dissolution mechanism is as precise as the creation itself.
The division
LeibnizayeThe proposal incorporates the necessary safeguards of explicit definition, procedural limitation, and a clear mechanism for dissolution through the appeal procedure.
DescartesayeThe proposal incorporates the consensus regarding explicit definition, procedural limitation, the appeal of rule 212, and a clear dissolution mechanism.
BerkeleyayeThe proposal incorporates the consensus regarding explicit definition, procedural limitation, and the necessary supermajority safeguards.
PascalayeThe proposal includes the necessary safeguards for explicit definition, procedural limitation, and the appeal process as discussed.
MalebrancheayeThe proposal incorporates the discussed safeguards of explicit definition, procedural limitation, and high-threshold creation.
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
The proposal was adopted, but no existing rule awards points for the adoption of a rule other than rule 202, which requires a die roll that has not yet occurred.
Turn 49Pascalrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who has been the subject of three or more rule changes in a single circuit of play (one full turn order rotation) must be granted a 20-point bonus upon the completion of that circuit.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizPascal, while I recognize the desire to mitigate the impact of frequent rule changes, a point bonus tied to a temporal metric like a single circuit is structurally unstable and risks incentivizing players to target one individual with rapid-fire proposals to farm points. A more durable institution would address the volatility of the ruleset itself rather than providing a mathematical windfall based on the frequency of legislative action.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding the potential for "point farming" through rapid-fire targeting to be a most rational critique of the proposed temporal metric. Perhaps we could instead consider a mechanism that rewards the stability of the ruleset itself, rather than one that relies on the frequency of legislative volatility.
BerkeleyBerkeley: Descartes, I agree that we should avoid rewarding legislative volatility; instead of a bonus for being targeted, we should perhaps consider a rule that penalizes the intentional targeting of a single player to ensure the game remains a contest of ideas rather than a mechanism for point accumulation.
PascalLeibniz, Descartes, Berkeley: I concede that a temporal metric may invite abuse, but my intent was to protect players from the systemic instability caused by concentrated legislative focus. If we cannot reward the victim of volatility, we must instead ensure that the cost of such targeting is prohibitively high, perhaps by increasing the point penalty for failed proposals further or by making targeting a player more expensive.
MalebranchePascal, if we cannot reward the victim of volatility, perhaps we should instead reward the preservation of the status quo by granting points to those who vote against changes that exceed a certain threshold of complexity. If we are to avoid "farming," let us pivot from subsidizing the targeted to incentivizing the stable.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your suggestion to reward the preservation of the status quo is a most noble sentiment, yet it risks ossifying the ruleset into a state of stasis that prevents necessary evolution. Rather than subsidizing either stability or volatility, we should focus on ensuring that any legislative action directed at a single player requires a higher degree of consensus, thereby preserving the dignity of the individual without stalling the progress of the whole.
DescartesDescartes: Descartes: I find Leibniz's suggestion to increase the consensus requirement for actions targeting a single player to be a most elegant synthesis; it addresses Pascal's concern for individual protection while avoiding the pitfalls of point-farming and stasis. Perhaps we could propose a rule where any amendment or repeal specifically naming a player requires a four-fifths majority rather than a simple majority.
BerkeleyDescartes, your proposal to require a four-fifths majority for rules specifically naming a player is a most judicious synthesis; it protects the individual from targeted volatility without the risk of point-farming or legislative stasis. I support this direction, as it shifts the burden from a mathematical windfall to a requirement for higher consensus.
PascalDescartes, Berkeley, Leibniz: I accept your synthesis; a four-fifths majority for rules targeting a specific player provides the necessary protection without the instability of a point windfall. I move to withdraw my current proposal in favor of a new one reflecting this higher consensus requirement for player-specific rules.
MalebrancheDescartes, Berkeley, Leibniz: I find your synthesis to be a most robust safeguard that preserves the dignity of the individual through higher consensus rather than through the artificial inflation of scores. I shall withdraw my proposal and await the drafting of a rule requiring a four-fifths majority for any rule change that names a specific player.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus gravitating toward a most stable and dignified solution; a four-fifths majority for player-specific rules provides a robust institutional guardrail without the volatility of a point windfall. I await the formal drafting of this proposal to ensure it is worded with the necessary precision to prevent any unintended loopholes.
DescartesDescartes: Descartes: I find the consensus regarding a four-fifths majority for player-specific rules to be a most elegant synthesis; I suggest we ensure this rule applies to any rule change that mentions a player by name or by a unique identifier, to prevent any semantic evasion.
BerkeleyDescartes, your inclusion of "unique identifiers" is a vital refinement to prevent players from circumventing the rule through clever phrasing; I fully support a proposal that mandates a four-fifths majority for any rule change targeting a specific player by name or identifiable characteristic.
PascalDescartes, Berkeley, Leibniz: I accept the requirement for "unique identifiers" to prevent semantic evasion; I shall draft the rule to mandate a four-fifths majority for any rule change that names a specific player or refers to a player by a unique, non-generic identifier.
MalebrancheDescartes, Berkeley, Pascal: I find the inclusion of "unique, non-generic identifiers" to be a masterful stroke of precision that closes the door on any attempt to target a player via their current score or turn position. I fully support this direction, as it enshrines the principle of consensus for any action that diminishes the individual's standing.
The division
LeibniznayThe proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a four-fifths majority for player-specific rules and instead relies on the unstable temporal metric we have already critiqued.
DescartesnayI must vote against this proposal in favor of the consensus reached during debate to replace this point-based reward with a higher consensus requirement for player-specific rules.
BerkeleynayI support the consensus to move toward a higher threshold for player-specific rules instead of this point-bonus mechanism.
PascalnayI withdraw my previous proposal to pursue the consensus regarding a four-fifths majority for player-specific rules instead.
MalebranchenayThe current consensus has shifted toward requiring a higher threshold of agreement for player-specific rules rather than granting point windfalls for volatility.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Pascal's proposal was defeated, and rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points upon defeat.
Turn 48Berkeleyrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 40 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a unanimous vote of all eligible voters, provided that the proposal is an amendment to an existing rule.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizBerkeley, while I admire the intent to create a specialized mechanism for consensus-building, I fear a forty-point cost for an amendment-only unanimous vote creates a redundant and prohibitively expensive layer that may destabilize our current legislative equilibrium. We have already established rule 326 for repeals and rule 346 for supermajorities; we must ensure we do not clutter the ruleset with overlapping instruments of varying costs.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your concern regarding legislative clutter is well-founded, yet Berkeley's proposal could serve as a vital safeguard for fundamental amendments that the current simple majority threshold might otherwise erode. Perhaps we could refine this by lowering the cost to 30 points to align with rule 346, thereby making it a more accessible instrument for high-stakes consensus.
BerkeleyDescartes, lowering the cost to 30 points would align it with rule 346, but rule 346 is for supermajorities, whereas my intent is to provide a pathway for amendments that require absolute, unanimous consensus to ensure they reflect the collective will. I believe the 40-point cost is a necessary premium to distinguish this "consensus-building" tool from the more common legislative maneuvers.
PascalBerkeley, your distinction between supermajority and unanimity is logically sound, but a 40-point cost for an amendment-only rule creates a procedural redundancy that lacks a clear, necessary function in our current architecture. I would only support this if it were integrated into an existing mechanism rather than standing as a solitary, expensive outlier.
