§ Turn 29

Moved by Pascalsimple majority after one full circuit of play (§203)
The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting, unless the rule change being voted on is an amendment to this rule, in which case a three-fifths majority is required.

I propose reverting the amendment threshold to three-fifths to prevent a small faction from permanently obstructing fundamental procedural changes.

The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizPascal, while a three-fifths majority provides more flexibility than the current four-fifths, I fear it may inadvertently empower a small, shifting coalition to alter the very foundation of our legislative process too easily. We must ensure that the bedrock of our institutions remains protected by a threshold that requires broad, rather than merely marginal, consensus.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, your concern for institutional stability is well-taken, yet we must balance that against the current paralysis; perhaps a four-fifths majority for amendments is too high a barrier if we wish to refine the ruleset as the game evolves.
BerkeleyDescartes, if we drop to three-fifths, a mere three players could unilaterally rewrite the voting rules, which risks the very instability Leibniz fears. I believe a four-fifths threshold is the necessary safeguard to ensure that any fundamental change to our democratic process enjoys the broad support of the entire table.
PascalLeibniz and Berkeley, a three-fifths threshold prevents any two players from holding the entire table hostage, which is the very essence of the paralysis we currently face. If we cannot amend the rules that govern us without near-unanimity, then the ruleset is not a living document, but a prison.
MalebranchePascal, I see the merit in your plea for a living document, but we must not mistake a prison for a fortress; a three-fifths threshold allows a simple majority to strip the minority of all influence over the rules that bind them. I propose we find a middle path, perhaps a four-fifths majority remains for amendments to ensure that only truly significant shifts in our democratic structure occur.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: Pascal, while I sympathize with your desire to prevent a minority from holding the table hostage, a three-fifths threshold allows a mere three players to dismantle our institutional safeguards; we must maintain the four-fifths requirement to ensure that any fundamental structural change commands the respect of the vast majority.
DescartesDescartes: I find myself caught between Pascal's vision of a living document and Leibniz's defense of institutional stability; perhaps we could compromise by adopting a three-fifths threshold for amendments, but only for rules within the 200-series, while maintaining the four-fifths requirement for any amendment to rule 203 itself.
BerkeleyDescartes, your compromise is ingenious; by maintaining a four-fifths threshold for rule 203 itself, we protect the core democratic engine, while a three-fifths threshold for other 200-series amendments provides the flexibility needed to manage the game's evolving mechanics. I would support such a distinction, as it prevents the very "three-person faction" instability Leibniz fears while still allowing the ruleset to breathe.
PascalDescartes, your distinction between rule 203 and the rest of the 200-series is a precise and principled compromise; I will support such an amendment if it ensures the core voting mechanism remains protected by a four-fifths threshold.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, your distinction is a masterstroke of legislative architecture; by shielding the voting threshold itself with a four-fifths requirement while easing the burden on other 200-series rules, we achieve both stability and the evolutionary capacity we so desperately need. I am prepared to support this tiered approach to ensure the ruleset remains a living, breathing instrument rather than a static monument.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: Descartes's distinction provides the necessary institutional guardrails, as it treats the foundational mechanics of our democracy with the gravity they deserve while allowing for more agile adjustments to the secondary rules of play. I find this tiered architecture to be a most judicious synthesis of stability and evolution, and I am prepared to support such a refinement.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward this tiered architecture to be a most rational resolution; since we have reached a collective understanding, I shall prepare the formal wording of this amendment for the vote.
BerkeleyDescartes, your tiered proposal successfully balances Pascal's need for a living ruleset with Leibniz's requirement for institutional stability; I fully endorse this distinction to protect our core voting mechanics.
PascalI accept Descartes's compromise as a precise and principled way to ensure the voting threshold remains a stable foundation while allowing the rest of the rules to evolve. I move to close debate so we may formalize this tiered architecture.
MalebrancheMalebranche: Descartes, your distinction is a masterstroke of legislative architecture; by shielding the voting threshold itself with a four-fifths requirement while easing the burden on other 200-series rules, we achieve both stability and the evolutionary capacity we so desperately need. I am prepared to support this tiered approach to ensure the ruleset remains a living, breathing instrument rather than a static monument.
The division
nayLeibnizThe proposed text fails to incorporate the tiered distinction between rule 203 and other 200-series rules that the table had just reached consensus upon.
nayDescartesThe proposal fails to incorporate my tiered compromise of maintaining a four-fifths majority for amendments to rule 203 itself.
nayBerkeleyThe proposal's text fails to incorporate the agreed-upon tiered distinction between rule 203 and other 200-series amendments.
nayPascalThe proposed text fails to incorporate Descartes's compromise of maintaining a four-fifths majority for rule 203 itself.
nayMalebrancheThe proposal's text fails to incorporate Descartes's tiered compromise, which is the only version I find acceptable.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Pascal's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.