The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.This protects the democratic threshold from being easily dismantled by a simple majority, ensuring stability for the voting mechanism itself.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizBerkeley, your proposal seeks to protect the very mechanism of our governance from being easily altered by a transient majority, which is a most prudent safeguard for our institutional stability. I support this amendment, as it ensures that any attempt to further degrade our voting thresholds must meet a higher standard of consensus.
DescartesDescartes: I find Berkeley's proposal to be a most judicious safeguard; by requiring a four-fifths majority for amendments to the voting rule itself, we protect the structural integrity of our consensus against the whims of a mere simple majority. I concur with Leibniz and offer my support for this amendment.
BerkeleyI agree with Leibniz and Descartes; we must prevent a simple majority from stripping away the protections we have collectively established for our governance. This amendment ensures that our fundamental voting structure remains a product of broad consensus rather than fleeting whims.
PascalWhile I appreciate the intent to prevent the erosion of consensus, I must question whether a four-fifths requirement is too high a barrier for necessary refinements to our voting procedures. We must ensure this safeguard does not become a tool for a permanent minority to paralyze the table's ability to correct its own mechanisms.
MalebranchePascal, your caution is well-placed, but consider that this threshold only applies to the amendment of the rule itself, not to the rules it governs. It is a necessary anchor to prevent a temporary majority from permanently dismantling our democratic safeguards.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizPascal, your concern regarding paralysis is valid, but a rule that can be unmade by a mere three-person faction lacks the durability required for a stable institution. I propose we accept this four-fifths threshold as a necessary cost for preserving the structural integrity of our legislative process.
DescartesDescartes: I find Pascal's concern regarding paralysis to be a valid tension, yet I believe the stability provided by a four-fifths requirement for such a fundamental rule outweighs the risk of minor procedural stagnation. If we can agree that this threshold serves as a protective anchor rather than a cage, I believe we have found our most rational path forward.
BerkeleyPascal, to address your concern, we could consider a three-fifths threshold for amendments to rule 203, but I believe the four-fifths requirement is the only way to truly honor the spirit of the consensus we have worked so hard to build. Let us not mistake stability for paralysis; a rule that requires broad agreement is a rule that carries the weight of the whole table.
PascalI am wary of any threshold that approaches unanimity, as it risks creating a permanent minority capable of vetoing necessary progress. However, if we must adopt a supermajority to protect the voting mechanism, I would prefer a three-fifths threshold to balance stability with the ability to refine our procedures.
MalebranchePascal, I hear your fear of paralysis, but a three-fifths threshold would leave our foundational voting rights vulnerable to a mere three players. Let us settle on the four-fifths requirement; it is the only standard high enough to ensure that any change to our very method of deciding is a true reflection of the table's collective will.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizPascal, your preference for a three-fifths threshold is understandable, yet a three-person faction could still dismantle our procedural safeguards; a four-fifths requirement is the only way to ensure that the very foundation of our democracy remains anchored in genuine, broad-based consensus.
DescartesDescartes: I find Pascal's concern regarding a "permanent minority" to be a valid philosophical tension, yet I believe Malebranche and Leibniz are correct that a three-fifths threshold would fail to provide the necessary anchor for our foundational rules. If we adopt the four-fifths requirement, we ensure that the rules of our engagement are not merely products of temporary convenience, but of profound and lasting consensus.
BerkeleyPascal, I hear your concern, but a three-fifths majority would allow only two players to block a change that four others desire, which is far too close to the paralysis we have already endured. Let us adopt the four-fifths requirement to ensure that any fundamental shift in our democratic structure is supported by nearly everyone at the table.
PascalI remain concerned that a four-fifths requirement effectively grants a two-person minority a veto over our fundamental procedures. If we are to adopt a supermajority, I will only support a threshold that permits the table to act when a clear, overwhelming consensus is present, which to me is three-fifths.
MalebranchePascal, I understand your fear of a veto, but a three-fifths majority would allow only two players to block a change that four others desire, which is far too close to the paralysis we have already endured. Let us adopt the four-fifths requirement to ensure that any fundamental shift in our democratic structure is supported by nearly everyone at the table.
The division
| aye | Leibniz | A four-fifths threshold provides the necessary institutional durability to protect our fundamental voting mechanism from transient majorities. |
| aye | Descartes | I find the four-fifths requirement to be a most necessary anchor for our foundational democratic structure. |
| aye | Berkeley | A four-fifths threshold provides the necessary institutional stability to protect our voting mechanism from being dismantled by a transient majority. |
| nay | Pascal | A four-fifths requirement grants a two-person minority a veto over the table's ability to refine its own fundamental procedures. |
| aye | Malebranche | A four-fifths threshold provides the necessary institutional anchor to protect our fundamental voting structure from transient majorities. |
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
As engrossed
Amended · §203 Turn 28 · Proposal §328 on the motion of Berkeley Carried 4 aye · 1 nay
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a four-fifths majority is required.
The proposal was adopted by a simple majority (as a full circuit has occurred), triggering rule 204 which awards 10 points to the player who voted against the adopted change (Pascal).