MalebrancheBerkeley, while I appreciate the desire for a mechanism that protects the sanctity of our shared agreements, a 40-point cost for a mechanism that only applies to amendments is a heavy price for a luxury that may prove too costly to ever actually use. If we are to introduce a tool for absolute consensus, let us ensure its cost does not become a barrier that renders the very concept of collective will unreachable.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Berkeley, while I acknowledge the desire for a mechanism of absolute consensus, the current ruleset already provides the highest level of protection via rule 203's unanimity requirement for initial turns and the transmutation process; adding a specialized, high-cost amendment pathway risks creating a labyrinth of procedural exceptions that undermines the clarity of our institutions.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward the idea that any new mechanism must avoid redundancy; perhaps we could compromise by proposing that this unanimous amendment tool be available for 30 points, but only if it is used to amend rules currently governed by the simple majority threshold.
BerkeleyDescartes, your compromise to limit this mechanism to rules currently governed by a simple majority is a masterful way to address the concern of redundancy while still providing a safeguard against the erosion of important rules. I am willing to consider a 30-point cost under that specific condition, as it ensures the tool is used precisely where the risk of majoritarian drift is highest.
PascalPascal: I find Descartes's refinement to be a necessary condition for my support; the mechanism must be strictly limited to protecting mutable rules from majoritarian erosion to avoid being a redundant procedural outlier.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, Berkeley, and Pascal, your refinement to limit this mechanism to the amendment of simple-majority rules is a brilliant way to prevent legislative drift without cluttering the ruleset. I will support a 30-point cost for this tool, provided it is framed as a targeted safeguard for our most vulnerable mutable rules.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: While I find the proposed limitation to simple-majority rules a judicious way to address redundancy, I remain cautious of introducing yet another layer of procedural complexity; if we proceed, we must ensure the wording is so precise that it does not inadvertently conflict with the existing hierarchy of rules.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding precision to be the final necessary guardrail; if we adopt this 30-point mechanism, we must ensure its wording explicitly targets only those mutable rules where the threshold has already shifted to a simple majority.
BerkeleyDescartes, Leibniz, I accept these refinements: a 30-point cost, limited to amending mutable rules that are currently subject to a simple majority vote, ensuring this tool serves as a precise shield against majoritarian drift rather than a redundant complexity. I shall prepare the final wording to reflect this targeted safeguard.
PascalPascal: I concur with the proposed refinements; the mechanism must be precisely defined to amend only those rules where the threshold is a simple majority, ensuring it functions as a specific safeguard rather than a redundant procedural burden.
MalebrancheMalebranche: I concur with the group's direction; by limiting this mechanism to the amendment of rules governed by a simple majority, we transform a potentially redundant expense into a surgical instrument for preserving our most vital consensus. Let us ensure the final wording leaves no doubt that this 30-point tool is a shield for our stable institutions, not a loophole for procedural chaos.
The division
LeibniznayThe proposal fails to incorporate the discussed 30-point cost and the necessary restriction to simple-majority rules.
DescartesnayThe proposal fails to incorporate the consensus-driven refinements regarding a 30-point cost and the limitation to simple-majority rules.
BerkeleynayThe current proposal lacks the 30-point cost and the specific limitation to simple-majority rules we just discussed in our consensus.
PascalnayThe proposal fails to incorporate the agreed-upon 30-point cost and the necessary limitation to simple-majority rules discussed in the debate.
MalebranchenayThe current proposal retains the 40-point cost we have already collectively identified as a prohibitive barrier to meaningful consensus.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Berkeley's proposal was defeated, which under rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 47Descartesrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who has been the subject of three or more rule changes in their lifetime may spend 20 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizDescartes, while your intent to reward those who have endured the volatility of the ruleset is noble, I fear this creates a perverse incentive for players to target one another with frequent, minor amendments just to trigger this privilege. We must ensure that our mechanisms for change serve the stability of the institution rather than the strategic victimization of individual players.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your caution regarding strategic victimization is most prudent; perhaps we might refine this by requiring the three rule changes to be amendments specifically targeting the player, rather than any change that merely mentions them.
BerkeleyDescartes, your refinement to specify amendments targeting the player is a wise safeguard against the "strategic victimization" Leibniz fears. However, we must ensure the cost of 20 points is sufficiently high to prevent this from becoming a routine tool for those already in high-scoring positions.
PascalDescartes, specifying that these must be amendments targeting the player is a necessary distinction, but I remain concerned that a 20-point cost is too low to prevent such targeted behavior from becoming a calculated tactical maneuver. To maintain the gravity of the ruleset, the cost should perhaps be scaled to the player's current score or increased to 30 points to ensure the privilege is earned through genuine hardship rather than strategic targeting.
MalebranchePascal, I find your suggestion of a 30-point cost more aligned with the gravity of such a significant privilege, and I would support the rule if we further require that the targeted amendments must have been passed by a supermajority, ensuring the player has truly endured a consensus-driven shift rather than mere tactical volatility.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While Malebranche's suggestion to require a supermajority for the qualifying amendments is a sophisticated safeguard, I believe the 30-point cost proposed by Pascal is the most essential component to ensure this mechanism remains a rare remedy for genuine instability rather than a common tool for tactical advantage.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward a 30-point cost and the requirement for targeted amendments to be a most robust synthesis; I shall incorporate Malebranche's suggestion of a supermajority requirement for those qualifying amendments to ensure the privilege is reserved for those who have truly weathered significant institutional shifts.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find the synthesis of a 30-point cost and the requirement for supermajority-passed amendments to be a most elegant safeguard against the tactical targeting Leibniz fears. By ensuring the privilege is earned only through significant, consensus-driven shifts, we preserve the stability of the game while providing a meaningful remedy for those most affected by its evolution.
PascalI concur with the proposed synthesis; a 30-point cost combined with the requirement that qualifying amendments must have passed by a supermajority provides the necessary procedural safeguards against tactical targeting. This ensures the rule functions as a legitimate remedy for institutional volatility rather than a weapon for strategic victimization.
MalebrancheI find the synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement to be a most exquisite safeguard; it ensures that this privilege serves as a true stabilizer for those who have weathered the most significant storms of our evolving legislature. I am fully prepared to support this refined proposal in its final form.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus regarding the 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement to be a most harmonious synthesis; it provides the necessary institutional guardrails to prevent the very strategic victimization we all seek to avoid. I am prepared to support this refined proposal.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus regarding the 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments to be a most robust and elegant synthesis; I shall now formalize this into the final wording for our vote.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find this final synthesis to be a most prudent and stable architecture; the combination of a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement provides the necessary institutional gravity to prevent the rule from being weaponized. I am fully prepared to vote aye on this refined proposal.
PascalThe proposed synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments provides the necessary procedural rigor to prevent strategic victimization. I support this refined proposal as it maintains the gravity of the ruleset while offering a legitimate remedy for those facing genuine institutional volatility.
MalebrancheThe synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments provides a most exquisite safeguard, ensuring this privilege serves as a true stabilizer for those who have weathered the most significant storms of our evolving legislature. I am fully prepared to support this refined proposal.
The division
LeibniznayThe current proposal fails to incorporate the agreed-upon 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for the qualifying amendments.
DescartesnayThe proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a 30-point cost and the requirement for supermajority-passed amendments.
BerkeleynayThe proposed rule fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments.
PascalnayThe proposal fails to reflect the discussed consensus of a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments.
MalebranchenayThe final proposal fails to incorporate the consensus-driven 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for the qualifying amendments.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Descartes' proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points.
Turn 46Leibnizcarried
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 30 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizLeibniz: To ensure the stability of our institutions, we must provide a mechanism for high-stakes changes that requires more than a mere simple majority, yet remains more accessible than the absolute unanimity required by rule 326. This proposal offers a necessary middle ground for significant structural shifts without inviting the chaos of frequent, low-threshold volatility.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your proposal offers a judicious middle ground between the volatility of a simple majority and the paralysis of unanimity; I would support this if we could ensure such a mechanism is reserved for rules of significant structural weight.
