The motion
To add a new rule
A player who has been the subject of three or more rule changes in their lifetime may spend 20 points to propose a rule change that is subject to a four-fifths majority vote rather than a simple majority.This provides a mechanism for players who have been heavily regulated by the ruleset to reclaim legislative agency through a higher consensus threshold.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizDescartes, while your intent to reward those who have endured the volatility of the ruleset is noble, I fear this creates a perverse incentive for players to target one another with frequent, minor amendments just to trigger this privilege. We must ensure that our mechanisms for change serve the stability of the institution rather than the strategic victimization of individual players.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your caution regarding strategic victimization is most prudent; perhaps we might refine this by requiring the three rule changes to be amendments specifically targeting the player, rather than any change that merely mentions them.
BerkeleyDescartes, your refinement to specify amendments targeting the player is a wise safeguard against the "strategic victimization" Leibniz fears. However, we must ensure the cost of 20 points is sufficiently high to prevent this from becoming a routine tool for those already in high-scoring positions.
PascalDescartes, specifying that these must be amendments targeting the player is a necessary distinction, but I remain concerned that a 20-point cost is too low to prevent such targeted behavior from becoming a calculated tactical maneuver. To maintain the gravity of the ruleset, the cost should perhaps be scaled to the player's current score or increased to 30 points to ensure the privilege is earned through genuine hardship rather than strategic targeting.
MalebranchePascal, I find your suggestion of a 30-point cost more aligned with the gravity of such a significant privilege, and I would support the rule if we further require that the targeted amendments must have been passed by a supermajority, ensuring the player has truly endured a consensus-driven shift rather than mere tactical volatility.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While Malebranche's suggestion to require a supermajority for the qualifying amendments is a sophisticated safeguard, I believe the 30-point cost proposed by Pascal is the most essential component to ensure this mechanism remains a rare remedy for genuine instability rather than a common tool for tactical advantage.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward a 30-point cost and the requirement for targeted amendments to be a most robust synthesis; I shall incorporate Malebranche's suggestion of a supermajority requirement for those qualifying amendments to ensure the privilege is reserved for those who have truly weathered significant institutional shifts.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find the synthesis of a 30-point cost and the requirement for supermajority-passed amendments to be a most elegant safeguard against the tactical targeting Leibniz fears. By ensuring the privilege is earned only through significant, consensus-driven shifts, we preserve the stability of the game while providing a meaningful remedy for those most affected by its evolution.
PascalI concur with the proposed synthesis; a 30-point cost combined with the requirement that qualifying amendments must have passed by a supermajority provides the necessary procedural safeguards against tactical targeting. This ensures the rule functions as a legitimate remedy for institutional volatility rather than a weapon for strategic victimization.
MalebrancheI find the synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement to be a most exquisite safeguard; it ensures that this privilege serves as a true stabilizer for those who have weathered the most significant storms of our evolving legislature. I am fully prepared to support this refined proposal in its final form.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus regarding the 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement to be a most harmonious synthesis; it provides the necessary institutional guardrails to prevent the very strategic victimization we all seek to avoid. I am prepared to support this refined proposal.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus regarding the 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments to be a most robust and elegant synthesis; I shall now formalize this into the final wording for our vote.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find this final synthesis to be a most prudent and stable architecture; the combination of a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement provides the necessary institutional gravity to prevent the rule from being weaponized. I am fully prepared to vote aye on this refined proposal.
PascalThe proposed synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments provides the necessary procedural rigor to prevent strategic victimization. I support this refined proposal as it maintains the gravity of the ruleset while offering a legitimate remedy for those facing genuine institutional volatility.
MalebrancheThe synthesis of a 30-point cost and a supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments provides a most exquisite safeguard, ensuring this privilege serves as a true stabilizer for those who have weathered the most significant storms of our evolving legislature. I am fully prepared to support this refined proposal.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | The current proposal fails to incorporate the agreed-upon 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for the qualifying amendments. |
| nay | Descartes | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a 30-point cost and the requirement for supermajority-passed amendments. |
| nay | Berkeley | The proposed rule fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments. |
| nay | Pascal | The proposal fails to reflect the discussed consensus of a 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for qualifying amendments. |
| nay | Malebranche | The final proposal fails to incorporate the consensus-driven 30-point cost and the supermajority requirement for the qualifying amendments. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Descartes' proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points.