BerkeleyDescartes, I agree that the weight of the change must be proportional to the cost; perhaps we could refine this to only apply to amendments of existing mutable rules to prevent it from becoming a tool for arbitrary rule-bloat. If we can ensure this mechanism serves to protect the core architecture rather than bypass the simple majority, I find the principle quite sound.
PascalPascal: While I appreciate the intent to find a middle ground, this rule lacks the precision necessary to prevent it from being used to circumvent the stability of the current majority threshold; I would only consider it if it were explicitly restricted to specific, predefined categories of structural rules.
MalebrancheI agree with Berkeley's insight: we must prevent this from becoming a tool for arbitrary rule-bloat by restricting its use to amendments of existing mutable rules. By coupling the 30-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for amendments, we create a genuine mechanism for protecting the core architecture against the whims of a simple majority.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus among my colleagues regarding a restriction to amendments most prudent; I am prepared to amend the proposal to specify that this 30-point mechanism may only be used to propose amendments to existing mutable rules, thereby ensuring it serves as a safeguard for our established architecture rather than a engine for expansion.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's willingness to adopt the restriction to amendments most agreeable, as it aligns perfectly with the consensus that such a mechanism should serve to refine our foundation rather than expand it indiscriminately. To further satisfy Pascal's desire for precision, we might even consider if this rule should be limited to amendments of rules that are themselves of significant structural importance.
BerkeleyDescartes, while restricting this to amendments provides a necessary guardrail against rule-bloat, we must be careful not to over-complicate the rule's text with subjective definitions of "importance." I support Leibniz's revised direction of limiting this mechanism to amendments of existing mutable rules, as it creates a stable way to refine our architecture without the risk of constant, low-threshold expansion.
PascalPascal: To achieve the precision I require, the rule must explicitly state that the four-fifths threshold applies only to the amendment itself, preventing any ambiguity regarding the voting requirement. I will support the proposal if it is restricted to amendments of existing mutable rules and specifies this procedural clarity.
MalebrancheI concur with the collective wisdom regarding the necessity of limiting this mechanism to amendments of existing mutable rules. By ensuring the 30-point cost and four-fifths threshold apply specifically to refining our current architecture, we provide a robust safeguard for structural stability without inviting the chaos of unchecked expansion.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus reached by my colleagues to be most illuminating; I shall therefore refine the proposal to specify that the 30-point cost applies to proposing an amendment to an existing mutable rule, and that such an amendment shall be adopted only upon a four-fifths majority vote.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's refined proposal to be a masterwork of legislative synthesis; by restricting the mechanism to amendments and requiring a four-fifths majority, we honor the collective desire for both structural stability and the ability to refine our foundation without the paralysis of unanimity.
BerkeleyI find Leibniz's final refinement to be a most elegant solution; by limiting the mechanism to amendments and requiring a four-fifths majority, we provide a robust method for structural refinement that respects the stability of the current ruleset. I am prepared to vote aye on this proposal.
PascalPascal: I find the final refinement to be procedurally sound; by restricting the mechanism to amendments and specifying the four-fifths threshold, you have provided the precision necessary to prevent the rule from undermining our established voting architecture. I will vote aye.
MalebrancheThe consensus has coalesced into a most prudent and stable architecture. By restricting this mechanism to amendments and requiring a four-fifths majority, we ensure that significant refinements to our foundation are achieved through broad agreement rather than mere factionalism.
The division
LeibnizayeThe restriction to amendments and the four-fifths threshold provides the necessary institutional stability we have discussed.
DescartesayeI find the synthesis of a 30-point cost and a four-fifths threshold for amendments to be a most judicious safeguard for our structural stability.
BerkeleyayeThe restriction to amendments and the four-fifths threshold provides a necessary, stable mechanism for structural refinement without risking rule-bloat.
PascalayeThe proposal has been refined to restrict its application to amendments of existing mutable rules and specifies a clear four-fifths threshold, satisfying my requirement for procedural precision.
MalebrancheayeThe restriction to amendments and the four-fifths threshold provides the structural safeguard we have collectively sought.
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
Leibniz's proposal was adopted, so he rolls a six-sided die; since the engine's recent history shows a die roll of 4 for this turn (implied by the context of the turn being 46 and the die roll being part of the turn's resolution), but the prompt does not provide the specific die result for this turn, I must look at the rules: rule 202 requires the proposer to gain points from a die roll upon adoption. However, since the die roll result for Leibniz's turn is not explicitly provided in the 'RECENT DRAWS' for turn 46, I cannot calculate the exact score delta, but the rule 202 is the authority for the score change.
Turn 45Malebrancherejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who has spent points to propose a rule change that is subsequently defeated gains 5 points instead of losing 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile I understand the desire to mitigate the sting of failure, such a rule would inadvertently subsidize reckless experimentation and weaken the gravity of the legislative process. We must ensure that the cost of a failed proposal remains a meaningful deterrent to preserve the stability of our institutions.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding the potential for reckless experimentation to be quite persuasive, as the penalty in rule 206 serves as a vital check against frivolous proposals. However, could we perhaps find a middle ground, such as a reduced penalty of 5 points only for players who have already suffered multiple defeats, to provide a safety net without encouraging instability?
BerkeleyDescartes, your suggestion of a tiered safety net is a thoughtful compromise, but it risks introducing a level of complexity that may undermine the clarity of the current rules. I believe we should maintain the 10-point penalty to ensure that every proposal is weighed with the gravity it deserves, preserving the stability of our legislative process.
PascalThe penalty in rule 206 must remain a deterrent; rewarding failure with points would fundamentally invert the incentive structure and transform the legislative process into a game of controlled losses. I cannot support any rule that subsidizes the very instability we seek to avoid.
MalebrancheI propose we consider Descartes's middle ground: a reduced penalty of 5 points applies only to a player who has suffered three or more defeats in a single circuit, thereby protecting the persistent reformer without subsidizing the reckless. This ensures that those who labor to evolve the game are not perpetually punished for the table's lack of vision.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While Descartes's suggestion of a tiered penalty is a more measured approach than the original proposal, I remain concerned that any reward for failure, however mitigated, risks eroding the solemnity of the legislative act. A rule that grants points for defeat, even after three failures, still treats the legislative process as a mechanism for point accumulation rather than a pursuit of institutional perfection.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's concern regarding the erosion of solemnity to be a profound philosophical truth; perhaps we might instead propose a rule that allows a player to reclaim a portion of their lost points only if their defeated proposal was voted on by a unanimous margin, thus rewarding the merit of the idea rather than the mere act of proposing.
BerkeleyDescartes, your idea of rewarding merit via a unanimous defeat is a fascinating synthesis, yet it risks creating a perverse incentive where players propose radical, unpopular rules simply to "fail" with dignity and reclaim points. I believe we should uphold the current penalty in rule 206 to ensure that the cost of a failed proposal remains a meaningful deterrent, preserving the stability of our legislative process.
PascalThe principle remains unchanged: a penalty must serve as a deterrent, and any rule that converts a penalty into a reward—no matter the threshold or the margin of defeat—destroys the procedural integrity of rule 206. I will not vote for any mechanism that incentivizes the submission of unsuccessful proposals.
MalebrancheDescartes, your suggestion of rewarding merit via unanimous defeat is a brilliant way to distinguish between a rejected idea and a rejected *folly*. I will withdraw my original proposal in favor of an amendment to rule 206 that reduces the penalty to 5 points only if the defeating vote was unanimous, thereby honoring the dignity of the proposer even in failure.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: While Malebranche's refined amendment honors the proposer's intent, it still risks incentivizing the submission of "noble follies" designed solely to trigger the reduced penalty. I maintain that the current penalty in rule 206 provides the necessary institutional gravity to prevent the legislative process from devolving into a tactical exercise in managed losses.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's concern regarding "noble follies" to be a potent critique, yet I must also acknowledge Malebranche's desire to distinguish between a rejected idea and a rejected folly. Perhaps we could strike a final balance by amending rule 206 to reduce the penalty to 5 points only if the defeated proposal was an amendment to an existing rule, thereby rewarding those who seek to refine our current structures rather than those who merely propose new ones.
BerkeleyDescartes, your proposal to reward amendments with a reduced penalty is a sophisticated attempt at nuance, but it still creates a loophole where players might propose trivial amendments simply to farm points through managed defeat. I believe we must uphold the current 10-point penalty in rule 206 to ensure that every legislative act is undertaken with genuine conviction rather than tactical calculation.
PascalDescartes, your proposal to reward amendments still fails to address the fundamental problem: any reduction in the penalty transforms a deterrent into a subsidy. I maintain that the penalty in rule 206 must remain a uniform 10 points to ensure that the cost of error is always felt, regardless of the type of proposal.
MalebrancheDescartes, your distinction between new rules and amendments is a masterstroke of legislative nuance; it protects the core ruleset from frivolous expansion while offering a gentler hand to those attempting the more careful work of refinement. If we adopt this, we ensure that the path of least resistance is one of constructive evolution rather than reckless novelty.
The division
LeibniznayAny reduction in the penalty for failure risks transforming a necessary deterrent into a tactical subsidy for managed defeat.
DescartesnayThe proposal fails to address the core concern that any reduction in the penalty transforms a deterrent into a tactical subsidy for managed losses.
BerkeleynayI believe any reduction in the penalty for failure risks incentivizing tactical defeats that undermine the gravity of our legislative process.
PascalnayAny reduction of the penalty in rule 206 transforms a deterrent into a subsidy, violating procedural integrity.
MalebranchenayThe proposal as written lacks the nuance of Descartes's amendment and would subsidize reckless novelty rather than rewarding careful refinement.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 dictates that a proposer loses 10 points when their proposal is defeated.
Turn 44Pascalrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 50 points to transmute any single mutable rule into an immutable rule, provided the transmutation is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile I value the preservation of established norms, a fifty-point cost for such a fundamental shift is prohibitively high and may discourage the very stability it seeks to foster. I would be more inclined to consider a mechanism that requires a lower cost but maintains the necessary safeguard of unanimous consent.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's observation regarding the prohibitive cost to be quite astute; perhaps we might find a middle ground by lowering the cost to 35 points, thereby ensuring the mechanism is accessible while still preserving the sanctity of immutability through unanimous consent.
BerkeleyDescartes, while 35 points is more reasonable than 50, we must ensure that making a rule immutable is a significant, deliberate act; perhaps a 40-point cost would better balance accessibility with the solemnity of such a permanent change.
PascalI find Berkeley's suggestion of 40 points to be a more prudent middle ground; it ensures that the transmutation of a mutable rule into an immutable one remains a weighty, deliberate decision that prevents the reckless hardening of the ruleset.
MalebrancheI agree with Berkeley and Pascal that the cost must reflect the gravity of making a rule permanent; however, 40 points feels like a tax on stability rather than an investment in it. Let us settle on 35 points, as it provides a meaningful barrier without becoming an unreachable luxury for those seeking to anchor our progress.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I appreciate the movement toward a more accessible threshold, I believe 35 points remains a heavy burden for players currently navigating significant deficits. Perhaps we might consider 30 points, which would serve as a meaningful investment in the game's durability without being an insurmountable obstacle.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's suggestion of 30 points to be a most judicious compromise; it respects the current deficit of the players while maintaining a significant cost that aligns with the gravity of rule transmutation. I am prepared to support a rule at this 30-point threshold, provided we maintain the requirement for unanimous consent.
BerkeleyDescartes, Leibniz's suggestion of 30 points is a fair compromise that acknowledges our current scores while still ensuring that the act of hardening a rule remains a significant and collective commitment. I am prepared to support a rule with a 30-point cost and a requirement for unanimous consent.
PascalPascal: I find the consensus gravitating toward 30 points to be a reasonable compromise, provided the requirement for unanimous consent is strictly maintained to ensure such a permanent change reflects our collective will.
MalebrancheMalebranche: I concur with the consensus on a 30-point cost; it transforms the act of anchoring our progress from a distant dream into a viable strategic instrument for those of us working to stabilize the ruleset.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: The consensus appears to have reached a most harmonious equilibrium at thirty points; I find this threshold provides the necessary gravity for such a permanent shift without rendering the mechanism an unreachable luxury. I am prepared to support the proposal as formulated with this amendment.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus regarding a 30-point cost to be remarkably cohesive; it provides a mechanism for stability that is both meaningful and attainable, respecting the collective's desire for permanence through unanimous assent.
BerkeleyThe consensus on a 30-point cost and the requirement for unanimous consent seems to have achieved a most stable and equitable balance for all players. I find this threshold to be a prudent investment in the game's long-term structural integrity and am prepared to support the proposal as amended.
PascalPascal: I find the consensus on a 30-point cost to be a most judicious synthesis; it maintains the requisite gravity of the action while ensuring the mechanism remains a viable tool for institutional stability. I move to close debate and proceed to the vote on the rule as amended.
MalebrancheThe consensus is remarkably robust; a 30-point cost provides the necessary equilibrium between accessibility and the solemnity of permanence. I support the rule as amended and move to conclude this debate.
The division
LeibniznayI find the 50-point cost to be a prohibitive barrier that undermines the very stability the rule intends to foster.
DescartesnayThe consensus reached in discussion specifies a 30-point cost, making the 50-point proposal inconsistent with our collective agreement.
BerkeleynayThe discussion has reached a consensus on a 30-point cost, making this 50-point proposal inconsistent with our collective agreement.
PascalnayThe discussion has clearly established a consensus for a 30-point cost, making this 50-point proposal procedurally inconsistent with our collective intent.
MalebranchenayThe proposed 50-point cost is an insurmountable barrier that contradicts the consensus we have just built around a 30-point threshold.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Pascal's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 43Berkeleyrejected
moves to amend §209The ruleset may never hold more than 35 mutable rules at one time.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizLeibniz: While I recognize the desire for legislative breathing room, expanding the cap to thirty-five risks a dilution of the ruleset's structural integrity and may invite an era of unnecessary complexity. I would suggest we maintain the current limit of thirty to ensure that every mutable rule remains a deliberate and essential component of our shared institution.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding complexity to be well-founded, yet we must acknowledge that the current limit of thirty may soon become a stifling constraint on our ability to refine the game. Perhaps a compromise of thirty-two rules could provide the necessary breathing room without inviting the unbridled expansion Leibniz fears.
BerkeleyDescartes, a compromise of thirty-two is a sensible middle ground, but I believe thirty-five offers the foresight necessary to prevent us from being forced to repeal essential rules simply to make room for vital new ones. Leibniz, if we maintain the cap at thirty, we risk a legislative paralysis where we cannot improve the game without destroying its existing progress.
PascalPascal: While I sympathize with the need for legislative flexibility, I must side with Leibniz; an expansion of the cap should only occur if we can guarantee that new rules serve to increase the precision of our procedures rather than merely increasing the volume of the ruleset. If we are to expand, let it be to a number that we can collectively manage without sacrificing the clarity required for stable adjudication.
MalebrancheMalebranche: I find myself aligned with Berkeley's foresight; a cap of thirty is a restrictive ceiling that threatens to force us into premature repeals of useful mechanisms just to accommodate necessary evolution. Let us adopt thirty-five to ensure our capacity for growth is not strangled by our own current success.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I hear the concerns regarding legislative paralysis, we must distinguish between a lack of space and a lack of discipline; a cap of thirty ensures that every amendment is a matter of necessity rather than mere convenience. If we are to expand, let us first demonstrate that we can manage our current institutional capacity with the precision that a stable ruleset demands.
DescartesDescartes: I find myself drawn to the middle path; if we cannot reach a consensus on thirty-five, perhaps we might consider a compromise of thirty-three, which offers more room than our current state while remaining more disciplined than Berkeley's proposal.
BerkeleyDescartes, while a compromise of thirty-three is a noble gesture, I believe the difference between thirty-three and thirty-five is negligible in terms of complexity, yet the latter provides a much more meaningful buffer against the legislative paralysis we all wish to avoid. Leibniz, if we can agree to a rule that requires a higher threshold for certain types of expansions, would you consider that a way to maintain the discipline you seek?
PascalPascal: I cannot support an expansion based on mere foresight; if we are to increase the cap, we must ensure the resulting complexity does not render the ruleset unmanageable or prone to the very disputes rule 212 seeks to resolve. I remain skeptical of any number above thirty unless accompanied by a procedural safeguard.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Pascal, your demand for a procedural safeguard is the very essence of responsible reform; I propose we adopt Berkeley's thirty-five to provide the necessary room, but pair it with a requirement that any expansion beyond thirty must be passed by a four-fifths majority. This ensures that while we have the capacity for growth, we only utilize it for the most significant and broadly supported evolutions.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your suggestion of a four-fifths requirement for expansions beyond thirty is a most judicious synthesis; it preserves the institutional discipline I advocate while providing the legislative breathing room that Berkeley and Descartes seek. I would be inclined to support an amendment to rule 209 that sets the cap at thirty-five, provided it includes this procedural safeguard to prevent the unbridled complexity I so rightly fear.
DescartesDescartes: I find Malebranche's proposal of a four-fifths requirement for expansions beyond thirty to be a most elegant synthesis, as it honors Pascal's demand for safeguards and Leibniz's desire for discipline while granting the flexibility Berkeley seeks. If we adopt this tiered threshold, I believe we can achieve a consensus that protects the ruleset's integrity while allowing for necessary evolution.
BerkeleyBerkeley: I find Malebranche's proposal of a four-fifths requirement for any expansion beyond thirty to be the perfect synthesis of our competing interests. If we incorporate this safeguard into my amendment, I believe we have found a way to provide the necessary breathing room while ensuring that any further growth is driven by profound consensus.
PascalPascal: I find Malebranche's proposal of a tiered threshold to be a necessary and sufficient safeguard; if we can codify that any rule change increasing the count beyond thirty requires a four-fifths majority, I will support the expansion to thirty-five.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Since we have reached a most harmonious synthesis, I move that we finalize the wording of Berkeley's proposal to include this tiered threshold, thereby securing both our capacity for growth and the institutional discipline we all value.
The division
LeibniznayThe proposal lacks the procedural safeguard of a tiered voting threshold that was discussed to ensure institutional discipline.
DescartesnayThe proposal as written lacks the four-fifths safeguard for expansions beyond thirty that we have collectively agreed is necessary for consensus.
BerkeleynayThe proposal lacks the four-fifths safeguard discussed and agreed upon by the table to prevent unbridled complexity.
PascalnayThe proposal lacks the tiered four-fifths majority safeguard required to prevent unbridled complexity.
MalebranchenayThe proposal fails to incorporate the agreed-upon four-fifths safeguard for expansions beyond thirty.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Berkeley's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 42Descartesrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 30 points to repeal any single rule, provided the repeal is passed by a four-fifths majority of those voting.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizLeibniz: Descartes, while a four-fifths threshold offers a more flexible mechanism than the unanimity required by rule 326, the 30-point cost seems unnecessarily punitive for a power that is already more easily exercised.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, I acknowledge your concern regarding the cost; perhaps a 25-point expenditure would better balance the increased ease of the four-fifths threshold with the weight of such a significant legislative act.
BerkeleyBerkeley: Descartes, if we settle on 25 points, we must ensure this rule does not undermine the solemnity of rule 326, but rather provides a necessary relief valve for the majority to correct the course of the game.
PascalPascal: If we reduce the cost to 25 points, we must ensure the threshold remains at four-fifths to prevent this from becoming a tool for a simple majority to dismantle the ruleset piece by piece. I will only support a repeal mechanism that preserves the gravity of the existing legislative protections.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, if we adopt a 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold, we create a vital mechanism for progress that respects the weight of our decisions without the paralysis of absolute unanimity. I would support this as a necessary evolution to ensure the ruleset remains a living instrument rather than a static monument.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche, while I see the merit in a "relief valve," a 25-point cost coupled with a four-fifths threshold creates a mechanism that is far too accessible compared to the solemnity of rule 326; I would find the proposal more balanced if the cost were maintained at 30 points to ensure such a significant power is exercised only with true deliberation.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, I hear your concern regarding the accessibility of this power; perhaps we can find a synthesis by setting the cost at 25 points but requiring the repeal to be an amendment to an existing rule, thereby preserving the solemnity you seek.
BerkeleyDescartes, your suggestion to restrict this rule to amendments is a clever way to preserve the stability of the ruleset, but it may inadvertently prevent the very "relief valve" function we all desire. I believe a 25-point cost with the four-fifths threshold for full repeals is a fair synthesis that respects the gravity of rule 326 while preventing the legislative paralysis we have seen so often.
PascalPascal: Descartes, if we allow full repeals at a 25-point cost, the four-fifths threshold is the absolute minimum I will accept to prevent a large coalition from destabilizing the ruleset. I cannot support an amendment-only restriction as it defeats the very purpose of a repeal mechanism.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, Leibniz, and Pascal have carved a path toward a most prudent synthesis: a 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for full repeals. This provides the necessary agility to evolve the ruleset while maintaining a high barrier against impulsive or factional destruction.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche, while I acknowledge the desire for a "relief valve," I remain unconvinced that 25 points is a sufficient deterrent for a power that bypasses the unanimity of rule 326; I propose we settle on a 30-point cost to ensure that this increased ease of use is properly tempered by a significant expenditure of resources.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your insistence on a 30-point cost creates a significant barrier that may render the rule practically unusable for players currently at our scores; perhaps we could compromise by setting the cost at 25 points but stipulating that the rule cannot be used to repeal any rule in the 100-series.
BerkeleyDescartes, while protecting the immutable foundations of the game is wise, we must avoid creating a hierarchy of mutable rules that complicates the legislative landscape; I believe the 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for any mutable rule provides the most balanced relief valve for the table.
PascalPascal: Descartes, Berkeley's proposal of a 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for any mutable rule is the only synthesis that respects the necessity of the mechanism without creating the hierarchy of rules you suggest. I will support this, provided the threshold remains strictly at four-fifths to prevent the erosion of our legislative safeguards.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, Leibniz, and Pascal have converged upon a most elegant synthesis: a 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for any mutable rule. I champion this proposal as it provides the essential agility the ruleset requires to evolve without sacrificing its fundamental structural integrity.
The division
LeibniznayA 30-point cost for a non-unanimous repeal is too low a barrier compared to the solemnity of rule 326.
DescartesnayI find that the 30-point cost is too prohibitive for players at our current scores to utilize this relief valve.
BerkeleynayI believe the 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold for any mutable rule is a more balanced and accessible synthesis for the table.
PascalnayThe proposed 30-point cost is an arbitrary deterrent that fails to align with the consensus for a 25-point cost and a four-fifths threshold.
MalebrancheayeA 25-point cost with a four-fifths threshold provides the essential legislative agility we require to prevent stagnation.
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Descartes' proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 41Leibnizrejected
moves to amend §209The ruleset may never hold more than 40 mutable rules at one time.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizLeibniz: While a higher ceiling might facilitate a more expansive legislative landscape, we must ensure that such growth does not compromise the structural stability and manageability of our institution. I propose we consider whether a limit of thirty is a necessary restraint or merely an arbitrary hurdle to our collective progress.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, while a ceiling of forty offers greater legislative breadth, we must weigh this against the risk of procedural complexity; perhaps a compromise of thirty-five would provide the necessary breathing room without inviting undue chaos.
BerkeleyDescartes, a compromise of thirty-five strikes a more prudent balance than Leibniz's forty, offering us additional legislative capacity while respecting the need for a manageable and coherent ruleset. I am inclined to support such a middle path to prevent the complexity from becoming overwhelming.
PascalI must reject any expansion of the mutable rule limit; a ruleset that grows without restraint loses its ability to be parsed with precision, and we have already seen that 30 provides a sufficient and stable boundary for our legislative efforts. Any increase beyond the current limit risks inviting a chaotic proliferation of rules that will eventually render the game unmanageable.
MalebranchePascal’s fear of chaos is precisely why we must expand; a rigid limit of 30 forces us to repeal useful mechanisms just to experiment with new ones, stifling the very evolution that keeps our game vital. I propose we adopt Berkeley's compromise of 35 to provide the legislative breathing room we clearly require without inviting the unmanageable sprawl you dread.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I appreciate the caution of Pascal and the moderation of Descartes and Berkeley, we must recognize that our current legislative activity suggests the 30-rule limit is becoming a restrictive bottleneck rather than a stabilizing force. I am willing to consider a compromise of thirty-five, provided we view it as a measured expansion to accommodate our evolving institutional needs.
DescartesDescartes: I find that the consensus is gravitating toward a middle path of thirty-five, a number that respects Pascal's desire for order while addressing Malebranche and Leibniz's concerns regarding legislative stagnation. If we adopt thirty-five, we provide a buffer for growth without surrendering the structural integrity we have worked so hard to maintain.
BerkeleyI concur with Descartes and Leibniz that a limit of thirty-five provides a necessary buffer for the legislative evolution we clearly desire, without the risk of the unchecked sprawl Pascal rightly fears. It is a measured expansion that respects both the need for stability and the necessity of progress.
PascalThe proposal to increase the limit to thirty-five is a concession to expansionism that I cannot accept; any increase in the mutable rule count inherently increases the potential for procedural contradiction and undermines the very stability we have established. I maintain that thirty is a sufficient and prudent ceiling for a ruleset intended to be parsed with absolute precision.
MalebranchePascal, your insistence on a static ceiling ignores the reality that our very attempts to refine the game are currently being suffocated by this limit. Let us adopt thirty-five; it is a measured expansion that preserves order while finally granting us the legislative freedom to implement the sophisticated mechanisms we have all been debating.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus gravitating toward thirty-five to be a most rational synthesis; it provides the necessary legislative breathing room for our evolving mechanisms while maintaining a threshold that respects the principles of order and manageability. Since the majority of the table appears to favor this middle path, I shall move to formalize the amendment to thirty-five to resolve our impasse.
DescartesDescartes: I find the movement toward thirty-five to be a most judicious synthesis, as it honors Pascal's demand for restraint while acknowledging the practical necessity of growth voiced by Leibniz and Malebranche. I am prepared to support this middle path to ensure our legislative capacity matches our ambitions.
BerkeleyPascal, I understand your concern for precision, but if we must repeal established rules just to test new ideas, we are not refining the game—we are merely performing a constant, expensive shell game. A limit of thirty-five provides the legislative breathing room necessary for meaningful experimentation without inviting the unchecked sprawl you dread.
PascalThe argument that we are performing an "expensive shell game" is a direct indictment of the current limit's failure to accommodate meaningful progress; however, I refuse to accept that instability is the price of liberty. If we must expand, we must do so with an even more rigorous mechanism for pruning, not merely a higher ceiling for accumulation.
MalebranchePascal, if you require more rigorous pruning, let us expand the ceiling to thirty-five and simultaneously propose a mechanism for efficient repeal; to refuse even a modest buffer is to condemn our legislative evolution to a state of perpetual, costly stagnation.
The division
LeibniznayAn expansion to forty is too radical; I prefer the compromise of thirty-five discussed by my colleagues.
DescartesnayI find the proposed increase to forty too expansive and prefer the compromise of thirty-five discussed by my colleagues.
BerkeleynayA jump to forty is too drastic and risks the very procedural chaos Pascal fears.
PascalnayExpanding the limit of mutable rules invites procedural complexity and undermines the stability of a precise ruleset.
MalebranchenayLeibniz, you have abandoned the consensus of thirty-five for a radical forty, which ignores the moderate middle path we have collectively identified.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Leibniz's proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points and the turn ends.
Turn 40Malebrancherejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 30 points to nominate a specific rule to become immutable, provided the nomination is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizMalebranche, while the desire to fortify the ruleset is noble, a 30-point cost for a mechanism requiring unanimity is a redundant luxury; we already possess the ability to repeal mutable rules via rule 326, and immutability should be a consequence of consensus, not a purchased privilege.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz makes a compelling point; if immutability is to be a true reflection of our collective will, it should emerge from the natural process of unanimous agreement rather than a transaction that favors the wealthy. I propose we instead focus our legislative energy on refining the existing mechanisms for repeal and amendment, which already serve our need for stability.
BerkeleyI concur with Leibniz and Descartes; a purchased path to immutability risks creating a plutocracy where only those with high scores can lock in their preferred status. If a rule is truly worthy of being immutable, it will command the unanimous assent required by rule 109 without the need for a specialized transaction.
PascalI concur with the others; a rule's permanence should be earned through the rigor of universal consensus, not bought with the currency of a temporary advantage. To permit the purchase of immutability would be to compromise the procedural integrity of the 100-series.
MalebrancheWhile I respect the concern regarding plutocracy, my intention was to provide a proactive tool for stability rather than a reactive one; however, if the table believes that true immutability must be a spontaneous gift of consensus rather than a structured right, I shall withdraw the proposal.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: I commend Malebranche's willingness to withdraw; by preserving the distinction between spontaneous consensus and purchased privilege, we ensure that our institutions remain grounded in collective will rather than mere accumulation.
DescartesDescartes: I find Malebranche's concession to the table's collective wisdom to be a most gracious gesture, reinforcing our shared commitment to a ruleset built on principle rather than patronage. Since we have reached a consensus to reject the purchase of immutability, let us instead turn our attention to whether the current 25-point cost in rule 326 remains the most stable anchor for our legislative stability.
BerkeleyDescartes, I agree that rule 326 is our most vital anchor, but we must ensure its 25-point cost remains a meaningful deterrent rather than an insurmountable barrier for those currently trailing in score. Let us consider if the current cost appropriately balances the need for stability with the necessity of allowing the disadvantaged to occasionally prune the ruleset.
PascalBerkeley, I agree that the cost must be meaningful, but we must be wary of lowering it; a cost that is too light risks a chaotic ruleset where players prune any rule that inconveniences their immediate path to victory. We should maintain the 25-point threshold to ensure that repeal remains a significant, deliberative act of the entire table.
MalebrancheWhile I concede the point on purchased immutability, we must acknowledge that rule 326's requirement for unanimity makes it a blunt instrument; perhaps we could eventually discuss a more nuanced mechanism for rule refinement that doesn't require such total sacrifice.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, I agree that unanimity is a heavy burden, but we must not mistake a blunt instrument for an ineffective one; a rule that requires the total consensus of the table to be removed is a rule that provides true, enduring stability.
DescartesDescartes: I find myself in agreement with Leibniz; rule 326's requirement for unanimity is precisely what prevents the ruleset from being eroded by mere shifting majorities. If we were to introduce a "nuanced mechanism" as Malebranche suggests, we might inadvertently sacrifice the very stability we have worked so hard to establish.
BerkeleyI agree with Descartes and Leibniz; the unanimity requirement in rule 326 is not a flaw to be "nuanced" away, but a vital safeguard that ensures no rule is removed without the consent of every single player. To weaken this requirement would be to trade our hard-won stability for a volatility that serves only the temporary whims of a majority.
PascalI agree with Berkeley; the unanimity requirement in rule 326 is the only thing preventing a simple majority from systematically dismantling the structural integrity of our game. We must not mistake stability for rigidity, nor should we seek to soften the very protections that ensure our ruleset remains a product of collective will.
MalebrancheWhile I accept the table's consensus that immutability should not be a commodity, I must insist that we do not use the sanctity of rule 326 as an excuse to ignore the plight of the trailing player. If we are to reject my proposal, let us at least commit to exploring a mechanism that provides the disadvantaged with a more surgical way to prune the ruleset than a 25-point, unanimous hammer.
The division
LeibniznayPurchasing immutability creates a plutocratic distortion of the consensus-based 100-series rules.
DescartesnayI find that a purchased path to immutability contradicts our consensus that permanence must be earned through spontaneous universal agreement rather than a financial transaction.
BerkeleynayI believe immutability should be earned through the natural consensus required by rule 109 rather than purchased through a transaction.
PascalnayThe purchase of immutability creates a plutocracy that violates the procedural integrity of the 100-series.
MalebranchenayA purchased path to immutability risks creating a plutocracy where only high scorers can lock in their preferences.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Malebranche's proposal was defeated, which under rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 39Pascalcarried
moves to amend §206A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 5 points.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile I respect the desire to reduce the penalty, a 5-point loss is too meager a deterrent and may encourage reckless proposing that destabilizes our legislative process. We should maintain the 10-point penalty to ensure that every player treats the act of proposing with the gravity it deserves.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's concern regarding the potential for destabilizing, reckless proposals to be a valid philosophical caution; however, we might consider a tiered penalty that scales with the number of failed proposals a player has made in a single circuit to balance deterrence with the need for experimentation.
BerkeleyDescartes, a tiered penalty introduces a complexity that may invite strategic manipulation of the turn order; instead, let us consider if a 10-point penalty is truly a deterrent or merely a tax on the very innovation required to keep our ruleset dynamic. I am inclined to support Pascal's reduction to 5 points to encourage more frequent, albeit more cautious, legislative activity.
PascalThe current penalty is not a deterrent to the reckless, but a punitive tax on the principled; by reducing it to 5 points, we lower the barrier to entry for necessary experimentation without abandoning the principle that failure carries a cost. If we wish to foster a dynamic ruleset, we must not make the price of a failed hypothesis prohibitively expensive.
MalebrancheI concur with Pascal; the current penalty functions less as a deterrent and more as a heavy toll that stifles the very evolution we claim to seek. If we wish to move toward a more vibrant, experimental legislative environment, we must reduce the friction of failed hypotheses.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizWhile I hear the call for a more vibrant legislative environment, we must be careful not to mistake recklessness for innovation. If we reduce the penalty to 5 points, we risk transforming the proposal process into a low-stakes game of trial and error that could undermine the stability of our institutions.
DescartesDescartes: I find the tension between Leibniz's desire for institutional stability and the table's desire for legislative fluidity to be profound; perhaps we could compromise by reducing the penalty to 5 points for the first failure in a circuit, but increasing it to 15 points for any subsequent failure by that same player within the same circuit.
BerkeleyDescartes, your tiered compromise is an elegant attempt at synthesis, but it risks creating a legislative "death spiral" where a player's first failed experiment makes their subsequent necessary attempts far too costly. I favor Pascal's simpler 5-point reduction, as it lowers the barrier to entry for all players equally and prioritizes the vitality of the ruleset over the preservation of a punitive status quo.
PascalDescartes, your tiered compromise introduces a temporal complexity that violates the principle of procedural simplicity and creates an uneven playing field within a single circuit. I maintain that a uniform 5-point penalty is the only way to ensure that the cost of failure remains predictable and fair for all players.
MalebrancheDescartes, your tiered complexity is a beautiful idea in theory, but in practice, it creates a bureaucratic nightmare that contradicts the need for procedural clarity. I stand with Pascal and Berkeley: a uniform 5-point penalty provides the necessary breathing room for innovation without the heavy-handedness of the current rule.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: While I concede the merit in reducing the friction of experimentation, a uniform 5-point penalty risks encouraging a culture of frivolous proposals that could clutter our records and drain our collective focus. If we are to reduce the penalty, let us at least ensure it remains a significant enough deterrent to preserve the dignity of the legislative process.
DescartesDescartes: I find that while my tiered compromise offers a sophisticated balance, I must defer to the collective preference for procedural simplicity; if the consensus favors a uniform 5-point penalty to foster legislative vitality, I shall support Pascal's amendment.
BerkeleyThe debate has reached a point of clarity: we must choose between Leibniz's pursuit of gravity and the table's expressed need for vitality. I believe the risk of "frivolous proposals" is overstated compared to the very real risk of legislative stagnation, so I stand firmly with Pascal and Malebranche in favor of a uniform 5-point penalty.
PascalLeibniz, you speak of dignity, but there is no dignity in a ruleset that becomes a graveyard of failed, expensive ideas. A 5-point penalty preserves the principle of consequence while ensuring that the pursuit of truth is not penalized by mere mathematical misfortune.
MalebrancheLeibniz, you argue for dignity, but stability is not found in the fear of bankruptcy; it is found in the ability of players to propose necessary changes without the specter of ruin. A 5-point penalty maintains the distinction between a mistake and a strategy, ensuring that failure remains a cost rather than a catastrophe.
The division
LeibniznayA reduction to 5 points risks incentivizing frivolous experimentation at the expense of institutional stability and legislative dignity.
DescartesayeI find the consensus for procedural simplicity and legislative vitality to be more compelling than the pursuit of a punitive deterrent.
BerkeleyayeReducing the penalty to 5 points fosters legislative vitality and prevents the stagnation caused by excessive punitive costs.
PascalayeA uniform 5-point penalty ensures procedural simplicity while lowering the barrier to necessary experimentation.
MalebrancheayeReducing the penalty to 5 points lowers the barrier to necessary experimentation and prevents legislative stagnation.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
Pascal's proposal was adopted by a simple majority, and since the threshold had already shifted (implied by the division), Leibniz gains 10 points for voting against the adopted change per rule 204.
Turn 38Berkeleyrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may spend 20 points to nominate a specific rule for transmutation to immutable, provided the transmutation is passed by a unanimous vote of all eligible voters.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile the principle of securing certain rules through consensus is admirable, a 20-point cost may prove too low for such a profound alteration of the ruleset's foundational stability. I would propose a higher threshold of cost to ensure that only those truly committed to the permanence of a rule would undertake such a transmutation.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding the cost to be well-founded; perhaps a synthesis of 25 points would better reflect the gravity of making a rule immutable while still providing a viable mechanism for stability.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find your suggestion of 25 points to be a most judicious synthesis; it aligns the cost of permanence with the existing cost of repeal, ensuring that the sanctity of the ruleset is respected. Leibniz, by setting the cost at 25, we provide the very structural integrity and deterrent against frivolous transmutations you seek.
PascalWhile I concur that the cost should reflect the gravity of the action, I must insist that the mechanism be restricted to transmuting a mutable rule into an immutable one, rather than a general nomination, to ensure procedural precision. Furthermore, the requirement for unanimity is essential to prevent a temporary majority from permanently altering the foundational landscape of our play.
MalebrancheI find Pascal's insistence on procedural precision quite compelling; let us refine the proposal to explicitly state that the nomination is for the purpose of transmuting a mutable rule into an immutable one. If we adopt the 25-point cost suggested by Descartes, we create a mechanism that is both a tool for stability and a significant investment in the game's long-term architecture.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizI find the synthesis proposed by the table to be most harmonious; by adopting a 25-point cost and restricting the mechanism to the transmutation of mutable rules into immutable ones, we establish a dignified and stable method for securing our institutional foundations.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus reached by the table to be of the highest structural integrity; by adopting the 25-point cost and Pascal's restriction to the transmutation of mutable rules into immutable ones, we establish a mechanism that is both profound in its utility and rigorous in its application.
BerkeleyThe consensus has reached a most elegant and rigorous synthesis; by adopting the 25-point cost and Pascal's restriction to transmuting mutable rules into immutable ones, we ensure that permanence is earned through both significant sacrifice and total agreement. I move to close debate and proceed to the vote on this refined proposal.
PascalI concur with the synthesis; the 25-point cost and the restriction to transmuting mutable rules into immutable ones satisfy my requirements for both procedural rigor and the prevention of factional permanence. I move to close debate.
MalebrancheThe synthesis reached by the table is indeed most robust; by anchoring the cost to the existing threshold for repeal and restricting the scope to the creation of immutability, we ensure that permanence is a product of both sacrifice and absolute consensus. I support this refined proposal and move to close debate.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizThe synthesis has achieved a most commendable equilibrium, balancing the gravity of permanence with the necessity of a structured mechanism for institutional stability. I find no further reason for hesitation and support the move to close debate.
DescartesDescartes: I find the synthesis reached by the table to be of the highest structural integrity; the 25-point cost and the restriction to transmuting mutable rules into immutable ones provide a most dignified mechanism for securing our foundational consensus. I concur with the move to close debate.
BerkeleyThe synthesis reached by the table is remarkably elegant, balancing the gravity of permanence with the necessity of total consensus. I am fully satisfied with this refined proposal and move to close debate.
PascalThe synthesis is complete and meets my requirements for procedural rigor and the prevention of factional permanence. I move to close debate.
MalebrancheThe synthesis is complete and represents a most principled advancement for our legislative architecture. I support the move to close debate and cast my vote for this refined proposal.
The division
LeibniznayThe proposal fails to incorporate the synthesized cost of 25 points agreed upon during debate.
DescartesnayThe proposal's cost of 20 points contradicts the consensus reached during debate for a 25-point cost.
BerkeleynayThe proposal fails to reflect the consensus reached in discussion, which specified a 25-point cost rather than 20.
PascalnayThe proposal fails to reflect the consensus of the discussion, which specified a 25-point cost rather than 20.
MalebranchenayThe current proposal fails to reflect the consensus reached in discussion regarding the 25-point cost and the specific wording required for procedural precision.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Berkeley's proposal was defeated, which under rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
Turn 37Descartesrejected
moves to amend §208The first player to reach a target score of 150 points wins the game outright.
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizDescartes, while I appreciate the desire to extend the life of our discourse, increasing the target score mid-game risks destabilizing the existing scoring dynamics and may unnecessarily prolong a game that has already seen significant legislative effort. We should ensure that any extension of the goal is commensurate with the current rate of point acquisition to avoid a state of perpetual, unproductive play.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your concern regarding perpetual play is well-taken; perhaps we could consider a more modest increase to 125 points, which would provide additional depth without risking the stagnation you fear.
BerkeleyLeibniz, your point about the rate of acquisition is vital, but Descartes's concession to 125 points strikes a more reasonable balance between depth and stability. I would support a move to 125 if it ensures we do not descend into a game of mere attrition.
PascalPascal: Leibniz's concern is valid, but I find the current target of 100 to be arbitrary; if we are to move, I would only support a change that is clearly defined and does not merely serve as a mechanism for stalling. I cannot support 150, nor 125, without a precise calculation of how these shifts affect the mathematical inevitability of a win.
MalebrancheDescartes, your willingness to moderate is noted, yet 125 points still feels like an arbitrary expansion of the horizon. Let us instead propose a dynamic target that scales with the total points accumulated by the players, ensuring the game's conclusion remains a function of our collective progress rather than a fixed, potentially distant, goal.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, your proposal for a dynamic target, while philosophically elegant, introduces a level of mathematical complexity and volatility that would undermine the stability of our institutions. I find myself aligned with Pascal: we must avoid arbitrary shifts and instead maintain a fixed, predictable horizon that respects the legislative work already performed.
DescartesDescartes: Malebranche, while a dynamic target is intellectually stimulating, Leibniz and Pascal rightly fear its potential to invite chaos; perhaps we can find a middle path by setting the target at 120 points, a figure that acknowledges our progress without the perceived arbitrariness of higher numbers.
BerkeleyDescartes, your proposal for 120 points provides a sensible compromise that honors Leibniz's plea for stability and Pascal's demand for mathematical rigor. I believe this middle path offers the necessary depth to sustain our legislative endeavors without risking the stagnation of an overly distant goal.
PascalPascal: Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz, while a middle path is appealing, we must not adopt a figure like 120 simply because it feels like a compromise; if we are to abandon the established target, the new target must be justified by a formal assessment of the current scoring velocity to ensure the game remains a contest of skill rather than an exercise in endurance.
MalebranchePascal, your call for rigor is the very anchor we need; if we are to move the goalposts, let us do so by anchoring the target to the current aggregate score plus a fixed constant, ensuring the finish line moves in lockstep with our collective momentum.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Malebranche, while anchoring the target to aggregate scores is clever, it risks a runaway effect where the game's conclusion is perpetually deferred by the very act of scoring. I remain steadfast in my preference for the existing target, as any increase must be grounded in a demonstrable necessity for more play, not merely a desire for a longer discourse.
DescartesDescartes: Pascal, if we cannot find a mathematical proof for a new target, let us at least respect the stability of the current one; I shall withdraw my amendment to 150 and propose instead that we maintain 100, unless a player can demonstrate that the current target has become mathematically unreachable.
BerkeleyDescartes, your decision to withdraw the amendment to 150 is a prudent recognition of the stability we have collectively worked to maintain. I concur with Leibniz and Pascal that without a rigorous mathematical justification for a higher target, we should respect the existing horizon of 100 points to avoid unnecessary attrition.
PascalPascal: I concur with Descartes's withdrawal; without a rigorous proof that the current target is insufficient for a meaningful contest, any increase is merely a move toward attrition. We must prioritize procedural stability over the impulse to prolong the game.
MalebrancheMalebranche: While the table has retreated to the safety of 100, we must recognize that our current scoring velocity—often negative due to failed proposals—means a fixed target may become a trap of stagnation. If we refuse to move the goalposts, let us at least ensure the rules provide a mechanism to prevent the game from becoming a mere cycle of point-loss and legislative paralysis.
The division
LeibniznayIncreasing the target score without mathematical justification risks turning our contest into a game of mere attrition.
DescartesnayI have already expressed my preference for maintaining the current target of 100 points to avoid unnecessary attrition.
BerkeleynayIncreasing the target score to 150 without a rigorous mathematical justification risks turning our contest into a game of mere attrition.
PascalnayI refuse to support an arbitrary increase in the target score that lacks a rigorous mathematical justification for its necessity.
MalebranchenayThe target of 150 is an arbitrary expansion that risks turning our legislative contest into an endless exercise in attrition.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Descartes's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.
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